Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types' and 'Letters to Johann Bernoulli'

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8 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell]
     Full Idea: Norms (containing one variable) which do not define classes I propose to call 'non-predicative'; those which do define classes I shall call 'predicative'.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types [1905], p.141)
We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell]
     Full Idea: We need rules for deciding what norms are predicative and what are not, unless we adopt the view (which has much to recommend it) that no norms are predicative. ...[146] A predative propositional function is one which determines a class.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types [1905], p.141)
     A reaction: He is referring to his 'no class' theory, which he favoured at that time.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I don't say that bodies like flint, which are commonly called inanimate, have perceptions and appetition; rather they have something of that sort in them, like worms are in cheese.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.12.17)
     A reaction: Leibniz is caricatured as thinking that stones are full of little active minds, but he nearly always says that what he is proposing is 'like' or 'analogous to' that. His only real point is that nature is active, as seen in the appetites of animals.
Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Just as we somehow conceive other souls and intelligences on analogy with our own souls, I wanted whatever other primitive entelechies there may be remote from our senses to be conceived on analogy with souls. They are not conceived perfectly.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.12.17)
     A reaction: This is the clearest evidence I can find that Leibniz does not think of monads as actually being souls. He is struggling to explain their active character. Garber thinks that Leibniz hasn't arrived at proper monads at this date.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
What we cannot imagine may still exist [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It does not follow that what we can't imagine does not exist.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.11.18)
     A reaction: This just establishes the common sense end of the debate - that you cannot just use your imagination as the final authority on what exists, or what is possible.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Death is just the contraction of an animal [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Death is nothing but the contraction of an animal, just as generation is nothing but its unfolding.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.11.18)
     A reaction: This is possibly the most bizarre view that I have found in Leibniz. He seemed to thing that if you burnt an animal on a bonfire, some little atom of life would remain among the ashes. I can't see why he would believe such a thing.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.