21547
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On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell]
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Full Idea:
To my contention that, on his principles, 'the existent round square' exists, Meinong replies that it is existent but does not exist. I must confess that I see no difference between existing and being existent, and I have no more to say on this head.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Uber die Stellung...' [1907], p.93)
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A reaction:
Russell is obviously invoking the famously dubious ontological argument for God's existence. Normally impossible objects are rejected because of contradictions, but there might also be category mistakes. 'The slow square'.
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17555
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'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas]
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Full Idea:
There are two sorts of one. There is the one which is convertible with being, which adds nothing to being except being undivided; and this deprives of multitude. Then there is the principle of number, which to the notion of being adds measurement.
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From:
Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de Potentia Dei [1269], q3 a16 ad 3-um)
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A reaction:
[From a lecture handout] I'm not sure I understand this. We might say, I suppose, that insofar as water is water, it is all one, but you can't count it. Perhaps being 'unified' and being a 'unity' are different?
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