18767
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Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA]
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Full Idea:
Free logics say 1) singular terms are allowed that do not designate anything that exists; sometimes 2) is added: the domain of discourse is allowed to be empty. Logics with both conditions are called 'universally free logics'.
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From:
C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.3)
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A reaction:
I really like the sound of this, and aim to investigate it. Karel Lambert's writings are the starting point. Maybe the domain of logic is our concepts, rather than things in the world, in which case free logic sounds fine.
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18771
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Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA]
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Full Idea:
Ontological quantifiers might just as well range over all the entities needed for the semantics. ...The minimal way would be to just stop calling '∃' an 'existential quantifier', and always read it as 'there is...' rather than 'there exists...'.
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From:
C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6)
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A reaction:
There is no right answer here, but it seems to be the strategy adopted by most logicians, and the majority of modern metaphysicians. They just allow abstracta, and even fictions, to 'exist', while not being fussy what it means. Big mistake!
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18768
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We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]
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Full Idea:
Parmenides was correct - one cannot speak of that which is not, even to say that it is not. But one can speak of concepts and say of them that they do not correspond to anything real.
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From:
C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.5)
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A reaction:
[This summarises Alonso Church, who was developing Frege] This sounds like the right thing to say about non-existence, but then the same principle must apply to assertions of existence, which will also be about concepts and not things.
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18765
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Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA]
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Full Idea:
The medieval philosophers and then Leibniz were keen on finding 'principles of individuation', and the idea appears again in Frege, to be taken up in some respects by Wittgenstein.
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From:
C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.6)
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A reaction:
I take a rather empirical approach to this supposed problem, and suggest we break 'individuation' down into its component parts, and then just drop the word. Discussions of principles of individuations strike me as muddled. Wiggins and Lowe today.
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18764
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The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA]
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Full Idea:
In the Identity of Indiscernibles, one speaks about properties, and the notion of a property is by no means clearly fixed and formalized in modern symbolic logic.
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From:
C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.5)
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A reaction:
The unclarity of 'property' is a bee in my philosophical bonnet, in speech, and in metaphysics, as well as in logic. It may well be the central problem in our attempts to understand the world in general terms. He cites intensional logic as promising.
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23681
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The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid]
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Full Idea:
That the first motion, or the first effect, whatever it be, cannot be produced necessarily, and, consequently, that the First Cause must be a free agent, has been demonstrated clearly and unanswerably.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 8)
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A reaction:
He has said that the First Cause can only be conceived by us as an 'agent'. If there is an agential First Cause, then he must be right. It is this need for God to be free which makes scepticism about free will unacceptable to many.
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23680
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We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
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Full Idea:
I believe in moral liberty first because we have a natural conviction of belief that in many cases we act freely, second because we are accountable, and third because we can prosecute an end by a long series of means adapted.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5)
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A reaction:
This is his final summary of why he believes in free will. Why didn't Plato and Aristotle have this natural belief? He could only believe we are 'accountable' because he believes in free will. Ants and bees pursue lengthy projects. Hm.
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23679
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The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid]
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Full Idea:
The law of nature respecting matter is grounded upon this principle: That matter is an inert, inactive substance, which does not act, but is acted upon.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5)
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A reaction:
A clear statement (alongside Euler's) of the 18th century view, still with us, but strikes me as entirely wrong. Their view needs the active power of God to drive the laws. Matter has intrinsic primitive powers, and laws describe patterns of behaviour.
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