37 ideas
11159 | My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: My assimilation of essence to definition ...may not provide us with an analysis of the concept, but it does provide us with a good model of how the concept works. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 3) | |
A reaction: An example of the modern shift in analytic philosophy, away from the dream of given a complete analysis of a concept, towards giving an account of the concepts relationships. Compare Shoemaker in Idea 8559. |
11157 | Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: In modern analytic philosophy we find that, as a result of sustained empiricist critique, the idea of real definition has been more or less given up (unless it be taken to be vestigially present in the notion of a sortal). | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 3) | |
A reaction: The account of essences as falling under sortals (roughly, categorising terms) is associated with David Wiggins. Kit Fine is in the business of reviving Aristotelian real definitions, as are fans of scientific essentialism (see under 'Nature'). |
11171 | Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There is an analogy between defining a term and giving the essence of an object. ..However, I am inclined to think that the two cases are not merely parallel but are, at bottom, the same. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p.13) | |
A reaction: The proposal is something like the meaning of a concept being the essence of the concept. And essence is definition. The parallel is that they both lead to necessities, either derived from objects or from concepts. Sounds good to me. |
20457 | Zeno assumes collecting an infinity of things makes an infinite thing [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: One possible answer is that Zeno is wrong because it is not true that by accumulating an infinite number of things one ends up with an infinite thing. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 01) | |
A reaction: I do love it when deep and complex ideas are expressed with perfect simplicity. As long as the simple version is correct. |
20468 | Quantum mechanics deals with processes, rather than with things [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: Quantum mechanics teaches us not to think about the world in terms of 'things' which are in this or that state, but in terms of 'processes' instead. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) |
20467 | Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: The world of quantum mechanics is not a world of objects: it is a world of events. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
A reaction: I presume a philosopher is allowed to ask what an 'event' is. Since, as Rovelli tells it, time is eliminated from the picture, events seem to be unanalysable primitives. |
11151 | An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: One object depends upon another (in one sense of the term) if its essence prevents it from existing without the other object. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 2) | |
A reaction: I take the interest of this to be that essences are usually thought to be intrinsic, but this seems to involve the object in necessary external relations. |
11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Essence has been conceived either on the model of definition, involving the 'real' as opposed to 'nominal' definitions, or it is elucidated in modal terms, located in de re cases of modal attributions (an object being necessarily a certain way). | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Fine sets out to defend the definitional view, which derives from Aristotle, his line being that necessity depends on essence, and so cannot be used to define it. I think I agree. |
11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We have an informal way of saying an object essentially has a property, as 'the object must have the property if it is to be the object that it is', and this form of words manages to convey what we wish to convey. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 4) | |
A reaction: The importance of this claim is that it makes no mention of 'necessity'. Fine's view is plausible, but hard to evaluate once he has said. We seem to then divide an object's properties into identity properties, causal properties and peripheral properties. |
11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The simplest form of the modal account takes an object to have a property essentially just in case it is necessary that the object has the property. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 3) | |
A reaction: Fine wants to reverse the account, explaining necessities in terms of prior essences. |
11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: With the advent of quantified modal logic, philosophers have been in a better position to formulate essentialist claims. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 3) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of the role which logic plays in modern analytic philosophy. It is not an unreasonable assumption that we will understand a theoretical problem more clearly if we can articulate it more accurately. |
11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Far from viewing essence as a special case of metaphysical necessity, we should view metaphysical necessity as a special case of essence. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 9) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as one of the most powerful proposals in modern philosophy (even if it is a reiteration of Aristotle!). |
16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: If an essence is a sum of essential properties (had in all possible worlds where it exists), Fine points out that it seems grossly to overgenerate essential properties ('S is either a man or a mouse', or 'S is such that 2+2=4'). | |
From: report of Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? 6 | |
A reaction: To me this is the sort of mess you get into when you accept that 'being such that p' is a property. Defenders of the modal approach always have to eliminate 'trivial' properties from essences, but non-trivial is a defining feature of an essence. |
11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Can we not recognise a sense of 'what an object is', according to which it lies in the nature of a singleton to have Socrates as a member, even though it does not lie in the nature of Socrates to belong to the singleton? | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 5) | |
A reaction: Important and persuasive. It echoes the example in Idea 11162, that the necessary relation is not part of the essence. Socrates is necessarily in {Socrates}, but that is because of the set, not because of Socrates. Essences causes necessities. |
11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Necessarily any necessary truth will hold if Socrates exists. But it is no part of Socrates' essence that there be infinitely many prime numbers, ..or that objects like the Eiffel Tower have their own necessary essence. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 5-6) | |
A reaction: This and the 'singleton Socrates' example (Idea 11165) are the twin prongs of Fine's attack on the modal account of essentialism. I think they constitute one of the best single pages in the whole of recent philosophy. Bravo. |
10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
Full Idea: Fine's view is that the notion of an essential property of a thing should be bound up with the notion of what it is to be that thing (unlike, for example, Socrates being such that there are infinitely many primes). | |
From: report of Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994]) by Adolph Rami - Essential vs Accidental Properties §2 | |
A reaction: I would think that Fine is so obviously right that it was hardly worth saying, but philosophers are a funny lot, and are quite likely to claim that features of prime numbers are part of the essence of a long-dead philosopher. |
10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
Full Idea: According to Fine's definitional characterization of essential properties, they are those of an object's properties that are part of the object's 'definition'. | |
From: report of Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994]) by Adolph Rami - Essential vs Accidental Properties §2 | |
A reaction: This demands not just an account of what a definition is, but also the notion that there is only one fixed and correct definition (since the object presumably only has one essence) - but there seems to be something relative about a good definition. |
11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If there is nothing in the nature of Socrates which demands that he exists, then presumably there is nothing in the nature of Socrates which demands that his parents exist. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 6) | |
A reaction: This sounds conclusive to me, against any claim that Socrates necessarily had those parents, if the claim is based on the identity or esssence of Socrates. |
11166 | The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We naturally suppose, if a subject-predicate proposition is necessary, that the subject of the proposition is the source of the necessity. But that singleton 2 contains 2 is necessary, whether the number or the set is the subject of the proposition. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 9) | |
A reaction: A very nice addition to his general attack on the idea that essence should be accounted for in terms of his necessity. He asks a beautifully simple question: for each necessity that we accept, what is the source of that necessity? |
11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Conceptual (and logical) necessities can be taken to be the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all concepts (or just the logical concepts). | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 9-10) | |
A reaction: The idea that something might be true simply because of the nature of a concept sounds good, and a slightly better formulation than traditional accounts of analytic truth. |
11162 | Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is necessary that Socrates and the Eiffel Tower be distinct. But it is not essential to Socrates that he be distinct from the Tower, for there is nothing in his nature which connects him in any special way to it. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 5) | |
A reaction: I find this simple argument very persuasive in separating out necessary facts about an object from the essence of that object. |
11168 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The metaphysically necessary truths can be identified with the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatever. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 9) | |
A reaction: This is part of Fine's proposal that necessities are derived from the essences or natures of things, which view I find very congenial. |
11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Just as a necessary truth may be true in virtue of the identity of certain objects as opposed to others, so an analytic truth may be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms as opposed to others (such as 'bachelor' rather than 'unmarried'). | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p.10) | |
A reaction: This is a beautifully simple observation, that the necessity of 'bachelors are unmarried men' derives from part of the proposition, not from the whole of it. So what is it about the part that generates the apparent necessity? The nature of the concept! |
11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Strictly speaking it is irrelevant to the meaning of 'bachelor' that the phrase 'unmarried man' means what it does. | |
From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p.13) | |
A reaction: His point is that the necessary truth here derives from the meaning of 'bachelor', and not from the meaning of 'unmarried man'. But is also true that 'unmarried man' means 'bachelor' (for those familiar with the latter, but not the former). |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20469 | There are probably no infinities, and 'infinite' names what we do not yet know [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: 'Infinite', ultimately, is the name that we give to what we do not yet know. Nature appears to be telling us that there is nothing truly infinite. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 11) |
20461 | The basic ideas of fields and particles are merged in quantum mechanics [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: The notions of fields and particles, separated by Faraday and Maxwell, end up merging in quantum mechanics. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
A reaction: This sounds to me just like Anaximander's 'apeiron' - the unlimited [Rovelli agrees! p.168]. Anaximander predicted the wall which enquiry would hit, but we now have more detail. |
20462 | Because it is quantised, a field behaves like a set of packets of energy [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: Since the energy of the electromagnetic field can take on only certain values, the field behaves like a set of packets of energy. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) |
20463 | There are about fifteen particles fields, plus a few force fields [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: There are about fifteen fields, whose quanta are elementary particles (electrons, quarks, muons, neutrinos, Higgs, and little else), plus a few fields similar to the electromagnetic one, which describe forces at a nuclear scale, with quanta like photons. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
A reaction: According to Rovelli, this sentence describes the essence of physical reality. |
20464 | The world consists of quantum fields, with elementary events happening in spacetime [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: The world is not made up of fields and particles, but of a single type of entity: the quantum field. There are no longer particles which move in space with the passage of time, but quantum fields whose elementary events happen in spacetime. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
A reaction: If you are not a scientist, there is (I find) a strong tendency to read and digest stuff like this, and then forget it the next day, because it so far from our experience. Folk like me have to develop two parallel views of the nature of reality. |
20460 | Electrons are not waves, because their collisions are at a point, and not spread out [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: Schrödinger's wave is a bad image for an electron, because when a particle collides with something else, it is always at a point: it is never spread out in space like a wave. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04 note) | |
A reaction: And yet there is the diffusion in the two-slit experiment, which Thomas Young discovered for light. I must take Rovelli's word for this. |
20459 | Electrons only exist when they interact, and their being is their combination of quantum leaps [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: Electrons don't always exist. They exist when they interact. They materialize when they collide with something. The quantum leap from one orbit to another constitutes their way of being real. An electron is a combination of leaps between interactions. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
A reaction: If a philosopher with an Aristotelian interest in the nature of matter wants to grasp the modern view, the electron looks like the thing to focus on. You can feel Rovelli battling here to find formulations that might satisfy a philosopher. |
20466 | Quantum Theory describes events and possible interactions - not how things are [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: Quantum Theory does not describe things as they are: it describes how things occur and interact with each other. It doesn't describe where there is a particle but how it shows itself to others. The world of existence is reduced to possible interactions. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
A reaction: Fans of 'process philosophy' should like this, though he is not denying that there may be facts about how things are - it is just that this is not mentioned in the theory. There is not much point in philosophers yearning to know the reality. |
20465 | Nature has three aspects: granularity, indeterminacy, and relations [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: I think that quantum mechanics has revealed three aspects of the nature of things: granularity, indeterminacy, and the relational structure of the world. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) |
20458 | The world is just particles plus fields; space is the gravitational field [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: The world is made up of particles + fields, and nothing else; there is no need to add space as an extra ingredient. Newton's space is the gravitational field. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 03) | |
A reaction: I get the impression that particles are just bumps or waves in the fields [yes! Rovelli p.110], which would mean there are fields and nothing else. And no one seems to know what a field is. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
20470 | Only heat distinguishes past from future [Rovelli] |
Full Idea: It is always heat and only heat that distinguishes the past from the future. | |
From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 12) | |
A reaction: I can remember the past but not the future - so can that fact be reduced to facts about heat? |