8 ideas
8758 | We could talk of open sentences, instead of sets [Chihara, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Chihara's programme is to replace talk of sets with talk of open sentences. Instead of speaking of the set of all cats, we talk about the open sentence 'x is a cat'. | |
From: report of Charles Chihara (Constructibility and Mathematical Existence [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 9.2 | |
A reaction: As Shapiro points out, this is following up Russell's view that sets should be replaced with talk of properties. Chihara is expressing it more linguistically. I'm in favour of any attempt to get rid of sets. |
10265 | Chihara's system is a variant of type theory, from which he can translate sentences [Chihara, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Chihara's system is a version of type theory. Translate thus: replace variables of sets of type n with level n variables over open sentences, replace membership/predication with satisfaction, and high quantifiers with constructability quantifiers. | |
From: report of Charles Chihara (Constructibility and Mathematical Existence [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.4 |
8759 | We can replace type theory with open sentences and a constructibility quantifier [Chihara, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Chihara's system is similar to simple type theory; he replaces each type with variables over open sentences, replaces membership (or predication) with satisfaction, and replaces quantifiers over level 1+ variables with constructability quantifiers. | |
From: report of Charles Chihara (Constructibility and Mathematical Existence [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 9.2 | |
A reaction: This is interesting for showing that type theory may not be dead. The revival of supposedly dead theories is the bread-and-butter of modern philosophy. |
10264 | Introduce a constructibility quantifiers (Cx)Φ - 'it is possible to construct an x such that Φ' [Chihara, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Chihara has proposal a modal primitive, a 'constructability quantifier'. Syntactically it behaves like an ordinary quantifier: Φ is a formula, and x a variable. Then (Cx)Φ is a formula, read as 'it is possible to construct an x such that Φ'. | |
From: report of Charles Chihara (Constructibility and Mathematical Existence [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.4 | |
A reaction: We only think natural numbers are infinite because we see no barrier to continuing to count, i.e. to construct new numbers. We accept reals when we know how to construct them. Etc. Sounds promising to me (though not to Shapiro). |
9286 | Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James] |
Full Idea: Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and not a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, is best explained by their relations to one another, the relations being experiences. | |
From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], §3) | |
A reaction: This view has suddenly caught people's interest. It might be better than the higher/lower relationship, which seems to leave the basic problem untouched. Does a whole network of relations between experiences gradually 'add up' to consciousness? |
9285 | 'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James] |
Full Idea: 'Consciousness' is the name of a nonentity. ..Those who cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumour left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy. ..I deny that it stands for an entity, but it does stand for a function. | |
From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], Intro) | |
A reaction: This kind of view is often treated as being preposterous, but I think it is correct. No one is denying the phenomenology, but it is the ontology which is at stake. Either you are a substance dualist, or mind must be eliminated as an 'entity'. |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |