17263
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Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
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Full Idea:
What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts.
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From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2)
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A reaction:
A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational!
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14212
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A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
A consistent theory is, by definition, one satisfied by some model; an isomorphic image of a model satisfies the same theories as the original model; to provide the making of an isomorphic image of any given model, a domain need only be large enough.
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Model')
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A reaction:
This is laying out the ground for Putnam's model theory argument in favour of anti-realism. If you are chasing the one true model of reality, then formal model theory doesn't seem to offer much encouragement.
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17270
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Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
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Full Idea:
We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims.
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From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3)
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A reaction:
I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole).
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14213
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Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
Anti-realists say the only world is imaginary, or only has the parts or classes or relations we divide it into, or doubt that reference to the world is possible, or doubt that our interpretations can achieve truth.
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Anti-R')
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A reaction:
[compression of a paragraph on anti-realism] Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. A nice example of the rhetorical device of ridiculing an opponent by suggesting that they don't even know what they themselves believe.
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17267
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The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
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Full Idea:
There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are.
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From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3)
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A reaction:
If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term.
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14210
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A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints of nature.
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Might')
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A reaction:
In that case they do, but if there are no atoms at the root of physics then presumably their could also be thoroughly jointless assemblages, involving probability distributions etc. Even random scattered atoms seem rather short of joints.
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14209
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Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families].
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc')
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A reaction:
(The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference.
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