17 ideas
| 12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: There are practically no defensible examples of definitions; for all the examples we've got, practically all the words (/concepts) are undefinable. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: I don't think a definition has to be defined all the way down. Aristotle is perfectly happy if you can get a concept you don't understand down to concepts you do. Understanding is the test, not further definitions. |
| 13831 | Logic is based on transitions between sentences [Prawitz] |
| Full Idea: I agree entirely with Dummett that the right way to answer the question 'what is logic?' is to consider transitions between sentences. | |
| From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], §04) | |
| A reaction: I always protest at this point that reliance on sentences is speciesism against animals, who are thereby debarred from reasoning. See the wonderful Idea 1875 of Chrysippus. Hacking's basic suggestion seems right. Transition between thoughts. |
| 13825 | Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz] |
| Full Idea: With Gentzen's natural deduction, we may say that the introductions represent, as it were, the 'definitions' of the logical constants. The introductions are not literally understood as 'definitions'. | |
| From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], 2.2.2) | |
| A reaction: [Hacking, in 'What is Logic? §9' says Gentzen had the idea that his rules actually define the constants; not sure if Prawitz and Hacking are disagreeing] |
| 13823 | In natural deduction, inferences are atomic steps involving just one logical constant [Prawitz] |
| Full Idea: In Gentzen's natural deduction, the inferences are broken down into atomic steps in such a way that each step involves only one logical constant. The steps are the introduction or elimination of the logical constants. | |
| From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], 1.1) |
| 12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: People say 'exist' is ambiguous, because of the difference between 'chairs exist' and 'numbers exist'. A reply goes: the difference between the existence of chairs and the existence of numbers is strikingly like the difference between chairs and numbers. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: To say 'numbers are objects which exist' is, to me, either a funny use of 'exist' or a funny use of 'object'. I think I will now vote for the latter. Just as 'real number' was a funny use of 'number', but we seem to have got used to it. |
| 12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Using dispositional analyses in aid of ontological reductions is what empiricism taught us. If you are down on cats, reduce them to permanent possibilities of sensation; if you are down on electrons, reduce them to possibilities of experimental outcome. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: The cats line is phenomenalism; the electrons line is instrumentalism. I like this as a serious warning about dispositions, even where they seem most plausible, as in the disposition of glass to break when struck. Why is it thus disposed? |
| 12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The essential problem is to explain how thinking manages reliably to preserve truth; and Associationism, as Kant rightly pointed out to Hume, hasn't the resources to do so. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: One might be able to give an associationist account of truth-preservation if one became a bit more externalist about it, so that the normal association patterns track their connections with the external world. |
| 12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The idea that there are mental representations is the idea that there are Ideas minus the idea that Ideas are images. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: Good for you, Fodor. I've always thought that the vociferous contempt with which modern philosphers refer to the old notion of 'Ideas' was grossly exaggerated. At last someone puts a clear finger on what seems to be the difficulty. |
| 6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Fodor has recently changed his mind about the innateness of concepts, which he formerly championed. | |
| From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.7 n25 | |
| A reaction: There is some sensible middle road to be charted here. We presumably do not have an innate idea of a screwdriver, but there are plenty of basic concepts in logic and perception that are plausibly thought of as innate. |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Nothing in any mental life could be the concept CAT unless it is satisfied by cats. If you haven't got a concept that applies to cats, that entails that you haven't got the CAT concept. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Of course, having a concept that applies to cats doesn't entail that you have the CAT concept. Quine's 'gavagai', for example. I think Fodor is right in this idea. |
| 12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: I argue for a very strong version of psychological atomism; one according to which what concepts you have is conceptually and metaphysically independent of what epistemic capacities you have. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This is a frontal assault on the tradition of Frege, Dummett and Peacocke. I immediately find Fodor's approach more congenial, because he wants to say what a concept IS, rather than just place it within some larger scheme of things. |
| 12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The definition theory says that concepts are complex structures which entail their constituents. By saying this, it guarantees both the connection between content and necessity, and the connection between concept individuation and concept possession. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: He cites Pinker as a spokesman for the definitional view. This is the view Fodor attacks, in favour of his atomistic account. He adds in a note that his view also offered to reduce conceptual truth to logical truth. |
| 12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Many concepts have no prototypes; and there are many complex concepts whose prototypes aren't related to the prototypes of their constituents in the way compositional explanation of productivity and systematicity requires. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: His favourite example of the latter is 'pet fish', where the prototype of 'pet' is hardly ever a fish, and the prototype of 'fish' is usually much bigger than goldfish. Fodor is arguing that concepts are atomic. |
| 12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If the theory theory has a distinctive and coherent answer to the 'What's a concept?' question on offer, it's a well-kept secret. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: Not an argument, but worth recording as an attitude. I certainly agree that accounts which offer some sort of answer to 'What is a concept?' have an immediate head's start on those which don't. |
| 12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: English has no semantics. Learning English isn't learning a theory about what its sentences mean, it's learning how to associate its sentences with the corresponding thoughts. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This sounds remarkably close to John Locke's account of language (which I always thought was seriously underrated). Presumably we can then say that the 'thought' (or Locke's 'idea') is the meaning, which is old-fashioned real meanings. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |