12 ideas
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
Full Idea: Maybe a sentence is not a candidate for truth until it is used to make a statement. | |
From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6) |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
Full Idea: Our beliefs must claim a correspondence with facts, and then the verbal expression of the belief must correspond to the belief itself. | |
From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.4) |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
Full Idea: The Semantic Theory of truth requires that sentences are truth-bearers (rather than statements, or propositions). | |
From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6) |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
Full Idea: We do not seem to have any use in ordinary discourse for phrases like 'true in English', 'false in German'. | |
From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], II.1) |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
Full Idea: If sentences can have truth-values only when they occur as asserted, it would be impossible to have a truth-functional basis to logic. | |
From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6) |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
Full Idea: The standard cases of events are physical changes which happen sufficiently fast to be observed as changes, and which are of sufficient interest to us to be noticed or commented on. | |
From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.7) |
12695 | Epicurean atomists say body is sensible, to distinguish it from space. [Garber] |
Full Idea: The Epicurean atomists also defined body in terms of the property of being sensible, in order to distinguish it from empty space, which is not sensible. | |
From: Daniel Garber (Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad [2009], 1) | |
A reaction: This is a very illuminating bit of background, for those of us who have the knee-jerk reaction that monadology is barking mad. |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
Full Idea: Without language we would be restricted to particular beliefs about the here and now. | |
From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.8) |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
Full Idea: It is only when beliefs are given some symbolic expression that they acquire the precision and stability that enables us to entertain them. | |
From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.5) |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
12705 | Epicurean atoms are distinguished by their extreme hardness [Garber] |
Full Idea: In Epicurean atomism (of Cordemoy, for example) there is a world of basic things distinguished by virtue of their extreme hardness. | |
From: Daniel Garber (Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: Garber says that Leibniz espouses 'substantial atomism', which is different from this. Leibniz's atoms have active power, where these atoms just embody total resistance. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |