20 ideas
10807 | Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis] |
Full Idea: It is generally accepted that mathematics reduces to set theory, and I argue that set theory in turn reduces, with some aid of mereology, to the theory of the singleton function. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.03) |
10809 | We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis] |
Full Idea: In my usage of 'class', there is no such things as the null class. I don't mind calling some memberless thing - some individual - the null set. But that doesn't make it a memberless class. Rather, that makes it a 'set' that is not a class. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.05) | |
A reaction: Lewis calls this usage 'idiosyncratic', but it strikes me as excellent. Set theorists can have their vital null class, and sensible people can be left to say, with Lewis, that classes of things must have members. |
10811 | The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The null set serves two useful purposes. It is a denotation of last resort for class abstracts that denote no nonempty class. And it is an individual of last resort: we can count on its existence, and fearlessly build the hierarchy of sets from it. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.09) | |
A reaction: This passage assuages my major reservation about the existence of the null set, but at the expense of confirming that it must be taken as an entirely fictional entity. |
10812 | The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Should we accept the null set as a most extraordinary individual, a little speck of sheer nothingness, a sort of black hole in the fabric of Reality itself? Not that either, I think. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.09) | |
A reaction: Correct! |
10813 | What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A new student of set theory has just one thing, the element, and he has another single thing, the singleton, and not the slightest guidance about what one thing has to do with the other. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.12) |
10814 | Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.13) |
10806 | Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification, as advocated by George Boolos, to the language of mereology. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.03) |
10816 | We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis] |
Full Idea: We can simulate quantification over relations using megethology. Roughly, a quantifier over relations is a plural quantifier over things that encode ordered pairs by mereological means. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.18) | |
A reaction: [He credits this idea to Burgess and Haven] The point is to avoid second-order logic, which quantifies over relations as ordered n-tuple sets. |
4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
Full Idea: The Lottery Paradox says that for 100 tickets and one winner, each ticket has a .99 likelihood of defeat, so they are all likely to lose, so there is unlikely to be a winner. | |
From: report of Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §5) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The problem seems to be viewing each ticket in isolation. If I buy two tickets, I increase my chances of winning. |
10808 | Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis] |
Full Idea: We can take the theory of singleton functions, and hence set theory, and hence mathematics, to consist of generalisations about all singleton functions. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.03) | |
A reaction: At first glance this sounds like a fancy version of the somewhat discredited Greek idea that mathematics is built on the concept of a 'unit'. |
10815 | We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis] |
Full Idea: We needn't believe in 'abstract structures' to have general structural truths about all successor functions. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.16) |
10810 | I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I accept the principle of Unrestricted Composition: whenever there are some things, no matter how many or how unrelated or how disparate in character they may be, they have a mereological fusion. ...The trout-turkey is part fish and part fowl. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.07) | |
A reaction: This nicely ducks the question of when things form natural wholes and when they don't, but I would have thought that that might be one of the central issues of metaphysicals, so I think I'll give Lewis's principle a miss. |
4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], Intro) | |
A reaction: I don't see why there shouldn't be a phenomenalist, anti-realist version of externalism, which just has 'starting points' instead of a serious commitment to foundations. |
4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The fundamental question that must be answered by any acceptable version of foundationalism is: how are basic beliefs possible? | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §I) | |
A reaction: This question seems to be asking for a justification for basic beliefs, which smacks of 'Who made God?' Look, basic beliefs are just basic, right? |
4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The central argument for foundationalism is simply that all other possible outcomes of the regress of justifications lead inexorably to scepticism. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §I) | |
A reaction: If you prefer coherence to foundations, you need the security of reason to assess the coherence (which seems to be an internal foundation!). |
4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The most extreme version of externalism would be one that held that the external condition required for justification is simply the truth of the belief in question. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §II) | |
A reaction: The question is, why should we demand any more than this? The problem case is, traditionally, the lucky guess, but naturalist may say that these just don't occur with any regularity. We only get beliefs right because they are true. |
4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: External or objective reliability is not enough to offset subjective irrationality (such as unexplained clairvoyance). | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §IV) | |
A reaction: A good argument. Where do animals fit into this? If your clairvoyance kept working, in the end you might concede that you 'knew', even though you were baffled about how you managed it. |
4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: It may be that where there are no positive grounds for a charge of irrationality, the acceptance of a belief with only external justification is still subjectively irrational in a sense that rules out its being epistemologically justified. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §IV) | |
A reaction: A key objection. Surely rational behaviour requires a judgement to be made before a belief is accepted? If you are consistently clairvoyant, you must ask why. |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |