37 ideas
10455 | Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach] |
Full Idea: Unlike standard first-order logic, free logic can allow empty names, but still has to deny existence by either representing it as a predicate, or invoke some dubious distinction such as between existence and being. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1) |
10454 | In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach] |
Full Idea: In standard logic we can't straightforwardly say that n exists. We have to resort to using a formula like '∃x(x=n)', but we can't deny n's existence by negating that formula, because standard first-order logic disallows empty names. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1) |
10453 | In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach] |
Full Idea: In standard first-order logic the role of proper names is played by individual constants. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1) |
10452 | Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach] |
Full Idea: Like it or not, proper names have non-referential uses, including not only attributive but even predicate uses. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1) | |
A reaction: 'He's a right little Hitler'. 'You're doing a George Bush again'. 'Try to live up to the name of Churchill'. |
10456 | Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach] |
Full Idea: The familiar problems with the Millian view of names are the problem of positive and negative existential statements, empty names, identity sentences, and propositional attitude ascription. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1) | |
A reaction: I take this combination of problems to make an overwhelming case against the daft idea that the semantics of a name amounts to the actual object it picks out. It is a category mistake to attempt to insert a person into a sentence. |
10440 | An object can be described without being referred to [Bach] |
Full Idea: An object can be described without being referred to. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear how this is possible for a well-known object, though it is clearly possible for a speculative object, such as a gadget I would like to buy. In the former case reference seems to occur even if the speaker is trying to avoid it. |
10444 | Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach] |
Full Idea: If Russell is, as I believe, basically right, then definite descriptions are the paradigm of singular terms that can be used to refer but are not linguistically (semantically) referential. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1 s5) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that we can decide what is 'semantically referential'. Most of the things we refer to don't have names. We don't then 'use' definite descriptions (I'm thinking) - they actually DO the job. If we use them, we can 'use' names too? |
4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: There is a 'moderate' nominalism (found in G.F.Stout, for example) which says that properties and relations do exist, but that they are particulars rather than universals. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.504) | |
A reaction: Both this view and the 'mereological' view seem to be ducking the problem. If you have two red particulars and a green one, how do we manage to spot the odd one out? |
4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The view that properties exist, but are particulars rather than universals, is still left with the problem of classification. On what basis do we declare that different things have the same property? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.504) | |
A reaction: This seems like a fairly crucial objection. The original problem was how we manage to classify things (group them into sets), and it looks as if this theory leaves the problem untouched. |
4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Should we decide what universals exist a priori (probably on semantic grounds, identifying them with the meanings of general words), or a posteriori (looking to our best general theories about nature to give revisable conjectures about universals)? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.505) | |
A reaction: Nice question for a realist. Although the problem is first perceived in the use of language, if we think universals are a real feature of nature, we should pursue them scientifically, say I. |
4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: There are some who claim that there can be uninstantiated universals, which are not exemplified by any particular, past, present or future; this would certainly imply that those universals have a Platonic transcendent existence outside time and space. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.504) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is potentially circular or defeasible, because one can deny the universal simply because there is no particular. |
4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It is difficult for Resemblance Nominalists to construct their interconnected classes in practice. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: Given the complexity of the world this is hardly surprising, but it doesn't seem insuperable for the theory. It is hard to decide whether an object is white, or hot, whatever your theory of universals. |
4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Resemblance Nominalists say that to have a property is to be a member of a class which is part of a network of resemblance relations with other classes of particulars. ..'Resemblance' is taken to be a primitive notion, though one that admits of degrees. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: Intuition suggests that this proposal has good prospects, as properties are neither identical, nor just particulars, but have a lot in common, which 'resemblance' captures. Hume saw resemblance as a 'primitive' process. |
4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: For a Predicate Nominalist different things have the same property, or belong to the same kind, if the same predicates applies to, or is 'true of', the different things. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: This immediately strikes me as unlikely, because I think the action is at the proposition level, not the sentence level. And why do some predicates seem to be synonymous? |
4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The standard objections to Predicate and Concept Nominalism are that some properties have no predicates or concepts, and that predicates and concepts seem to be types rather than particulars, and it is types the theory is seeking to analyse. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: The claim that some properties have no concepts is devastating if true, but may not be. The regress problem is likely to occur in any explanation of universals, I suspect. |
4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Concept Nominalism says different things have the same property, or belong to the same kind, if the same concept in the mind is applied to different things. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: This is more appealing than Predicate Nominalism, and may be right. Our perception of the 'properties' of a thing may be entirely dictated by human interests, not by nature. |
4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Class Nominalism can be defended (by Quinton) against the problem of random sets (with nothing in common), by giving an account of properties in terms of 'natural' classes, where 'natural' comes in degrees, but is fundamental and unanalysable. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: This still seems to beg the question, because you still have to decide whether two things have anything 'naturally' in common before you assign them to a set. |
4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Class Nominalists substitute classes or sets for properties or kinds, so that being white is just being a member of the set of white things; relations are treated as ordered sets. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: This immediately seems wrong, because it invites the question of why something is a member of a set (unless membership is arbitrary and whimsical - which it usually isn't). |
4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Class Nominalism cannot explain co-extensive properties (which qualify the same things), and also a random (non-natural) set has particulars with nothing in common, thus failing to capture an essential feature of a general property. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: These objections strike me as conclusive, since we can assign things to a set quite arbitrarily, so membership of a set may signify no shared property at all (except, say, 'owned by me', which is hardly a property). |
4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Mereological Nominalism views a property as the omnitemporal whole or aggregate of all the things said to have the property, so whiteness is a huge white object whose parts are all the white things. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: A charming proposal, in which bizarre and beautiful unities thread themselves across the universe, but white objects may also be soft and warm. |
4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Mereological Nominalism has some plausibility for a case like whiteness, but breaks down completely for other universals, such as squareness. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: A delightful request that you attempt a hopeless feat of imagination, by seeing all squares as parts of one supreme square. A nice objection. |
10447 | We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach] |
Full Idea: If fictional entities, such as characters in a play, are real, albeit abstract entities, then we can genuinely refer to them. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Nathan Salmon 1998] Personally I would prefer to say that abstract entities are fictions. Fictional characters have uncertain identity conditions. Do they all have a pancreas, if this is never mentioned? |
10443 | You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach] |
Full Idea: If you say 'a special person is coming to visit', you are not referring to but merely 'alluding to' that individual. This does not count as referring because you are not expressing a singular proposition about it. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1 s2) | |
A reaction: If you add 'I hope he doesn't wear his red suit, but I hope he plays his tuba', you seem to be expressing singular propositions about the person. Bach seems to want a very strict notion of reference, as really attaching listeners to individuals. |
10446 | Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach] |
Full Idea: We must distinguish 'reference' in a fiction from reference outside the fiction to fictional entities. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1) | |
A reaction: This may be more semantically than ontologically significant. It is perhaps best explicated by Coleridge's distinction over whether or not I am 'suspending my disbelief' when I am discussing a character. |
10439 | What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach] |
Full Idea: Philosophers agree that some expressions refer, but disagree over which ones. Few include indefinite descriptions, but some include definite descriptions, or only demonstrative descriptions. Some like proper names, some only indexicals and demonstratives. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: My initial prejudice is rather Strawsonian - that people refer, not language, and it can be done in all sorts of ways. But Bach argues well that only language intrinsically does it. Even pointing fails without linguistic support. |
10441 | If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach] |
Full Idea: We can refer to things which change over time, which suggests that in thinking of and in referring to an individual we are not constrained to represent it as that which has certain properties. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1) | |
A reaction: This seems a good argument against the descriptive theory of reference which is not (I think) in Kripke. Problems like vagueness and the Ship of Theseus rear their heads. |
10442 | We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach] |
Full Idea: Being able to think of an individual does not require being able to identify that individual by means of a uniquely characterizing description. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1 s1) | |
A reaction: There is a bit of an equivocation over 'recognise' here. His example is 'the first child born in the 4th century'. We can't visually recognise such people, but the description does fix them, and a records office might give us 'recognition'. |
10445 | It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach] |
Full Idea: If one is referring to whatever happens to satisfy a description, and one would be referring to something else were it to have satisfied the description instead, this is known as 'weak' reference,...but surely this is not reference at all. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1 s7) | |
A reaction: Bach wants a precise notion of reference, as success in getting the audience to focus on the correct object. He talks of this case as 'singling out' some unfixed thing, and he also has 'alluding to' an unstated thing. Plausible view. |
10457 | Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach] |
Full Idea: An embarrassingly simple argument is that most expressions can be used literally but not referentially, no variation in meaning explains this fact, so its meaning is compatible with being non-referential, so no expression is inherently referential. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L2) | |
A reaction: I think I have decided that no expression is 'inherently referential', and that it is all pragmatics. |
10463 | Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach] |
Full Idea: Much of what speakers do that passes for referring is merely alluding or describing. ...It is one thing for a speaker to express a thought about a certain object using an expression, and quite another for the expression to stand for that object. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.3) | |
A reaction: Bach builds up a persuasive case for this view. If the question, though, is 'what are you talking about?', then saying what is being alluded to or singled out or described seems fine. Bach is being rather stipulative. |
10459 | Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach] |
Full Idea: Context does not determine or constitute reference; rather, it is something for the speaker to exploit to enable the listener to determine the intended reference. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L3) | |
A reaction: Bach thinks linguistic reference is a matter of speaker's intentions, and I think he is right. And this idea is right too. The domain of quantification constantly shifts in a conversation, and good speakers and listeners are sensitive to this. |
10460 | 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach] |
Full Idea: If one ducks starts quacking furiously, and you say 'that duck is excited', it isn't context that makes me take it that you are referring to the quacking duck. You could be referring to a quiet duck you recognise by its distinctive colour. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L3) | |
A reaction: A persuasive example to make his point against the significance of context in conversational reference. Speaker's intended reference must always trump any apparent reference suggested by context. |
10461 | What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach] |
Full Idea: To illustrate speakers' intentions, consider the anaphoric reference using pronouns in these: "A cop arrested a robber; he was wearing a badge", and "A cop arrested a robber; he was wearing a mask". The natural supposition is not the inevitable one. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L4) | |
A reaction: I am a convert to speakers' intentions as the source of all reference, and this example seems to illustrate it very well. 'He said..' 'Who said?' |
10462 | Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach] |
Full Idea: It is a fallacy that all the information in an utterance must come from its interpretation, which ignores the essentially pragmatic fact that the speaker is making the utterance. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L4) | |
A reaction: [He cites Barwise and Perry 1983:34] This is blatantly obvious in indexical remarks like 'I am tired', where the words don't tell you who is tired. But also 'the car has broken down, dear'. |
10458 | People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach] |
Full Idea: People slide from contextual variability to context relativity to context sensitivity to context dependence to contextual determination. | |
From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L3) | |
A reaction: This is reminiscent of the epistemological slide from cultural or individual relativity of some observed things, to a huge metaphysical denial of truth. Bach's warning applies to me, as I have been drifting down his slope lately. Nice. |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |