Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Causal Relations' and 'In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis

8349	The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson]
	Full Idea: I do not know any better way of showing what there is than looking at the assumptions needed to make sense of our normal talk.
	From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4)
	A reaction: Davidson was a pupil of Quine. This I take to be the last flowering of twentieth century linguistic philosophy. The ontology we deduce from talk in a children's playground might be very bizarre, but we are unlikely to endorse it. 'Honest, it's true!'

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive

8348	If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
	Full Idea: The assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events, is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our most common talk.
	From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4)
	A reaction: He considers events to be unanalysable basics. Explanation of normal talk also needs ghosts, premonitions, telepathy and Father Christmas. It is extremely hard to individuate events, unless they are subatomic, and rather numerous.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism

12295	3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Three-dimensionalist think a thing is somehow 'stretched out' through its location at a given time though not through the period during which it exists, and it is present in its entirety at a moment when it exists though not at a position of its location.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1)
	A reaction: This definition is designed to set up Fine's defence of the 3-D view, by showing that various dubious asymmetries show up if you do not respect the distinctions offered by the 3-D view.

12298	Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: In order to have genuine motion, rather than mere variation in position, it is necessary that the object should be 'entirely present' at each moment of the change. Thus without entire presence, or existence, genuine motion will not be possible.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.6)
	A reaction: See Idea 4786 for a rival view of motion. Of course, who says we have to have Kit Fine's 'genuine' motion, if some sort of ersatz motion still gets you to work in the morning?

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism

12296	4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Four-dimensionalists have thought that a material thing is as equally 'stretched out' in time as it is in space, and that there is no special way in which it is entirely present at a moment rather than at a position.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1)
	A reaction: Compare his definition of 3-D in Idea 12295. The 4-D is contrary to our normal way of thinking. Since I don't think the future exists, I presume that if I am a 4-D object then I have to say that I don't yet exist, and I disapprove of such talk.

18882	You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons]
	Full Idea: Fine says it is acceptable to ask when a wedding was and where it was, and it is acceptable to ask or state where the bride was (at a certain time), but not when she was.
	From: report of Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.18) by Peter Simons - Modes of Extension: comment on Fine p.18
	A reaction: This is aimed at three-dimensionalists who seem to think that a bride is a prolonged event, just as a wedding is. Fine is, interestingly, invoking ordinary language. When did the wedding start and end? When was the bride's birth and death?

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts

12297	Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Even if one is a three-dimensionalist, one might affirm the existence of temporal parts, on the grounds that everything merely endures for an instant.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.2)
	A reaction: This seems an important point, as belief in temporal parts is normally equated with four-dimensionalism (see Idea 12296). The idea is that a thing might be 'entirely present' at each instant, only to be replaced by a simulacrum.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation

8347	Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
	Full Idea: Explanations typically relate statements, not events.
	From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4)
	A reaction: An oddly linguistic way of putting our attempts to understand the world. Presumably the statements are supposed to be about the events (or whatever), and they are supposed to be true, so we are trying to relate features of the world.

25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles

13304	Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
	Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
	From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
	A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

10371	Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Davidson distinguishes between causation, an extensional relation that holds between coarse events, and explanation, which is an intensional relation that holds between the coarse events under a description.
	From: report of Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2
	A reaction: I'm unclear why everything has to be so coarse, when reality and causal events seem to fine-grained, but the distinction strikes me as good. Explanations relate to human understanding and human interests. Cf. Anscombe's view.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

8403	Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson]
	Full Idea: It is best to avoid Davidson's view that only quite concrete events can serve as causes; we should either say that facts as well as events can serve as causes; or that the events can be highly unspecific, including 'omissions'.
	From: comment on Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Hartry Field - Causation in a Physical World 1
	A reaction: Something NOT happening might be the main cause of an effect (drought), or an effect may mainly result from a situation rather than an event (famine).

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation

8346	Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
	Full Idea: The fuller we make the description of a cause, the better our chances of demonstrating that it was sufficient (as described) to produce the effect, and the worse our chances of demonstrating that it was necessary. (For the effect, it is the opposite).
	From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §3)
	A reaction: If the fullness of description is relevant, this suggests that Davidson is focusing on human explanations, rather than on the ontology of causation. If the cause IS necessary, why wouldn't a better description make that clearer?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation

4778	A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos]
	Full Idea: For Davidson, what makes singular causal statements true is the existence of some regularities or laws. All causal is nomological: c causes e iff there is a law that connects events like c with events like e.
	From: report of Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6
	A reaction: I wonder if the cart is before the horse here. Scriven says this is just a claim that there are "phantom laws". It is the Humean view of causation, but surely the laws come after the causation, so can't be used to explain it?

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure

20820	Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
	Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
	From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
	A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.