13857
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Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
How likely is a fair die landing on an even number to land six? My approach is, assume an even number, so three possibilities, one a six, so 'one third'; the truth-functional approach is it's true if it is not-even or six, so 'two-thirds'.
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 3)
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A reaction:
The point is that in the truth-functional approach, if the die lands not-even, then the conditional comes out as true, when she says it should be irrelevant. She seems to be right about this.
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13853
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It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
The mistake philosophers have made, in trying to understand the conditional, is to assume that its function is to make a statement about how the world is (or how other possible worlds are related to it), true or false, as the case may be.
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1)
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A reaction:
'If pigs could fly we would never catch them' may not be about the world, but 'if you press this switch the light comes on' seems to be. Actually even the first one is about the world. I've an inkling that Edgington is wrong about this. Powers!
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13854
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Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
It is often necessary to suppose (or assume) that some epistemic possibility is true, and to consider what else would be the case, or would be likely to be the case, given this supposition. The conditional expresses the outcome of such thought processes.
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1)
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A reaction:
This is the basic Edgington view. It seems to involve an active thought process, and imagination, rather than being the static semantic relations offered by possible worlds analyses. True conditionals state relationships in the world.
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20189
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Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume]
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Full Idea:
Belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something, that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not master.
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From:
David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Appen p.2)
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A reaction:
This is the opposite of Descartes' 'doxastic voluntarism' (i.e. we choose what to believe). If you want to become a Christian, steep yourself in religious literature, and the company of religious people. It will probably work.
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5323
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Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
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Full Idea:
Our experiences are logically independent, but they may be factually connected. What unites them is that either they are experienced together, or (if at separate times) they are separated by a stream of experience which is felt to be continuous.
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From:
comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Bk 3 App.) by A.J. Ayer - The Central Questions of Philosophy §VI.A
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A reaction:
A strict empiricist cannot deny that the feeling of continuity could be false, though that invites the Cartesian question of what exactly is experiencing the delusion. Hume denies that we experience any link between simultaneous experiences.
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21311
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Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume]
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Full Idea:
Is the self the same with substance? If it be, how can that question have place concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? If they be distinct, what is the difference between them?
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From:
David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Appendix)
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A reaction:
Locke seems to think there is a characterless substance which supports momories, and the latter constitute the self. So if my substance acquires Nestor's memories, I become Nestor. Hume, the stricter empiricist, cares nothing for characterless things.
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23115
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We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume]
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Full Idea:
It may be affirm'd, that there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to ourself.
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From:
David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], p.481), quoted by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 9.4
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A reaction:
Hume says this is for the best. I can't imagine spontaneous love of human beings we have never met. It takes the teachings of some sort of doctrine - religious or political - to produce such an attitude. I see it as a distortion of love. A hijacking.
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15250
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If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume]
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Full Idea:
Hume confuses 'repetition of impressions' with 'impression of repetitions of impressions'. ...In order of 'force and vivacity' we have: impressions, memories, ideas. This omits the vital fact that memory is memory; the notion of repetition is lost.
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From:
comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740]) by Alfred North Whitehead - Process and Reality V.II
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A reaction:
[compressed; Harré and Madden spotted this idea] This seems to pinpoint rather nicely the hopeless thinness of Hume's account. He is so desperate to get it down to minimal empirical experience that his explanations are too thin. One big idea....
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