7068
|
If infatuation with science leads to bad scientism, its rejection leads to obscurantism [Critchley]
|
|
Full Idea:
If what is mistaken in much contemporary philosophy is its infatuation with science, which leads to scientism, then the equally mistaken rejection of science leads to obscurantism.
|
|
From:
Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001], Ch.1)
|
|
A reaction:
Clearly a balance has to be struck. I take philosophy to be a quite separate discipline from science, but it is crucial that philosophy respects the physical facts, and scientists are the experts there. Scientists are philosophers' most valued servants.
|
7075
|
To meet the division in our life, try the Subject, Nature, Spirit, Will, Power, Praxis, Unconscious, or Being [Critchley]
|
|
Full Idea:
Against the Kantian division of a priori and empirical, Fichte offered activity of the subject, Schelling offered natural force, Hegel offered Spirit, Schopenhauer the Will, Nietzsche power, Marx praxis, Freud the unconscious, and Heidegger offered Being.
|
|
From:
Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001])
|
|
A reaction:
The whole of Continental Philosophy summarised in a sentence. Fichte and Schopenhauer seem to point to existentialism, Schelling gives evolutionary teleology, Marx abandons philosophy, the others are up the creek.
|
19542
|
It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
|
|
Full Idea:
The proposition that understanding does not involve knowledge is widespread (for example, in discussions of what philosophy aims at), but hardly withstands scrutiny. If you do not know how a jet engine works, you do not understand how it works.
|
|
From:
Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.24)
|
|
A reaction:
This seems a bit disingenuous. As in 'Theaetetus', knowing the million parts of a jet engine is not to understand it. More strongly - how could knowledge of an infinity of separate propositional truths amount to understanding on their own?
|
19541
|
Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
|
|
Full Idea:
If we say our cognitive aim is to get knowledge, the opposing views are the naturalistic view that what matters is just true belief (or just 'getting by'), or that there are rival epistemic goods such as understanding and wisdom.
|
|
From:
Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.17)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed summary] I'm a fan of understanding. The accumulation of propositional knowledge would relish knowing the mass of every grain of sand on a beach. If you say the propositions should be 'important', other values are invoked.
|