28 ideas
8092 | Logic was merely a branch of rhetoric until the scientific 17th century [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Until the rise of what we call the scientific method in the seventeenth century, logic was regarded largely as one aspect of rhetoric - a study of how one person't argument could convince another. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This may well give the main reason why the Greeks invented logic in the first place. Aristotle wrote a book on rhetoric, and that was where the money was. Leibniz is clearly a key figure in the change of attitude. |
19504 | My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D] |
Full Idea: One philosopher's modus ponens is another philosopher's modus tollens. | |
From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 3.§2) | |
A reaction: [Anyone know the originator of this nice thought?] You say A is true, and A proves B, so B is true. I reply that if A proves something as daft as B, then so much the worse for A. Ain't it the truth? |
8081 | 'No councillors are bankers' and 'All bankers are athletes' implies 'Some athletes are not councillors' [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Most people find it hard to find any conclusion that fits the following premises: 'No councillors are bankers', and 'All bankers are athletes'. There is a valid conclusion ('Some athletes are not councillors') but it takes quite an effort to find it. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of the fact that syllogistic logic is by no means automatic and straightforward. There is a mechanical procedure, but a lot of intuition and common sense is also needed. |
8085 | Modern propositional inference replaces Aristotle's 19 syllogisms with modus ponens [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Where Aristotle had 19 different inference rules (his valid syllogisms), modern propositional logic carries out deductions using just one rule of inference: modus ponens. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: At first glance it sounds as if Aristotle's guidelines might be more useful than the modern one, since he tells you something definite and what implies what, where modus ponens just seems to define the word 'implies'. |
8086 | Predicate logic retains the axioms of propositional logic [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Since predicate logic merely extends propositional logic, all the axioms of propositional logic are axioms of predicate logic. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: See Idea 7798 for the axioms. |
8091 | Situation theory is logic that takes account of context [Devlin] |
Full Idea: In many respects, situation theory is an extension of classical logic that takes account of context. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: John Barwise is cited as the parent of this movement. Many examples show that logical form is very hard to pin down, because word-meaning depends on context (e.g. 'several crumbs' differs from 'several mountains'). |
8087 | Golden ages: 1900-1960 for pure logic, and 1950-1985 for applied logic [Devlin] |
Full Idea: The period from 1900 to about 1960 could be described as the golden age of 'pure' logic, and 1950 to 1985 the golden age of 'applied' logic (e.g. applied to everyday reasoning, and to theories of language). | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: Why do we always find that we have just missed the Golden Age? However this supports the uneasy feeling that the golden age for all advances in human knowledge is just coming to an end. Biology, including the brain, is the last frontier. |
8089 | Montague's intensional logic incorporated the notion of meaning [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Montague's intensional logic was the first really successful attempt to develop a mathematical framework that incorporates the notion of meaning. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: Previous logics, led by Tarski, had flourished by sharply dividing meaning from syntax, and concentrating on the latter. |
8082 | Where a conditional is purely formal, an implication implies a link between premise and conclusion [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Implication involves some form of link or causality between the antecedent and the consequent of an if-then; normally it says that the conclusion is a consequence of the premise (where conditionals are just defined by 'true' and 'false'). | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This distinction is a key one when discussing 'If-then' sentences. Some are merely formal conditionals, but others make real claims about where you can get to from where you are. |
8072 | Sentences of apparent identical form can have different contextual meanings [Devlin] |
Full Idea: "Safety goggles must be worn in the building" is clear enough, but "dogs must always be carried on the escalator" doesn't require us to head off in search of a dog. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of how the requirements of logical form will often take us beyond the strict and literal meaning of a sentence, into context, tone, allusion and subjective aspects. |
8075 | Space and time are atomic in the arrow, and divisible in the tortoise [Devlin] |
Full Idea: The arrow paradox starts with the assumption that space and time are atomic; the tortoise starts with the opposite assumption that space and time are infinitely divisible. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: Aquinas similarly covers all options (the cosmos has a beginning, or no beginning). The nature of movement in a space which involves quantum leaps remains metaphysically puzzling. Where is a particle at half of the Planck time? |
19503 | An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D] |
Full Idea: Low probability events such as lottery wins can occur in nearby possible worlds. | |
From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 2.n2) | |
A reaction: This seems to ruin any chance of mapping probabilities and counterfactuals in the neat model of nested possible worlds (like an onion). [Lewis must have thought of this, surely? - postcards, please] |
19505 | Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG] |
Full Idea: The three main objections to Moore's common-sense refutation of scepticism is that it either begs the question, or it just offers a rival view instead of a refutation, or it uses 'know' in a conversationally inappropriate way. | |
From: report of Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 3.§2) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: [I deserve applause for summarising two pages of Pritchard's wordy stuff so neatly] |
19499 | We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D] |
Full Idea: The closure principle forces us to regard Zula as knowing that what she is looking at is not a cleverly disguised mule, and yet she doesn't appear to have any supporting evidence for this knowledge. | |
From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 2.§3) | |
A reaction: [Zula observes a zebra in the zoo] Entailment is a different type of justification from perception. If we add fallibilism to the mix, then fallibility can increase as we pursue a string of entailments. But proper logic, of course, should not be fallible. |
19500 | Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D] |
Full Idea: The Favouring Principle says that if S knows two things, and that the first entails the second, then S has better evidence in support of her belief in the first than she has for denying the second. | |
From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 2.§3) | |
A reaction: [his version is full of Greek letters, but who wants that stuff?] Pritchard concludes that if you believe in the closure principle then you should deny the favouring principle. |
19502 | Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D] |
Full Idea: According to the 'contrastivist' proposal knowledge is to be understood as essentially involving discrimination, such that knowing a proposition boils down to having the relevant discriminatory capacities. | |
From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 2.§6) | |
A reaction: Pritchard says this isn't enough, and we must also to be aware of supporting favouring evidence. I would focus on the concept of coherence, even for simple perceptual knowledge. If I see a hawk in England, that's fine. What if I 'see' a vulture? |
19498 | Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D] |
Full Idea: Typically, internal epistemic conditions are characterised in terms of a reflective access requirement. | |
From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 1.§6) | |
A reaction: If your justification is straightforwardly visual, it is unclear what the difference would be between seeing the thing and having reflective access to the seeing. |
19506 | Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D] |
Full Idea: Standard epistemic internalism faces an uphill struggle when it comes to dealing with radical scepticism, which points in favour of epistemic externalist neo-Mooreanism. | |
From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 3.§3) | |
A reaction: I incline towards internalism. I deal with scepticism by being a fallibilist, and adding 'but you never know' to every knowledge claim, and then getting on with life. |
19496 | Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D] |
Full Idea: Slogan for disjunctivism: perceptual knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief whose epistemic support is both factive (i.e. it entails the truth of the propositions believed) and reflectively accessible to the agent. | |
From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm not a fan of externalism, but it could be that the factive bit achieves the knowledge, and then being able to use and answer for that knowledge may just be a bonus, and not an essential ingredient. |
19497 | Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical disjunctivists hold that veridical perceptual experiences are not essentially the same as the experiences involved in corresponding cases involving illusion and (especially) hallucination. | |
From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 1.§4) | |
A reaction: Metaphysical disjunctivism concerns what the experiences are; epistemological justification concerns the criteria of justification. I think. I wish Pritchard would spell things out more clearly. Indeed, I wish all philosophers would. |
19495 | Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D] |
Full Idea: A fundamental difficulty for epistemic externalist positions is that it is hard on this view to capture any adequate notion of epistemic responsibility. | |
From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: He never explains the 'responsibility', but I presume that would be like an expert witness in court, vouching for their knowledge. |
19501 | We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D] |
Full Idea: When faced with an error-possibility we can appeal to background knowledge, as long as the error-possibility does not call into question this background knowledge. The same is not true when we focus on the radical sceptical hypothesis. | |
From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 2.§5) | |
A reaction: [reworded] Doubting everything simultaneously just looks like a mad project. If you doubt linguistic meaning, you can't even express your doubts. |
19507 | Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D] |
Full Idea: Crucially, radical sceptical error-possibilities are never epistemically motivated, but are instead merely raised. | |
From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 3.§5) | |
A reaction: In 'The Matrix' someone sees a glitch in the software (a cat crossing a passageway), and that would have to be taken seriously. Otherwise it is a nice strategy to ask why the sceptic is raising this bizzare possibility, without evidence. |
8088 | People still say the Hopi have no time concepts, despite Whorf's later denial [Devlin] |
Full Idea: The Hopi time myth does not appear to have been stopped for a moment by the fact that Whorf himself subsequently wrote that the Hopi language does indeed have words for past, present, and future | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Arguments for relativism based on the Hopi seem now to be thoroughly discredited. Sensible people never believed them in the first place. |
8073 | How do we parse 'time flies like an arrow' and 'fruit flies like an apple'? [Devlin] |
Full Idea: How do people identify subject and verb in the sentences "time flies like an arrow" and "fruit flies like an apple"? | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of the fact that even if we have an innate syntax mechanism, it won't work without some semantics, and some experience of the environmental context of utterances. |
8076 | The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic [Devlin] |
Full Idea: The distinction between sentences and the abstract propositions that they express is one of the key ideas of logic. A logical argument consists of propositions, assembled together in a systematic fashion. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: He may claim that arguments consist of abstract propositions, but they always get expressed in sentences. However, the whole idea of logical form implies the existence of propositions - there is something which a messy sentence 'really' says. |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |