11 ideas
| 7755 | Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: The paradigmatic referring devices are singular terms, denoting particular items. In English these include proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, and a few others. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: This list provides the agenda for twentieth century philosophy of language, since this is the point where language is supposed to hook onto the world. |
| 15897 | Zermelo realised that Choice would facilitate the sort of 'counting' Cantor needed [Zermelo, by Lavine] |
| Full Idea: Zermelo realised that the Axiom of Choice (based on arbitrary functions) could be used to 'count', in the Cantorian sense, those collections that had given Cantor so much trouble, which restored a certain unity to set theory. | |
| From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Proof that every set can be well-ordered [1904]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite I |
| 7768 | The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: This suggests a nice connection to Fodor's account of intentional thinking. The whole package sounds right to me (though the representations need not be 'symbolic', or in mentalese). |
| 7766 | Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: How could we know whether a sentence is verifiable unless we already knew what it says? | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 8) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a devastating objection to verificationism. Lycan suggests that you can formulate a preliminary meaning, without accepting true meaningfulness. Maybe verification just concerns truth, and not meaning. |
| 7764 | Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Could I not know the use of an expression and fall in with it, mechanically, but without understanding it? | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: In a foreign country, you might successfully recite a long complex sentence, without understanding a single word. This doesn't doom the 'use' theory, but it means that quite a lot of detail needs to be filled in. |
| 7763 | It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Proper names pose a problem for the "use" theorist. Try stating a rule of use for the name 'William G. Lycan'. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: Presumably it is normally used in connection with a particular human being, and is typically the subject of a grammatical sentence. Any piece of language could also be used to, say, attract someone's attention. |
| 7770 | Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: A Davidsonian truth theory will not be able to distinguish the meaning of a sentence containing 'renate' from that of one containing 'cordate'. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: One might achieve the distinction by referring to truth conditions in possible worlds, if there are possible worlds where some cordates are not renate. See Idea 7773. |
| 7773 | A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: A sentence's truth conditions can be taken to be the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the meaning can't be complete possible worlds, so this must be a supplement to the normal truth conditions view proposed by Davidson. It particularly addresses the problem seen in Idea 7770. |
| 7774 | Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: The possible worlds construal affords an elegant algebra of meaning by way of set theory: e.g. entailment between sentences is just the subset relation - S1 entails S2 if S2 is true in any world in which S1 is true. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: We might want to separate the meanings of sentences from their entailments (though Brandom links them, see Idea 7765). |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |