Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'fragments/reports' and 'The Meditations (To Himself)'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A philosopher should have principles ready for understanding, like a surgeon with instruments [Aurelius]
     Full Idea: As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for cases which suddenly require their skill, so should you have principles ready for the understanding of things divine and human.
     From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 3.13)
     A reaction: Nice. Philosophy is the training ground where wisdom and good living are made possible, but it cannot be a substitute for living.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
     Full Idea: The 'undetected' or 'veiled' paradox of Eubulides says: if you know your father, and don't know the veiled person before you, but that person is your father, you both know and don't know the same person.
     From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
     A reaction: Essentially an uninteresting equivocation on two senses of "know", but this paradox comes into its own when we try to give an account of how linguistic reference works. Frege's distinction of sense and reference tried to sort it out (Idea 4976).
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
     Full Idea: The liar paradox of Eubulides says 'if you state that you are lying, and state the truth, then you are lying'.
     From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
     A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.95) Don't say it, then. These kind of paradoxes of self-reference eventually lead to Russell's 'barber' paradox and his Theory of Types.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
     Full Idea: The 'sorites' paradox of Eubulides says: if you take one grain of sand from a heap (soros), what is left is still a heap; so no matter how many grains of sand you take one by one, the result is always a heap.
     From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
     A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.49) This is a very nice paradox, which goes to the heart of our bewilderment when we try to fully understand reality. It homes in on problems of identity, as best exemplified in the Ship of Theseus (Ideas 1212 + 1213).
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Everything is changing, including yourself and the whole universe [Aurelius]
     Full Idea: All things are changing; and you yourself are in continuous mutation and in a manner in continuous destruction, and the whole universe too.
     From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 9.19)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Nothing is evil which is according to nature [Aurelius]
     Full Idea: Nothing is evil which is according to nature.
     From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 2.17)
     A reaction: A bit hopeful. Sounds tautological. I.e. anything which is agreed to be evil is probably immediately labelled as 'unnatural'. What would he agree was evil?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Justice has no virtue opposed to it, but pleasure has temperance opposed to it [Aurelius]
     Full Idea: In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to pleasure, and that is temperance.
     From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 8.39)
     A reaction: There are plenty of hideous things opposed to justice, but presumably that immediately disqualifies them from being virtues.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
The art of life is more like the wrestler's than the dancer's [Aurelius]
     Full Idea: The art of life is more like the wrestler's than the dancer's.
     From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 7.61)
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Humans are naturally made for co-operation [Aurelius]
     Full Idea: We are made for cooperation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of upper and lower teeth. To act against one another, then, is contrary to nature.
     From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 2.1)
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.