46 ideas
14888 | Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The most important thing about wisdom is that it prevents human beings from being ruled by the moment. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 30 [25]) |
14863 | Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Inherent in wisdom [sophia] is discrimination, the possession of good taste: whereas science, lacking such a refined sense of taste, gobbles up anything that is worth knowing. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [086]) | |
A reaction: This is blatantly unfair to science, which may lack 'taste', but at least prefers deep theories with wide-ranging explanatory power to narrow local theories. Maybe the line across the philosophical community is the one picking out those with taste? |
14890 | Suffering is the meaning of existence [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Suffering is the meaning of existence. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 32 [67]) | |
A reaction: This doesn't mean that he is advocating suffering. The context of his remark is that the pursuit of truth involves suffering. |
14861 | Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is indispensable for education because it draws knowledge into an artistic conception of the world, and thereby ennobles it. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [052]) | |
A reaction: I take this to be an unusual way of saying that philosophy aims at the unification of knowledge, which is roughly my own view. It has hard for us to keep believing that life could be 'ennobled'. |
14885 | The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The philosopher's product is his life (first, before his works). It is his work of art. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [205]) |
14887 | You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One should have a philosophy only to the extent that one is capable of living according to this philosophy: so that everything does not become mere words. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 30 [17]) |
14889 | Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: As long as philosophers do not muster the courage to advocate a lifestyle structured in an entirely different way and demonstrate it by their own example, they will come to nothing. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 31 [10]) | |
A reaction: This is a pretty tough requirement for the leading logicians and metaphysicians of our day, but they must face their marginality. The public will only be interested in philosophers who advocate new ways of living. |
14862 | Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The reason why unprovable philosophizing still has some value - more value, in fact, than many a scientific proposition - lies in the aesthetic value of such philosophizing, that is, in its beauty and sublimity. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [076]) | |
A reaction: I am increasingly inclined to agree. I love wide-ranging and ambitious works of metaphysics, each of which is a unique creation of the human intellect (and with which no other individual will ever entirely agree). A great short paper is also beautiful. |
14876 | Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is not possible to base a popular culture on philosophy. Thus, with regard to culture, philosophy never can have primary, but always only secondary, significance. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 23 [14]) | |
A reaction: It is the brilliance of Christianity as a set of ideas that it is simple enough to found a popular culture. A complex theology would make that impossible. Luther brought it back to its roots, when the priesthood lost touch with the people. |
14878 | It would better if there was no thought [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It would be better if thought did not exist at all. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [004]) |
14881 | Why do people want philosophers? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Why do human beings even want philosophers? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [019]) | |
A reaction: It is not clear, of course, that they do want philosophers. The standard attitude to them seems to be a mixture of contempt and fear. |
14860 | Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In a certain sense, Kant's influence was detrimental; for the belief in metaphysics has been lost. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [028]) | |
A reaction: As I understand it, there are two interpretations of Kant, one of which is fairly thoroughly anti-metaphysical, and another which is less so. Also one path leads to idealism and the other doesn't, but I need to research that. |
14859 | If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The philosophy that is in control of science must also consider the extent to which science should be allowed to develop; it must determine its value! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [024]) |
14018 | Is Sufficient Reason self-refuting (no reason to accept it!), or is it a legitimate explanatory tool? [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Mackie (1983) dismisses the Principle of Sufficient Reason quickly, arguing that it is self-refuting: there is no sufficient reason to accept it. However, a principle is not invalidated by not applying to itself; it can be a powerful heuristic tool. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.VI) | |
A reaction: If God was entirely rational, and created everything, that would be a sufficient reason to accept the principle. You would never, though, get to the reason why God was entirely rational. Something will always elude the principle. |
14008 | The redundancy theory conflates metalinguistic bivalence with object-language excluded middle [Bourne] |
Full Idea: The problem with the redundancy theory of truth is that it conflates the metalinguistic notion of bivalence with a theorem of the object language, namely the law of excluded middle. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 3.III Pr3) |
14880 | Logic is just slavery to language [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Logic is merely slavery in the fetters of language. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [008]) | |
A reaction: I don't think I agree with this, but I still like it. |
14869 | If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If pleasure, displeasure, sensation, memory, reflex movements are all part of the essence of matter, then human knowledge penetrates far more deeply into the essence of things. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [161]) | |
A reaction: I don't think Nietzsche is thinking of monads at this point, but his idea certainly applies to them. Leibniz rested his whole theory on the close analogy between how minds work and how matter must also work. |
14010 | All relations between spatio-temporal objects are either spatio-temporal, or causal [Bourne] |
Full Idea: If there are any genuine relations at all between spatio-temporal objects, then they are all either spatio-temporal or causal. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 3.III Pr4) | |
A reaction: This sounds too easy, but I have wracked my brains for counterexamples and failed to find any. How about qualitative relations? |
14009 | It is a necessary condition for the existence of relations that both of the relata exist [Bourne] |
Full Idea: It is widely held, and I think correctly so, that a necessary condition for the existence of relations is that both of the relata exist. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 3.III Pr4) | |
A reaction: This is either trivial or false. Relations in the actual world self-evidently relate components of it. But I seem able to revere Sherlock Holmes, and speculate about relations between possible entities. |
14875 | Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The human being starts to believe when he ceases to know. …Knowledge is not as important for the welfare of human beings as is belief. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 21 [13]) | |
A reaction: The first idea is now associated with Williamson (and Hossack). The second is something like the pragmatic view of belief espoused by Ramsey. |
14866 | It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Against Kant we can still object, even if we accept all his propositions, that it is still possible that the world is as it appears to us. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [125]) | |
A reaction: This little thought at least seems to be enough to block the slide from phenomenalism into total idealism. The idea that direct realism can never be ruled out, even if it is false, is very striking. |
14872 | Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Every piece of knowledge that is beneficial to us involves an identification of nonidentical things, of things that are similar, which means that it is essentially illogical. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [236]) | |
A reaction: I take the thought to be that no two tigers are alike, but we call them all 'tigers' and merge them into a type, and then all our knowledge is based on this distortion. A wonderful idea. I love particulars You should love particulars. |
14879 | The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Even skepticism contains a belief: the belief in logic. The most extreme position is hence the abandoning of logic. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [008]) | |
A reaction: Some might say that flirting with non-classical logic (as in Graham Priest) is precisely travelling down this road. You could also be sceptical about meaning in language, so you couldn't articulate your abandonment of logic. |
14873 | If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The feeling of certainty is the most difficult to develop. Initially one seeks explanation: if a hypothesis explains many things, we draw the conclusion that it explains everything. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [238]) | |
A reaction: As so often, a wonderful warning from Nietzsche to other philosophers. They love to latch onto a Big Idea, and offer it as the answer to everything (especially, dare I say it, continental philosophers). |
14868 | Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The primary faculty seems to me to be the perception of structure, that is, based upon the mirror. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [153]) | |
A reaction: The point about the mirror makes this such an intriguingly original idea. Personally I like very much the idea that structure is our prime perception. See Sider 2011 on structure. |
14870 | We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The only form of causality of which we are aware is that between willing and acting - we transfer this to all things, and thereby explain the relationship between two changes that always occur together. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [209]) | |
A reaction: This is a rather Humean view, of projecting our experience onto the world, but it may be that we really are experiencing real causation, just as it occurs between insentiate things. |
14867 | It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!) [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To view 'spirit', the product of the brain, as supernatural. Even to deify it. What madness! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [127]) | |
A reaction: When I started philolosophy I was obliged to take mind-body dualism very seriously, but I have finally managed to drag myself to the shores of this lake of madness, where Nietzsche awaited with a helping hand. |
14884 | The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value) [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If happiness were the goal, then animals would be the highest creatures. Their cynicism is grounded in forgetfulness: that is the shortest path to happiness, even if it is a happiness with little value. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [143]) | |
A reaction: I would be reluctant to describe an apparently contented cow as 'happy'. Is a comatose person happy? Maybe happiness is fulfilling one's nature, like a monkey swinging through trees? |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
14886 | Education is contrary to human nature [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Education runs contrary to the nature of a human being. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 30 [06]) | |
A reaction: Tell me about it! |
14883 | We should evaluate the past morally [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: For the past I desire above all a moral evaluation. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [096]) | |
A reaction: There is a bit of a contradiction with Idea 14819, of only a few years later. He was always interested in a historical approach to morality, but I'm not sure if his ethics gives a decent basis for moral assessments of remote historical eras. |
14882 | Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Protest against vivisection of living things, that is, those things that are not yet dead should be allowed to live and not immediately be treated as an object for scientific investigation. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [027]) | |
A reaction: Wow. How many other people had come up with this idea in 1873? |
14865 | We do not know the nature of one single causality [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We do not know the nature of one single causality. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [121]) |
14871 | Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All laws of nature are only relations between x, y and z. We define laws of nature as relations to an x, y, and z, each of which in turn, is known to us only in relation to other x's, y's and z's. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [235]) | |
A reaction: This could be interpreted in Armstrong's terms, as only identifying the x's, y's and z's by their universals, and then seeing laws as how those universal relate. I suspect, though, that Nietzsche has a Humean regularity pattern in mind. |
14016 | The idea of simultaneity in Special Relativity is full of verificationist assumptions [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Special Relativity, with its definition of simultaneity, is shot through with verificationist assumptions. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.IIc) | |
A reaction: [He credits Sklar with this] I love hearing such points made, because all my instincts have rebelled against Einstein's story, even after I have been repeatedly told how stupid I am, and how I should study more maths etc. |
14019 | Relativity denies simultaneity, so it needs past, present and future (unlike Presentism) [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Special Relativity denies absolute simultaneity, and therefore requires a past and a future, as well as a present. The Presentist, however, only requires the present. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.VII) | |
A reaction: It is nice to accuse Relativity of ontological extravagence. When it 'requires' past and future, that may not be a massive commitment, since the whole theory is fairly operationalist, according to Putnam. |
14013 | Special Relativity allows an absolute past, future, elsewhere and simultaneity [Bourne] |
Full Idea: There is in special relativity a notion of 'absolute past', and of 'absolute future', and of 'absolute elsewhere', and of 'absolute simultaneity' (of events occurring at their space-time conjunction). | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 5.III) | |
A reaction: [My summary of his paragraph] I am inclined to agree with Bourne that there is enough here to build some sort of notion of 'present' that will support the doctrine of Presentism. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
14015 | No-Futurists believe in past and present, but not future, and say the world grows as facts increase [Bourne] |
Full Idea: 'No-Futurists' believe in the real existence of the past and present but not the future, and hold that the world grows as more and more facts come into existence. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.IIb) | |
A reaction: [He cites Broad 1923 and Tooley 1997] My sympathies are with Presentism, but there seems not denying that past events fix truths in a way that future events don't. The unchangeability of past events seems to make them factual. |
14007 | How can presentists talk of 'earlier than', and distinguish past from future? [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Presentists have a difficulty with how they can help themselves to the notion of 'earlier than' without having to invoke real relata, and how presentism can distinguish the past from the future. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 2.IV) | |
A reaction: The obvious response is to infer the past from the present (fossils), and infer the future from the present (ticking bomb). But what is it that is being inferred, if the past and future are denied a priori? Tricky! |
14011 | Presentism seems to deny causation, because the cause and the effect can never coexist [Bourne] |
Full Idea: It seems that presentism cannot accommodate causation at all. In a true instance of 'c causes e', it seems to follow that both c and e exist, and it is widely accepted that c is earlier than e. But for presentists that means c and e can't coexist. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: A nice problem. Obviously if the flying ball smashed the window, we are left with only the effect existing - otherwise we could intercept the ball and prevent the disaster. To say this cause and this effect coexist would be even dafter than the problem. |
14017 | Since presentists treat the presentness of events as basic, simultaneity should be define by that means [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Since for presentism there is an ontologically significant and basic sense in which events are present, we should expect a definition of simultaneity in terms of presentness, rather than the other way round. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: Love it. I don't see how you can even articulate questions about simultaneity if you don't already have a notion of presentness. What are the relata you are enquiring about? |
14003 | Time is tensed or tenseless; the latter says all times and objects are real, and there is no passage of time [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Theories of time are in two broad categories, the tenseless and the tensed theories. In tenseless theories, all times are equally real, as are all objects located at them, and there is no passage of time from future to present to past. It's the B-series. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], Intro IIa) | |
A reaction: It might solve a few of the problems, but is highly counterintuitive. Presumably it makes the passage of time an illusion, and gives no account of how events 'happen', or of their direction, and it leaves causation out on a limb. I'm afraid not. |
14005 | B-series objects relate to each other; A-series objects relate to the present [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Objects in the B-series are earlier than, later than, or simultaneous with each other, whereas objects in the A-series are earlier than, later than or simultaneous with the present. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], Intro IIb) | |
A reaction: Must we choose? Two past events relate to each other, but there is a further relation when 'now' falls between the events. If I must choose, I suppose I go for the A-series view. The B-series is a subsequent feat of imagination. McTaggart agreed. |
14006 | Time flows, past is fixed, future is open, future is feared but not past, we remember past, we plan future [Bourne] |
Full Idea: We say that time 'flows', that the past is 'fixed' but the future is 'open'; we only dread the future, but not the past; we remember the past but not the future; we plan for the future but not the past. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], Intro III) | |
A reaction: These seem pretty overwhelming reasons for accepting an asymmetry between the past and the future. If you reject that, you seem to be mired in a multitude of contradictions. Your error theory is going to be massive. |
14864 | The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The Greeks lack a normative theology: everyone has the right to deal with it in a poetic manner and he can believe whatever he wants. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [110]) | |
A reaction: There is quite a lot of record of harshness towards atheists, and the trial of Socrates seems to have been partly over theology. However, no proper theological texts have come down, or records of the teachings of the priests. |