Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'A Thousand Plateaus' and 'Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


7 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson]
     Full Idea: On a friendly reading of Quine, there is nothing to make the difference between a table's being contingently plastic and its being essentially plastic.
     From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 5)
     A reaction: This is, of course, the dreaded modern usage of 'essential' to just mean 'necessary' and nothing more. In my view, there may be a big problem with knowing whether a problem is necessary, but knowing whether it is essential is much easier.
An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson]
     Full Idea: On the possible world's account, x's being essentially F is nothing more nor less than x's being F in every world in which it appears.
     From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 6)
     A reaction: There you go - 'true in every possible world' is the definition of metaphysical necessity, not the definition of essence. Either get back to Aristotle, or stop (forever!) talking about 'essence'!
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson]
     Full Idea: The unfriendly response to Quine's objection to essentialism is that it conflates the de re and the de dicto. The friendly response is that behind that conflation is a real epistemological problem for essentialism.
     From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 1)
     A reaction: He cites Richard Cartwright 1968 for the friendly response. The epistemological question is how we can know the essentialness of an essence.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson]
     Full Idea: If something is offered as a candidate necessary a posteriori truth, how could we show that it is necessary, in the face of the fact that it takes investigation to show that it is true, and so, in some sense, it might have turned out to be false?
     From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 1)
     A reaction: This is the topic of his paper, which he compares with how we can know that essences are essential.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
Political theory should not focus on the state or economy, but on the small scale of power [Deleuze/Guattari, by May]
     Full Idea: Liberals who focus on the state and Marxists who focus on the economy are macropolitical theorists. They overlook the small elements that comprise our political lives. To understand how we are constructed and power works we must turn to the smaller scale.
     From: report of G Deleuze / F Guattari (A Thousand Plateaus [1980]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 4.04
     A reaction: This seems to be precisely in tune with the ideas of Foucault. I'm not sure that a study of power within the family or the office throws much light on macropolitics. How the micro intrudes into the micro seems more interesting.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.