Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Nature of Judgement' and 'works'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings

6405	Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
	Full Idea: The rejection of idealism by Moore and Russell was marked in 1898 by the publication of Moore's article 'The Nature of Judgement'.
	From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
	A reaction: This now looks like a huge landmark in the history of British philosophy.

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis

7527	Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
	Full Idea: For Moore and Russell analysis is not - as is commonly understood now - a linguistic activity, but an ontological one. To analyse a proposition is not to investigate language, but to carve up the world so that it begins to make some sort of sense.
	From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4
	A reaction: A thought dear to my heart. The twentieth century got horribly side-tracked into thinking that ontology was an entirely linguistic problem. I suggest that physicists analyse physical reality, and philosophers analyse abstract reality.

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic

8720	A logic is 'relevant' if premise and conclusion are connected, and 'paraconsistent' allows contradictions [Priest,G, by Friend]
	Full Idea: Priest and Routley have developed paraconsistent relevant logic. 'Relevant' logics insist on there being some sort of connection between the premises and the conclusion of an argument. 'Paraconsistent' logics allow contradictions.
	From: report of Graham Priest (works [1998]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 6.8
	A reaction: Relevance blocks the move of saying that a falsehood implies everything, which sounds good. The offer of paraconsistency is very wicked indeed, and they are very naughty boys for even suggesting it.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions

22302	Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
	Full Idea: Moore avoided the problematic correspondence between propositions and reality by identifying the former with the latter; the world consists of true propositions, and there is no difference between a true proposition and the fact that makes it true.
	From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 28 'Refut'
	A reaction: This is "the most platonic system of modern times", he wrote (letter 14.8.1898). He then added platonist ethics. This is a pernicious and absurd doctrine. The obvious problem is that false propositions can be indistinguishable, but differ in ontology.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions

7526	Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
	Full Idea: Moore rejected the Hegelian view, that a proposition is a unity that defies analysis; instead, it is a complex that positively cries out to be broken up into its constituent parts, which parts Moore called 'concepts'.
	From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4
	A reaction: Russell was much influenced by this idea, though it may be found in Frege. Anglophone philosophers tend to side instantly with Moore, but the Hegel view must be pondered. An idea comes to us in a unified flash, before it is articulated.

25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles

13304	Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
	Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
	From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
	A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure

20820	Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
	Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
	From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
	A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.