16 ideas
| 22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: There is no sense in abandoning a successful theory if you have nothing to replace it with. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 2) | |
| A reaction: This is also a problem for infererence to the best explanation. What to do if your best explanation is not very good? The simple message is do not rush to dump a theory when faced with an anomaly. |
| 22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Popper's theory implies that more informative theories seem to be less probable. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 3) | |
| A reaction: [On p.75 Gorham replies to this objection] The point is that to be more testable they must be more detailed. He's not wrong. Theories are meant to be general, so they sweep up the details. But they need precise generalities and specifics. |
| 22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Structural Realists must show that it is the mathematical aspects of the theories, not their content, that account for their success ….and that their structure and content can be clearly separated. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: Their approach certainly seems to rely on mathematical types of science, so it presumably fits biology, geology and even astronomy less well. |
| 22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Is Newton's theory simpler than Einstein's, since there is only one relation of simultaneity in absolute time, or is Einstein's simpler because it dispenses with absolute time altogether? | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: A nice question, to which a good scientist might be willing to offer an answer. Since simultaneity is crucial but the existence of time is not, I would vote for Newton as the simpler. |
| 22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Structural Realists say that modern science achieves a true or 'truer' account of the world only with respect to its mathematical structure rather than its intrinsic qualities or nature. The structure carries over to new theories. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: At first glance I am unconvinced that when an old theory is replaced it neverthess contains some sort of 'mathematical structure' which endures and is worth preserving. No doubt Worrall, French and co have examples. |
| 22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: The strangeness of interpreting theories as mere tools for organising present experience is brought out clearly in sciences like cosmology and paleontology, which largely concern events in the remote past or future. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: Not conclusive. An anti-realist has to interpret those sciences in terms of the current observations that are available. |
| 22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: The main difficulty with instrumentalism is its implausible account ot the meaning of theoretical claims and concepts. Most scientists take them to be straightforward attempts to describe the world. Most say they are useful because they are accurate. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: Instrumentalism is seen as a Pragmatist view, and Dewey is cited. |
| 22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: The more unification and integration is found among the modern sciences, the less likely it seems it will have all been a dream. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: I believe this strongly. Ancient theories which were complex, wide ranging and false do not impress me. This is part of my coherence view of justification. |
| 22971 | In moving from capitalism to communism a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is needed [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Between the capitalist and communist society lies the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
| A reaction: This hugely influential idea was catastrophic for the twentieth century, because the leaders of the proletarian dictatorship adored and abused the power, and wouldn't give it up for some feeble next stage. |
| 22970 | Freedom is making the state subordinate to its society [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed on society into one completely subordinate to it. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
| A reaction: The intermediate stage is dictatorship of the proletariat (presumably exercised by the communist leadership). No twentieth century marxist state ever got near the freedom which Marx was seeking. A liberal society might achieve it! |
| 22969 | People who only have their labour power are the slaves of those permitting them to work [Marx] |
| Full Idea: The man who possesses no other property than his labour power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labour. He can only work with their permission. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], I) | |
| A reaction: In a world of vast multinationals, the person giving the permission to work is nearly always dependent on some higher level permission. In any sort of society people can only work with the consensus of other people. |
| 22000 | From each according to his ability, to each according to his need [Marx] |
| Full Idea: From each according to his ability, to each according to his need. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875]), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 9 | |
| A reaction: Singer says this was not original to Marx, and he placed little emphasis on it. The obvious capitalist response is to ask how you will motivate someone who has huge abilities but few needs. It implies huge inequalities of altruism. |
| 22972 | Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' just tolerates all sorts of religious intolerance [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' is just the toleration of all possible kinds of religious unfreedom of conscience, and the workers' party should endeavour to liberate the conscience from the witchery of religion. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
| A reaction: We see this in modern 'faith' schools in the UK, which do not seem to be required to live up to the standards of freedom of belief expected in the rest of a liberal society. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Aristotelian physics assumed that celestial motion is naturally circular and eternal while terrestrial motion is naturally toward the center of the earth and final. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: The overthrow of this by Galileo and then Newton may have been the most dramatic revolution of the new science. It opened up the possibility of universal laws of physics. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |