Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The iterative conception of Set' and 'Conspectus libelli (book outline)'

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7 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII

18192	Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy]
	Full Idea: For Boolos, the Replacement Axioms go beyond the iterative conception.
	From: report of George Boolos (The iterative conception of Set [1971]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.3

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates

12699	A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Without soul or form of some kind, a body would have no being, because no part of it can be designated which does not in turn consist of more parts. Thus nothing could be designated in a body which could be called 'this thing', or a unity.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1988), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
	A reaction: The locution 'soul or form' is disconcerting, and you have to spend some time with Leibniz to get the hang of it. The 'soul' is not intelligent, and is more like a source of action and response.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier

12700	Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Substantial form, or soul, is the principle of unity and duration, matter is that of multiplicity and change
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1398-9), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2
	A reaction: Leibniz was a fan of the unfashionable Aristotle, and tried to put a spin on his views consonant with contemporary Hobbesian mechanistic views. Oddly, he likes the idea that 'form' is indestructable, which I don't understand.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent

12736	If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
	Full Idea: Insofar as we have some insight into how God chooses, we can know a priori the laws of nature that God chooses for this best of all possible worlds. In this way, it is possible to have genuine a priori knowledge of contingent truths.
	From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1998-9) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
	A reaction: I think it would be doubtful whether our knowledge of God's choosings would count as a priori. How do we discover them? Ah! We derive God from the ontological argument, and his choosings from the divine perfection implied thereby.

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism

12698	Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I believe that there is in every body a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.2010), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
	A reaction: Note that he never says that there is any intelligence present. This eventually becomes his monadology, but Leibniz is the most obvious post-Greek philosopher to flirt with panpsychism.

25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles

13304	Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
	Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
	From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
	A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure

20820	Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
	Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
	From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
	A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.