10 ideas
5062 | First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this? [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We rise to metaphysics by saying 'nothing takes place without a reason', then asking 'why is there something rather than nothing?, and then 'why do things exist as they do?' | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §7) | |
A reaction: Wonderful. This is what we pay philosophers for - to attempt to go to the heart of the mystery, and then start formulating the appropriate questions. The question of 'why this?' is the sweetest question. The first one seems a little intractable. |
19377 | A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Each monad, together with a particular body, makes up a living substance. Thus, there is not only life everywhere, joined to limbs or organs, but there are also infinite degrees of life in the monads, some dominating more or less over others. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], 4) | |
A reaction: Two key ideas: that each monad is linked to a body (which is presumably passive), and the infinite degrees of life in monads. Thus rocks consist of monads, but at an exceedingly low degree of life. They are stubborn and responsive. |
19353 | 'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We distinguish between 'perception', the internal state of the monad representing external things, and 'apperception', which is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this internal state, not given to all souls, nor at all times to a given soul. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §4) | |
A reaction: The word 'apperception' is standard in Kant. I find it surprising that modern analytic philosophers don't seem to use it when they write about perception. It strikes me as useful, but maybe specialists have a reason for avoiding it. |
6455 | Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey] |
Full Idea: One possibility is that talk of sense-data is a mere linguistic convenience, providing a noun for talking about appearances, as when seeing a red object in sodium light (when it looks grey). | |
From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196) | |
A reaction: The term seems to have been coined to deal with situations where there is a gap between appearance and presumed reality, as in illusions. Maybe illusions prove the existence of sense-data, rather than it being a 'convenient' term. |
6453 | Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey] |
Full Idea: Sometimes it is said that sense-data are public, and parts either of objects or of the surfaces of objects. | |
From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196) | |
A reaction: This suggests two drastically different theories, one making sense-data into mental events, the other placing them in the 'external' world. The latter theory can dovetail them with the physics, but then why would we need them? |
6454 | Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey] |
Full Idea: It is hard to individuate sense-data, saying where one ends and the next begins, and hard to say whether they can change; are they substances, qualities, events, or what? | |
From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196) | |
A reaction: The problem is not that these questions are unanswerable. The answer seems to be either that they are physical and external, or that they are mental and internal, and that there is no ontological space for them between the two. |
5061 | Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is a connexion between the perceptions of animals, which bears some resemblance to reason: but it is based only on the memory of facts or effects, and not at all on the knowledge of causes. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §5) | |
A reaction: This amounts to the view that animals can do Humean induction (where you see regularities), but not Leibnizian induction (where you see necessities). I say all minds perceive patterns, but only humans can think about the patterns they have perceived. |
5063 | Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Music charms us although its beauty only consists in the harmony of numbers. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §17) | |
A reaction: 'Only'! This is a super-pythagorean view of music, as you might expect from a great mathematician. Did he understand the horrible compromises that had just been made to achieve even-tempered tuning? Patterns are the key, as always. |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |