2764
|
Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
|
|
Full Idea:
Blanshard says that in a fully coherent system there would not only be consistency, but every proposition would be entailed by the others, and no proposition would stand outside the system.
|
|
From:
report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], 2:265) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 8.1
|
|
A reaction:
Hm. If a proposition is entailed by the others, then it is a necessary truth (given the others) which sounds deterministic. You could predict all the truths you had never encountered. See 1578:178 for quote.
|
19080
|
Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
|
|
Full Idea:
Blanshard said that coherent justification leads to coherence truth. It might be said that coherence is a test for truth, but truth is correspondence. But coherence doesn't guarantee correspondence, and coherence is a test, so truth is not correspondence.
|
|
From:
report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], Ch.26) by James O. Young - The Coherence Theory of Truth §2.2
|
|
A reaction:
[compression of Young's summary] Rescher (1973) says that Blanshard's argument depends on coherence being an infallible test for truth, which it isn't.
|
19403
|
Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz]
|
|
Full Idea:
As there are an infinity of possible worlds, there are also an infinity of laws, some proper to one, another to another, and each possible individual of any world contains in its own notion the laws of its world.
|
|
From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On Sufficient Reason [1686], p.95)
|
|
A reaction:
Hence Leibniz is not really a scientific essentialist, in that he doesn't think the laws arise out of the nature of the matter consituting the world. I wonder if the primitive matter of bodies which attaches to the monads is the same in each world?
|