17 ideas
| 12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
| Full Idea: If a plural variable is said to have not a single value but some values (some clothes), then a non-count variable may have, more quirkier still, some value (some clothing, for instance) in ranging arbitrarily over the scattered stuff. | |
| From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 4.4) | |
| A reaction: We seem to need the notion of a sample, or an archetype, to fit the bill. I hereby name them 'sample variables'. Damn - Laycock got there first, on p.137. |
| 12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
| Full Idea: Plurality is a semantical but not also an ontological construction. | |
| From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4) | |
| A reaction: I love it when philososphers make simple and illuminating remarks like this. You could read 500 pages of technical verbiage about plural reference without grasping that this is the underlying issue. Sounds right to me. |
| 17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
| Full Idea: The very words we class as non-count nouns may themselves be used for counting, of kinds or types, and phrases like 'several wines' are perfectly in order. ...Not only do we have 'less cheese', but we also have the non-generic 'fewer cheeses'. | |
| From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n23) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Laycock generally endorses the thought that what can be counted is not simply distinguished by a precise class of applied vocabulary. He offers lots of borderline or ambiguous cases in his footnotes. |
| 17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
| Full Idea: Some words that seem to be semantically non-count can take syntactically plural forms: 'snows', 'sands', 'waters' and the like. | |
| From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n24) | |
| A reaction: This seems to involve parcels of the stuff. The 'snows of yesteryear' occur at different times. 'Taking the waters' probably involves occasions. The 'Arabian sands' presumably occur in different areas. Semantics won't fix what is countable. |
| 12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
| Full Idea: The central fact about the category of stuff or matter is that it is profoundly antithetical to reference. | |
| From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Pref) | |
| A reaction: This is taking 'reference' in the strictly singular classical sense, but clearly we refer to water in various ways. Laycock's challenge is very helpful. We have been in the grips of a terrible orthodoxy. |
| 12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
| Full Idea: The definite descriptions of stuff like water are neither singular descriptions denoting individual mereological aggregates, nor plural descriptions denoting multitudes of discrete units or semantically determined atoms. | |
| From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 5.3) | |
| A reaction: Laycock makes an excellent case for this claim, and seems to invite a considerable rethink of our basic ontology to match it, one which he ultimately hints at calling 'romantic'. Nice. Conservatives try to force stuff into classical moulds. |
| 12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
| Full Idea: Suppose that water, qua vapour, mixes with the atmosphere. Is there any abstract metaphysical principle, other than that of atomism, which implies that water must, in any such process, retain its identity? That claim seems indefensible. | |
| From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 1.2 n22) | |
| A reaction: It can't be right that some stuff always loses its identity in a mixture, if the mixture was in a closed vessel, and then separated again. Dispersion is what destroys the identity, not mixing. |
| 12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
| Full Idea: The notion of a part is such that parts must be of the same very general type - concrete, material or physical, for instance - as the wholes of which they are (said to be) parts. | |
| From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 2.9) | |
| A reaction: The phrase 'same very general type' cries out for investigation. Can an army contain someone who isn't much of a soldier? Can the Treasury contain a fear of inflation? |
| 17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
| Full Idea: Work is needed to distinguish abstract nouns ...from the generic uses of what are otherwise concrete nouns. The contrast is that of 'humility is a virtue' and 'water is a liquid'. | |
| From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n25) | |
| A reaction: 'Work is needed' implies 'let me through, I'm an analytic philosopher', but I don't think they will separate very easily. What does 'watery' mean? Does water have concrete virtues? |
| 12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |
| Full Idea: Some people hold that it is reference, in some more or less full-blooded sense, which constitutes our basic intellectual or psychological connection with the world. | |
| From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Pref) | |
| A reaction: This is the view which Laycock sets out to challenge, by showing that we talk about stuff like water without any singular reference occurring at all. I think he is probably right. |
| 18225 | If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: If you can only know what is intrinsically valuable through intuition (as Moore claims), you can still argue about what is unconditionally valuable. There must be something unconditionally valuable because there must be a source of value. | |
| From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Three') | |
| A reaction: If you only grasped the values through intuition, does that give you enough information to infer the dependence relations between values? |
| 18228 | An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: If what is final is whatever is an end but never a means, ...why should something be more valuable just because it is useless? | |
| From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Finality') | |
| A reaction: Korsgaard is offering this as a bad reading of what Aristotle intends. |
| 18224 | Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: 'Subjectivism' identifies good ends with or by reference to some psychological state. ...'Objectivism' says that something is good as an end if a property, intrinsic goodness, is attributed to it. | |
| From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Three') |
| 18233 | Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: It is because contemplation is an activity that is not also a process that Aristotle identifies it as the most final good. | |
| From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Activity') | |
| A reaction: Quite a helpful way of labelling what Aristotle has in mind. So should we not aspire to be involved in processes, except reluctantly? I take the mind itself to be a process, so that may be difficult! |
| 18226 | For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: Contemplation, as Aristotle understand it, is not research or inquiry, but an activity that ensues on these: an activity that consists in understanding. | |
| From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Aristotle') | |
| A reaction: Fairly obvious, when you read the last part of 'Ethics', but helpful in grasping Aristotle, because understanding is the objective of 'Posterior Analytics' and 'Metaphysics', so he tells you how to achieve the ideal moral state. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |