33 ideas
| 18290 | But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek? [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom. For who knows for what purpose your body requires precisely your best wisdom? | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.05) | |
| A reaction: Lovely question. For years I've paid lip-service to wisdom as the rough aim of all philosophy. Not quite knowing what wisdom is doesn't bother me, but knowing why I want wisdom certainly does, especially after this idea. |
| 18303 | Reject wisdom that lacks laughter [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Let that wisdom be false to us that brought no laughter with it! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.12.23) |
| 18305 | To love truth, you must know how to lie [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Inability to lie is far from being love of truth. ....He who cannot lie does not know what truth is. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.13.9) |
| 20757 | The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Behind your thoughts and feelings stands a powerful commander, an unknown wise man - he is called a self. He lives in your body; he is your body. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], I.4), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 5 'Creature' | |
| A reaction: I find Nietzsche's view of the self very congenial, though I tend to see the self as certain central functions of the brain. The brain is enmeshed in the body (as in the location of pains). |
| 18289 | Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: You say 'I' and you are proud of this word. But greater than this - although you will not believe in it - is your body and its great intelligence, which does not say 'I' but performs 'I'. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.05) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure if I understand this, but I offer it as a candidate for the most profound idea ever articulated about personal identity. |
| 2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
| Full Idea: The chief difficulty with the behaviour-disposition account is the virtual impossibility of specifying a disposition except as a 'disposition of x to behave as though x were in pain'. | |
| From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.57) | |
| A reaction: This has become the best-known objection to behaviourism - that you can't specify a piece of behaviour clearly unless you mention the mental state which it is expressing. The defence is to go on endlessly mentioning further behaviour. |
| 2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
| Full Idea: Two animals with all motor nerves cut will have the same actual and potential behaviour (i.e. none), but if only one has uncut pain fibres, it will feel pain where the other won't. | |
| From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.57) | |
| A reaction: This is a splendidly literal and practical argument against behaviourism - if you prevent all the behaviour, you don't thereby prevent the experience. Clearly we have to say something about what is inside the 'black box' of the mind. |
| 2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
| Full Idea: I propose the hypothesis that pain, or the state of being in pain, is a functional state of a whole organism. | |
| From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.54) | |
| A reaction: This sounds wrong right from the start. Pain hurts. The fact that it leads to avoidance behaviour etc. seems much more like a by-product of pain than its essence. |
| 2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
| Full Idea: The functional-state hypothesis is not incompatible with dualism, as a system consisting of a body and a soul could meet the required conditions. | |
| From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.55) | |
| A reaction: He doesn't really believe this, of course. This claim led to all the weak objections to functionalism involving silly implementations of minds. A brain is the only plausible way to implement our mental functions. |
| 2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
| Full Idea: The presence of a certain functional state is not merely 'correlated with' but actually explains the pain behaviour on the part of the organism. | |
| From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.58) | |
| A reaction: Does it offer any further explanation beyond saying that it is the brain state that causes the behaviour? The pain is just a link between damage and avoidance. I wish that is all that pain was. |
| 2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
| Full Idea: The concept of temperature is not the same as the concept of mean molecular kinetic energy. But temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy. | |
| From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.52) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard analogy for mind-brain identity, and it seems fair enough to me. The mind is the activity of the brain. It is rather unhelpful to think of weather in terms of chemistry, but it is actions of chemicals. |
| 6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
| Full Idea: Putnam was too quick to assert neuroscientific support for multiple realizability; current evidence does not reveal it, and there is some reason to think the enterprises of neuroscience are premised on the hypothesis of brain-state identity. | |
| From: comment on Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968]) by Thomas W. Polger - Natural Minds Ch.1.4 | |
| A reaction: I have always been suspicious of the glib claim that mental states were multiply realisable. I see no reason to think that octupi see colours as we do, or experience fear as we do, even though their behaviour has to be similar, for survival. |
| 2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
| Full Idea: Mental states have vastly diverse physical/biological realizations in different species and structures (e.g. pain in humans and in molluscs), so no mental state can be identified with any single physical/biological state. | |
| From: report of Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968]) by Jaegwon Kim - Mind in a Physical World n p.120 | |
| A reaction: But maybe mollusc and human nervous systems ARE the same in the respects that matter. We don't know enough about pain to deny that possibility. |
| 18299 | The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Powerless against that which has been done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past. The will cannot will backwards; that it cannot break time and time's desire - that is the will's most lonely affliction. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.20) |
| 18297 | We created meanings, to maintain ourselves [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Man first implanted values into things to maintain himself - he first created the meaning of things, a human meaning! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.16) | |
| A reaction: It is certainly hard to see anything resembling values or meaning in the cosmos, if you remove the human beings. We should expect an evolutionary grounding in their explanation. |
| 18293 | The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The noble man wants to create new things and a new virtue. The good man wants the old things and that the old things shall be preserved. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.09) | |
| A reaction: There is a limit to how many plausible virtues the noble men can come up with. We may already have run out. Are we going to have to re-run the Iliad? |
| 18301 | We only really love children and work [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: One loves from the very heart only one's child and one's work. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.03) | |
| A reaction: Very Nietzchean (and masculine?) to cite one's work. Rachmaninov said he was 85% musician and 15% human being, so I guess he loved music from the very heart. |
| 18307 | I want my work, not happiness! [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Do I aspire after happiness? I aspire after my work! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.20) | |
| A reaction: I empathise with aspiring to do something, rather than be something. But what do we wish for our children? Happiness first, then achievement? |
| 18291 | Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Every virtue is jealous of the others, and jealousy is a terrible thing. Even virtues can be destroyed through jealousy. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.07) | |
| A reaction: How much more subtle and plausible than the picture of accumulating virtues, like medals! Zarathustra says it is best to have just one virtue. |
| 18287 | People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Nobody grows rich or poor any more: both are too much of a burden. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.01) | |
| A reaction: True. Most people I know are just puzzled by people who actually seem to want to be extremely wealthy. |
| 18295 | If you want friends, you must be a fighter [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: If you want a friend, you must be willing to wage war for him: and to wage war, you must be capable of being an enemy. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.15) |
| 18286 | The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: What is the greatest thing you can experience? It is the hour of the great contempt. The hour in which even your happiness grows loathsome to you, and your reason and your virtue also. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.01) | |
| A reaction: This would be a transient state for Nietzsche, in which you realise the hollowness of those traditional ideas, and begin to seek something else. |
| 18296 | An enduring people needs its own individual values [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: No people could live without evaluating; but if it wishes to maintain itself it must not evaluate as its neighbour evaluates. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.16) | |
| A reaction: Political philosophers say plenty about a 'people', but little about what unifies them, or about what keeps one people distinct from another. Most people's are proud of their local values. |
| 18294 | The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The state is the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it lies, too; and this lie creeps from its mouth: 'I, the state, am the people'. It is a lie! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.12) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as just as true even after everyone gets the vote. Rulers can't help gradually forgetting about the people. |
| 18304 | Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: 'To live as I desire to live or not to live at all': that is what I want, that is what the most saintly man wants. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.09) | |
| A reaction: [spoken by Zarathustra] |
| 18300 | Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The spirit of revenge: my friends, that, up to now, has been mankind's chief concern; and where there was suffering, there was always supposed to be punishment. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.20) |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 18302 | Man and woman are deeply strange to one another! [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Who has fully conceived how strange man and woman are to one another! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.10.2) |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
| 18292 | I can only believe in a God who can dance [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: I should believe only in a God who understood how to dance. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.08) |
| 18298 | Not being a god is insupportable, so there are no gods! [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: If there were gods, how could I endure not to be a god! Therefore there are no gods. ...For what would there to be create if gods - existed! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.02) | |
| A reaction: [Zarathustra says this, not Nietzsche!] |
| 18288 | Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: It was the sick and dying who despised the body and the earth and invented the things of heaven and the redeeming drops of blood. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.04) |
| 18306 | We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: We certainly do not want to enter into the kingdom of heaven: we have become men, so we want the kingdom of earth. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.18.2) |