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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Logical Necessity: Some Issues' and 'The Metaphysics of Causation'

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39 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
10373 Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Logical form should not have the last word in metaphysics, since it might predicate a property that we have theoretical reason to reject.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.3.1)
     A reaction: These kind of warnings need to be sounded all the time, to prevent logicians and language experts from pitching their tents in the middle of metaphysics. They are welcome guests only,
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
10367 There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: It can be argued that if all facts are logically equivalent, then there is only one fact - the True.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.1)
     A reaction: [he cites Davidson's 'Causal Relations', who cites Frege] This is the sort of bizarre stuff you end up with if you start from formal logic and work out to the world, instead of vice versa.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12184 Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: If it is logically necessary that if p then q, then there is no other sense of 'necessary' in which it is not necessary that if p then q.
     From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §1)
     A reaction: The thesis which McFetridge proposes to defend. The obvious rival would be metaphysical necessity, and the rival claim would presumably be that things are only logically necessary if that is entailed by a metaphysical necessity. Metaphysics drives logic.
15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
     Full Idea: McFetridge's conception of logical necessity is one which sees the concept as receiving its fundamental exemplification in the connection between the premiss and conclusion of a deductively valid inference.
     From: report of Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986]) by Bob Hale - Absolute Necessities 2
     A reaction: This would mean that p could be logically necessary but false (if it was a valid argument from false premisses). What if it was a valid inference in a dodgy logical system (including 'tonk', for example)?
15084 In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
     Full Idea: McFetridge's view proves that if the conditional corresponding to a valid inference is logically necessary, then there is no sense in which it is possible that its antecedent be true but its consequent false. ..This result generalises to any statement.
     From: report of Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986]) by Bob Hale - Absolute Necessities 2
     A reaction: I am becoming puzzled by Hale's assertion that logical necessity is 'absolute', while resting his case on a conditional. Are we interested in the necessity of the inference, or the necessity of the consequent?
12180 Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: There will be a legitimate notion of 'logical' necessity only if there is a notion of necessity which attaches to the claim, concerning a deductively valid argument, that if the premisses are true then so is the conclusion.
     From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §1)
     A reaction: He quotes Aristotle's Idea 11148 in support. Is this resting a stronger idea on a weaker one? Or is it the wrong way round? We endorse validity because we see the necessity; we don't endorse necessity because we see 'validity'.
12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: The traditional crucial assumption is that logical necessity is the strongest notion of necessity. If it is logically necessary that p, then it is necessary that p in any other use of the notion of necessity there may be (physically, practically etc.).
     From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §1)
     A reaction: Sounds right. We might say it is physically necessary simply because it is logically necessary, and even that it is metaphysically necessary because it is logically necessary (required by logic). Logical possibility is hence the weakest kind?
12183 It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: Is there any sense in which, despite an ascription of necessity to p, it is held that not-p is possible? If there is, then the original claim then it was necessary is not a claim of 'logical' necessity (which is the strongest necessity).
     From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §1)
     A reaction: See Idea 12181, which leads up to this proposed "test" for logical necessity. McFetridge has already put epistemic ('for all I know') possibility to one side. □p→¬◊¬p is the standard reading of necessity. His word 'sense' bears the burden.
12192 The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: The manifestation of the belief that a mode of inference is logically necessarily truth-preserving is the preparedness to employ that mode of inference in reasoning from any set of suppositions whatsoever.
     From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §4)
     A reaction: He rests this on the idea of 'cotenability' of the two sides of a counterfactual (in Mill, Goodman and Lewis). There seems, at first blush, to be a problem of the relevance of the presuppositions.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
12182 We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: Time- and person-relative epistemic possibility can be asserted even when logical possibility cannot, such as undecided mathematical propositions. 'It may be that p' just comes to 'For all I know, not-p'.
     From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §1)
     A reaction: If it is possible 'for all I know', then it could be actual for all I know, and if we accept that it might be actual, we could hardly deny that it is logically possible. Logical and epistemic possibilities of mathematical p stand or fall together.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12187 Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: The 'objectual modal realist' holds that what makes modal beliefs true are certain modal objects, typically 'possible worlds'. ..The 'non-objectual modal realist' says modal judgements are made true by how things stand with respect to this world.
     From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §2)
     A reaction: I am an enthusiastic 'non-objectual modal realist'. I accept the argument that real possible worlds have no relevance to the actual world, and explain nothing (see Jubien). The possibilities reside in the 'powers' of this world. See Molnar on powers.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12186 Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: The 'modal realist' holds that part of the totality of what is the case, the totality of facts, are such things as that certain events could have happened, certain propositions are necessarily true, if this happened then that would have been the case.
     From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §2)
     A reaction: I am an enthusiastic modal realist. If the aim of philosophy is 'to understand' (and I take that to be the master idea of the subject) then no understanding is possible which excludes the possibilities and necessities in things.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
13304 Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
10359 In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The questions about causation concern their relata (in space-time, how fine-grained, how many?) and the metaphysics (distinguish causal sequences from others, the direction of causation, selecting causes among pre-conditions?).
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], Intro)
     A reaction: A very nice map (which has got me thinking about restructuring this database). I can't think of a better way to do philosophy than this (let's hear it for analysis - but the greatest role models for the approach are Aristotle and Aquinas).
10372 Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: It is not clear whether causation is transitive. For example, if a boulder roll's towards a hiker's head, causing the hiker to duck, which causes the hiker to survive, it does not seem that the rolling boulder causes the survival of the hiker.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2)
     A reaction: Maybe survival is not an event or an effect. How many times have I survived in my life? We could, though, say that the hiker strained a muscle as he or she ducked. But then it is unclear whether the boulder caused the muscle-strain.
10374 There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Theories of causal connection are: nomological subsumption, statistical correlation, counterfactual dependence, agential manipulability, contiguous change, energy flow, physical processes, property transference, primitivism and eliminativism.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.3.1)
     A reaction: Schaffer reduces these to probability and process. I prefer the latter. The first two are wrong, the third right but superficial, the fourth wrong, the fifth, sixth and seventh on the right lines, the eighth wrong, the ninth tempting, and the last wrong.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
10366 Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The main argument for causation being transcendent (rather than being immanent in nature) is that absences can be involved in causal relations. Thus a rock-climber is caused to survive by not falling.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.1)
     A reaction: I don't like that. The obvious strategy is to redescribe the events. Even being hit with a brick could be described as an 'absence of brick-prevention'. So not being hit by a brick can be described as 'presence of brick prevention'.
10377 Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: One problem case for the process view of causation is 'disconnection'. If a brick breaks a window by being fired from a catapult, a latch is released which was preventing the catapult from firing, so the 'process' is just internal to the catapult.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.1)
     A reaction: Schaffer says the normal reply is to deny that the catch-releasing is genuinely causal. I would have thought we should go more fine-grained, and identify linked components of the causal process.
10378 A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: A problem case for the process view of causation is 'misconnection'. A process may be connected to an effect, without being causal, as when someone watches an act of vandalism in dismay.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.1)
     A reaction: This is a better objection to the process view than Idea 10377. If I push a window with increasing force until it breaks, the process is continuous, but it suddenly becomes a cause.
10382 Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: It might be that if causation is said to be a process, then a process is nothing more than a causal sequence, so that causation is primitive.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: This again is tempting (as well as the primitivist view of probabilistic causation). If one tries to define a process as mere chronology, then the causal and accidental are indistinguishable. I take the label 'primitive' to be just our failure.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
10375 At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The traditional view that the direction of causation is the direction of time has been challenged, by the direction of forking, by overdetermination, by independence, and by manipulation, which all seem to be one-directional features.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.3.1)
     A reaction: Personally I incline to the view that time is prior, and fixes the direction of causation. I'm not sure that 'backward causation' can be stated coherently, even if it is metaphysically or naturally possible.
10389 Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Reasons for causal order being temporal order are that otherwise the effect might occur but the cause then get prevented, ..and that they must be the same, because the temporal order can only be analysed in terms of the causal order.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.2)
     A reaction: If one took both time and causation as primitive, then the second argument would be void. The first argument, though, sounds pretty overwhelming to me.
10390 Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Reasons for denying that causal order is temporal order are that time travel seems possible, that cause and effect can be simultaneous, because joint effects have temporal order without causal connection, and because backward causation may exist.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.2)
     A reaction: The possibility of time travel and backward causation can clearly be doubted, and certainly can't be grounds for one's whole metaphysics. The other two need careful analysis, but I think they can be answered. Causation is temporal.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
10380 Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Primitivism arises from our failure to reduce causation, but also from causation being too central to reduce. The probability and process accounts are said to be inevitably circular, as they cannot be understood without reference to causation.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: This is very tempting. The primitive view, though, must deal with the direction problem, which may suggest that time is even more primitive. Can we have a hierarchy of primitiveness? To be alive is to be causal.
10385 If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The three main objections to causation being primitive are that causation can't be anything more than what we observe, or that such a primitive is too spooky to be acceptable, or that primitivism leads to elimination of causation.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: [summarised] I don't like the first (Humean) view. I suspect that anything which we finally decide has to be primitive (time, for example) is going to be left looking 'spooky', and I suspect that eliminativism is just Humeanism in disguise.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
10387 The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The concepts of 'event', 'law', 'cause' and 'explanation' are nomic concepts which serve to allow a systematic understanding of science; they do not themselves appear in the equations.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: This is a criticism of Russell's attempt to eliminate causation from science. It shows that there has to be something we can call 'metascience', which is the province of philosophers, since scientists don't have much interest in it.
10388 Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Causation can't be eliminated if it is needed to explain persistence, explanation, disposition, perception, warrant, action, responsibility, mental functional role, conceptual content, and reference. It's elimination would be catastrophic.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: [compressed list] I think I am going to vote for the view that causation is one of the primitives in the metaphysics of nature, so I have to agree with this. Most of the listed items, though, are controversial, so eliminativists are not defeated.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
10384 If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Causation seems to be primitive if the same laws and patterns of events might embody three different possible causes, as when two magicians cast the same successful spell, each with a 50% chance of success, and who was successful is unclear.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: I'm cautious when the examples involve magic. It implies that the process that leads to the result will be impossible to observe, but if magic never really happens, then the patterns of events will always be different.
10386 If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The view that causation is primitive can be defended against Humean critics by saying that causation can be directly observed in the will or our bodies, or that it can be inferred as the best explanation.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: I like both views, and have just converted myself to the primitivist view of causation! I can't know the essence of a tree, because I am not a tree, but I can know the essence of causation. The Greek fascination with explaining movement is linked.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
10361 Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Events are relatively coarse-grained, unlike facts; so the event of John's saying 'hello' seems to be the same event as John's saying 'hello' loudly, while they seem to be different facts.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1)
     A reaction: The example seems good support for facts, since saying 'hello' loudly could have quite different effects from just saying 'hello'. I also incline temperamentally towards a fine-grained account, because it is more reductivist.
10360 Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The standard view make causal relata events (Davidson, Kim, Lewis), but there is considerable support for facts (Bennett, Mellor), and occasional support for features (Dretske), tropes (Campbell), states of affairs (Armstrong), and situations and aspects.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1)
     A reaction: An event is presumed to be concrete, while a fact is more abstract (a proposition, perhaps). I'm always drawn to 'processes' (because they are good for discussing the mind), so an event, as a sort of natural process, looks good.
10362 One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The view that there are two causal relata is widely assumed but seldom defended. But the account based on 'effectual difference' says the form is 'c causes e rather than e*'. One might defend four relata, in 'c rather than c* causes e rather than e*'.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] This doesn't sound very plausible to me. How do you decide which is e*? If I lob a brick into the crowd, it hits Jim rather than - who?
10368 If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Theorists who reject both events and facts as causal relata do so because the relata must be immanent in nature, and thus not facts, but also fine-grained and thus not events.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2)
     A reaction: Kim, however, offers a fine-grained account of events (as triples), and Bennett individuates them even more finely (as propositions), so events might be saved. Descriptions can be very fine-grained.
10383 The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The primitivist about causation might say that the notion of an event (or other relata) cannot be understood without reference to causation, because properties themselves are individuated by their causal role.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: Having enthusiastically embraced the causal view of properties (see Shoemaker and Ellis), I suddenly realise that I seem required to embrace primitivism about causation, which I hadn't anticipated! I've no immediate problem with that.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
10393 Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The main argument against saying that there is no basis for selecting the one cause of an event is that our selections are too predictable to be without a basis.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.3)
     A reaction: The problem is that we CAN, if we wish, whimsically pick out any pre-condition of an event for discussion (e.g. the railways before WW1). I would say that sensitivity to nature leads us to a moderately correct selection of 'the' cause.
10394 Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Another argument against the view that there is no basis for selecting 'the' cause is that we have no concept of causation without such a selection.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.3)
     A reaction: Good. Otherwise we could only state the conditions preceding an event, and then every event that occurred at any given moment in a region would have the same cause. How can 'the' cause be necessary, and yet capricious?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
10376 The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: If Pam threw the brick that broke the window, then Bob (who refrained) might be a more reliable vandal, so that Pam's throw might have made the shattering less likely, so probability-raising is not necessary for causation.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1)
     A reaction: That objection looks pretty conclusive to me. I take the probabilistic view to be a non-starter.
10381 All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive: nomological - to distinguish laws from generalizations; statistical - to decide background; counterfactual - decide background; agent intervention - to understand intervention.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: I don't need much convincing that the probabilistic view is wrong. To just accept causation as primitive seems an awful defeat for philosophy. We should be able to characterise it, even if we cannot know its essence.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
20820 Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.