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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Vocation of Man' and 'reports'

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50 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: In power of persuasion, reasoning is far stronger than gold.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B051), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.04.12
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
The need to act produces consciousness, and practical reason is the root of all reason [Fichte]
     Full Idea: Consciousness of the real world proceeds from the need to act, not the other way around. …Practical reason is the root of all reason.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 3.I)
     A reaction: Strongly agree with the last part. In my conceptual scheme 'sensible' behaviour (e.g. of animals) precedes, in every way, rational behaviour. Sensible attitudes to quantity and magnitude precede mathematical logic. Minds exist for navigation.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Sufficient reason makes the transition from the particular to the general [Fichte]
     Full Idea: The principle of sufficient reason is the point of transition from the particular, which is itself, to the general, which is outside it.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but it seems worth passing on. Personally I would say that we have a knack of generalising, triggered when we spot patterns.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte]
     Full Idea: Each object has a definite number of properties, no more, no less. …Each of these objects possesses each of these properties to a definite degree.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: Quine flatly disagrees with this. Fichte offers no grounds for his claim. On the whole I think of properties as psychologically abstracted by us from holistic objects, so there is plenty of room for error. The underlying powers are real.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The principle of activity and generation is found in a self-moving basic force [Fichte]
     Full Idea: The principle of activity, of generation and becoming in and for itself, is purely in that force itself and not in anything outside it…; the force is not driven or set in motion, it sets itself in motion.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: A good account of primitive powers, as self-motivating forces. I can't think what else could be fundamental to nature. This whole passage of Fichte expounds a powers ontology.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
I am myself, but not the external object; so I only sense myself, and not the object [Fichte]
     Full Idea: I sense in myself, not in the object, for I am myself and not the object; therefore I sense only myself and my condition, and not the condition of the object.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 2)
     A reaction: I'm not clear why anyone would have total confidence in internal experience and almost no confidence in experience of externals. In daily life I am equally confident about both. In philosophical mode I make equally cautious judgements about both.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Awareness of reality comes from the free activity of consciousness [Fichte]
     Full Idea: It is the necessary faith in our freedom of power, in our own real activity, and in the definite laws of human action, which lies at the root of all our consciousness of a reality external to ourselves.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], p.98), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 06.4
     A reaction: I'd love to know what the 'laws of human action' are. Is it what Hume was trying to do? Moore says there is an 'element of self-creation' in Fichte's account of the source of reality. This is Descartes' dream argument biting back.
Self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge, and knowing something is knowing myself [Fichte]
     Full Idea: The immediate consciousness of myself is the condition of all other consciousness; and I know a thing only in so far as I know that I know it; no element can enter into the latter cognition which is not contained in the former.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], p.37), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 06.2
     A reaction: This strikes me as false, and a lot of intellectual contortion would be needed to believe it. Is knowing this pen is in front of me a case of knowing that I have knowledge of this pen, or is it just knowledge of this pen? [cf Kant 1781:A129]
There is nothing to say about anything which is outside my consciousness [Fichte]
     Full Idea: Of any connection beyond the limits of my consciousness I cannot speak. ...I cannot proceed a hair's breadth beyond this consciousness, any more than I can spring out of myself.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], p.74), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 06.3
     A reaction: I can't see that this is any different from the idealism of Berkeley, although they get there from different starting points. Idealist seem unable to even begin explaining consciousness.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte]
     Full Idea: Immediately I know only of myself. What I am able to know beyond that I am only able to know through inference.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: A direct descendant of the Cartesian Cogito, I assume. Personally, if I bang my head on a beam I take the beam to be a full paid-up member of reality. Is it not possible that he also knows himself through inference? Do animals infer reality?
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Faith is not knowledge; it is a decision of the will [Fichte]
     Full Idea: Faith is no knowledge, but a decision of the will to recognise the validity of knowledge.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 3.I)
     A reaction: What matters is the grounds for the decision. Mad conspiracy theories are decisions of the will which are false. Legitimate faith is an intuition of coherence which cannot be fully articulated.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte]
     Full Idea: No knowledge can be its own foundation and proof. Every knowledge presupposes something still higher as its foundation, and this ascent has no end.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 3.I)
     A reaction: A metaphor that's hard to visualise! He must have in mind a priori as well as empirical knowledge. The 'higher' levels don't seem to be God, but some region of absolute rationality, to which free minds have access. I think.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Consciousness has two parts, passively receiving sensation, and actively causing productions [Fichte]
     Full Idea: My immediate consciousness is composed of two constituent parts, the consciousness of my passivity, the sensation; and the consciousness of my activity, in the production of an object according to the principle of causality.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 2)
     A reaction: Kind of obvious, but unusual to make this sharp binary division. Modern neuroscience strongly militates against any and every simple binary division of brain activities.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
We can't know by sight or hearing without realising that we are doing so [Fichte]
     Full Idea: Q. Could you not perhaps know an object through sight or hearing without knowing that you are seeing or hearing? A. Not at all.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 2)
     A reaction: A nice statement of the traditional view which seemed to be demolished by the discovery of blindsight. In the light of modern brain research, the views of the mind found in past philosophers mostly seem very naïve.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte]
     Full Idea: Q. So that constantly and under all circumstances my consciousness of things outside of me is accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of myself? A. Quite so.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 2)
     A reaction: He should be more cautious about asserting the existence of something 'unnoticed'. The Earth's core is unnoticed by me, but there is plenty of evidence for it. Not so sure about unnoticed self. Still, I think central control of the mind is indispensable.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Forming purposes is absolutely free, and produces something from nothing [Fichte]
     Full Idea: My thinking and originating of a purpose is in its nature absolutely free and brings forth something from nothing.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 3.I)
     A reaction: Modern fans of free will are more equivocal in their assertions, and would be uncomfortable bluntly claiming to 'get something from nothing'. But that's what free will is! Embrace it, or run for your life.
The capacity for freedom is above the laws of nature, with its own power of purpose and will [Fichte]
     Full Idea: This capacity [for freedom], once it exists, is in the servitude of a power which is higher than nature and quite free of its laws, the power of purposes, and the will.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: You would think this could only refer to God, but he in fact is referring to the power of human free will. The clearest statement I have found of the weird human exceptionalism implied by a strong commitment to free will.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
I want independent control of the fundamental cause of my decisions [Fichte]
     Full Idea: I want to be independent - not to be in and through another but to be something for myself: and as such I want myself to be the fundamental cause of all my determinations.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: I think this sums up the absurdity of the concept of free will. The only reason he gives for his passionate belief in free will is that he desperately wants some imagined 'fundamental cause' for his action, and he wants full control of that chimera.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Nature contains a fundamental force of thought [Fichte]
     Full Idea: There is an original force of thought in nature just as there is an original formative force.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: I think this idea is false, but it helps to understand Fichte.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is awareness of one of our inner natural forces [Fichte]
     Full Idea: To will is to be immediately conscious of the activity of one of our inner natural forces.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: A more Nietzschean view would be that to will is to be conscious of the victor among our inner natural drives. It can't just be awareness of one force, because the will feels conflicts.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Physical beauty is merely animal unless intelligence be present.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B105)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Do not say or do what is base, even when you are alone. Learn to feel shame in your own eyes much more than before others.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B244), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.31.7
     A reaction: I like this. How you think and behave when unobserved is the true test of who you are. Feeling shame at a very private failing is an interesting phenomenon.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
I cannot change the nature which has been determined for me [Fichte]
     Full Idea: I cannot will the intention of making myself something other than what I am determined to be by nature, for I don't make myself at all but nature makes me and whatever I become.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: I take this to be a lot more accurate than Sartre's claim that we can re-make ourselves, but Fichte doesn't seem quite right. Don't I get any credit at all if I give up smoking, or train myself to treat someone more sympathetically?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
The self is, apart from outward behaviour, a drive in your nature [Fichte]
     Full Idea: This 'you' for which you show such a lively interest is, so far as it is not overt behaviour, at least a drive in your own peculiar nature.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: I assume this use of 'drive' is the origin of Nietzsche's picture of such things, focused on the basic will to power. I like Fichte's emphasis on active forces as the basis of nature.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Good breeding in cattle depends on physical health, but in men on a well-formed character.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B057), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.29.18
     A reaction: In our ultra-democratic age (supposedly) it is heresy to talk about good breeding, or some people being superior to others. But surely people should aim to improve their characters?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If life lacks love it becomes destruction [Fichte]
     Full Idea: Only in love is there life; without it there is death and annihilation.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: He gives not context of justification for this sudden claim. Watching from a melancholy distance the current 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, I take this idea to be a profound truth. If you let go of love, you float away down a dark stream.
Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B073), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.5.23
     A reaction: Is it possible to love something without seeing it as beautiful? A badly crippled dog, for example. If not, that seems to reveal something about beauty.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: One should choose not every pleasure, but only that concerned with the beautiful.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B207), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.22
     A reaction: The pleasures we should prefer are those which involve the whole person, rather than the mere stimulation of one sense. Sez me.
Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: For all men, good and true are the same; but pleasant differs for different men.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B069)
     A reaction: Truth is not 'for' anyone, but there's good-in-itself, and good-for-me. Are there some pleasures we should all enjoy (such as watching our children flourish)?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Accept no pleasure unless it is beneficial.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B074)
     A reaction: Maybe all pleasures bestow some benefit - even if they are linked to harm. I struggle to see what is wrong with a harmless and non-beneficial pleasure, and I doubt if anyone could explain it to me.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B194), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.03.46
     A reaction: Only, of course, for those able to perceive the nobility. In what does the 'nobility' consist, other than in the morally acceptable pleasure? Hard to explain 'noble'. Just 'wow!'?
Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Moderation multiplies pleasures, and increases pleasure.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B211), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.27
     A reaction: So moderation is a sneaky trick to avoid moderation? I presume the most intense pleasures are mostly unfamiliar, and so add novelty to the mix. Apart from eating chocolate, of course.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not a man.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B070)
     A reaction: Not factually correct, since the world is full of adults who have immoderate desires (notably for money). However, there are plenty of grown ups who don't seem very adult.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy, but he who is stronger than pleasures. Some men are masters of cities, but are enslaved by women.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B214), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.07.25
     A reaction: I'm not sure if 'bravery' is the relevant virtue here.Sounds like self-control or temperance. I suspect that mastering a city is quite pleasurable, if that's your thing.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Virtue consists, not in avoiding wrong-doing, but in having no wish thereto.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B062), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.17.37
Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Refrain from crimes not through fear but through duty [deon].
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B041), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.95
     A reaction: [not sure about the translation here]
A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: To live badly is not just to live badly, but to spend a long time dying.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B160), quoted by (who?) - where?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Repentance for shameful deeds is salvation in life.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B043)
Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: More men become good through practice than by nature.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B242), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.66
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B190), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.91
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the man wronged.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B045)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Unless a point of satiety is reached, the desire for money is far more cruel than the utmost poverty, because the greater the desire, the greater the need
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B219), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.10.43
Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Small appetite makes poverty equivalent to wealth.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B284), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.33.24
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The friendship of one intelligent man is better than that of all the unintelligent.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B098)
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B042), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.44.68
     A reaction: Something wrong with the translation here, if there is no Greek word for 'duty'.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Freedom means making yourself become true to your essential nature [Fichte]
     Full Idea: I want to be free means: I myself want to make myself be whatever I will be. I would therefore …already have to be, in a certain sense, what I am to become, so that I could make myself be it.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: This is much closer to the existenial picture of the malleable self, which Fichte arrives out once he commits to his desperate desire to have free will. [Not sure if my gist captures what he says].
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Poverty in a democracy is as preferable to what is called prosperity under autocracy as freedom is to slavery.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B251), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.40.42
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is wholly interconnected, and the tiniest change affects everything [Fichte]
     Full Idea: Nature is an interconnected whole; …you could shift no grain of sand from its spot without thereby, perhaps invisibly to your eyes, changing something in all parts of the immeasurable whole.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: Sounds like idealist daydreaming, but might it actually be true with respect to gravity?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.