16 ideas
14600 | Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: An analysis is an attempt at providing finite, non-circular, and intuitively adequate necessary and sufficient conditions. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3) | |
A reaction: Specifying the 'conditions' for something doesn't seem to quite add up to telling you what the thing is. A trivial side-effect might qualify as a sufficient condition for something, if it always happens. |
14603 | 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: 'Reification' occurs when a mere concept is mistaken for a thing. We seem generally prone to this sort of error. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Personally I think we should face up to the fact that this is the only way we can think about generalised or abstract entities, and stop thinking of it as an 'error'. We have evolved to think well about objects, so we translate everything that way. |
14607 | T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: System T is a normal modal system augmented with the reflexivity-generating axiom □p→p, and is, I think, the best modal logic for modeling lawhood. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n46) | |
A reaction: Schaffer shows in the article why transitivity would not be appropriate for lawhood. |
14604 | If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Science represents our best systematic understanding of the world, and if a certain notion proves unneeded in our best attempt at that, this provides strong evidence that what this notion concerns is not ontologically basic. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3.2) | |
A reaction: But is the objective of science to find out what is 'ontologically basic'? If scientists can't get a purchase on a question, they have no interest in it. What are electrons made of? |
14599 | Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Theoretical reduction concerns terms found in a theory; Definitional reduction concerns concepts found in the mind; Ontological reduction is independent of how we conceptualize entities, or theorize about them, and is about reality. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: An Aristotelian definition refers to reality, rather than to our words or concepts. |
14605 | Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Tropes can be identified with events. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n17) | |
A reaction: This is presumably on the view of events, associated with Kim, as instantiations of properties. This idea is a new angle on tropes and events which had never occurred to me. |
14601 | Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Individuation principles are attempts to describe how to count entities in a given domain, by saying when there is one. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3) | |
A reaction: At last, someone tells me what they mean by 'individuation'! So it is just saying what your units are prior to counting, followed (presumably) by successful counting. It seems to aim more at kinds than at particulars. |
12066 | Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt] |
Full Idea: The differences between Aristotelian essentialism and Kripke's essentialism are so fundamental and pervasive that it is a serious distortion of both views to think of essentialism as a single theory. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be very important, because there is a glib assumption that when essentialism is needed for modal logic, that we must immediately have embraced what Aristotle was saying. Aristotle was better than Kripke. |
12067 | An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt] |
Full Idea: An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition of the entity in question. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is a simple and necessity corrective to the simplistic idea that Aristotle thought that essences just were definitions. Aristotle believes in real essences, not linguistic essences. |
12082 | If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt] |
Full Idea: By holding that the most unified beings have essences in an unqualified sense, while allowing that other beings have them in a qualified sense - we can think of unity as a matter of degree. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 4.3) | |
A reaction: This is Witt's somewhat unorthodox view of how we should read Aristotle. I am sympathetic, if essences are really explanatory. That means they are unstable, and would indeed be likely to come in degrees. |
12089 | Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt] |
Full Idea: The central function of essence is to explain the actual existence of a unified substance. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 5 n1) | |
A reaction: She is offering an interpretation of Aristotle. Since existence is an active and not a passive matter, the identity of the entity will include its dispositions etc., I presume. |
12102 | Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt] |
Full Idea: The radical individuality of essential properties of origin makes them unsuitable for inclusion in an Aristotelian essence. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 6.2) | |
A reaction: Nevertheless, Aristotle believes in individual essences, though these seem to be fixed by definitions, which are composed of combinations of universals. The uniqueness is of the whole definition, not of its parts. |
14606 | Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The only plausible link from conceivability to possibility is via ideal conceivability. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n22) | |
A reaction: [He cites Chalmers 2002] I'm not sure what 'via' could mean here. Since I don't know any other way than attempted conceivability for assessing a possibility, I am a bit baffled by this idea. |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
12085 | Reality is directional [Witt] |
Full Idea: Reality is directional. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [Plucked from context! She attributes the view to Aristotle] This slogan beautifully summarises the 'scientific essentialist' view of reality, based not on so-called 'laws', but on the active powers of the stuffs of reality. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |