21 ideas
12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: I assume a form of truthmaking theory, ..which is a many-many relation, unlike, say correspondence, so that one entity can make multiple truths true and one truth can have multiple truthmakers. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: This sounds like common sense, once you think about it. One tree makes many things true, and one statement about trees is made true by many trees. |
14375 | If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: If a relation holds between two properties as a result of their intrinsic natures, then it appears the relation between the properties is not needed to do the structuring of reality; the properties themselves suffice to fix the structure. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.1) | |
A reaction: [the first bit quotes Jubien 2007] He cites a group of scientific essentialists as spokesmen for this view. Sounds right to me. No on seems able to pin down what a relation is - which may be because there is no such entity. |
14378 | Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Scientific practice seems aimed precisely at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.3) | |
A reaction: Good. Friends of powers should look at this nice paper by Jacobs. There is a good degree of support for this view from pronouncements of modern scientists. If scientists don't support it, they should. Otherwise they are trapped in the superficial. |
12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: The source of powers is not the laws of nature; it is the powerful nature of the ordinary properties of concrete particulars. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2) | |
A reaction: This pithily summarises my own view. People who think the powers of the world derive from the laws either have an implicit religious framework, or they are giving no thought at all to the ontological status of the laws. |
14377 | Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: To be possible is just to be one of the many manifestations of some power, and to be impossible is to be a manifestation of no power. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2.1) | |
A reaction: [This remark occurs in a discussion of theistic Aristotelianism] I like this. If we say that something is possible, the correct question is to ask what power could bring it about. |
14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: A non-actual state of affairs in possible if there actually was a substance capable of initiating a causal chain, perhaps non-deterministic, that could lead to the state of affairs that we claim is possible. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2) | |
A reaction: [He is quoting A.R. Pruss 2002] That seems exactly right. Of course the initial substance(s) might create a further substance, such as a transuranic element, which then produces the state of affairs. I favour this strongly actualist view. |
14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: A counterfactual is an invitation to consider what the properties picked out by the antecedent are powers for (where Lewis 1973 took it to be an invitation to consider what goes on in a selected possible world). | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.4.3) | |
A reaction: A beautifully simple proposal from Jacobs, with which I agree. This seems to be an expansion of the Ramsey test for conditionals, where you consider the antecedent being true, and see what follows. What, we ask Ramsey, would make it follow? |
14372 | Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Possible worlds are just not the sorts of things that could ground modality; they are not suitable truthmakers. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: Are possible world theorists actually claiming that the worlds 'ground' modality? Maybe Lewis is, since all those concrete worlds had better do some hard work, but for the ersatzist they just provide a kind of formal semantics, leaving ontology to others. |
12466 | All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Properties and the relations between them introduce modal connections in the actual world. ..This is a strong form of actualism, since all of modality is part of the fundamental fabric of the actual world. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: This is the view of modality which I find most congenial, with the notion of 'powers' giving us the conceptual framework on which to build an account. |
14371 | We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Together with a definition of possibility and necessity in terms of counterfactuals, the powers semantics of counterfactuals generates a semantics for modality that appeals to causal powers and not possible worlds. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: Wonderful. Just what the doctor ordered. The only caveat is that if we say that reality is built up from fundamental powers, then might those powers change their character without losing their identity (e.g. gravity getting weaker)? |
12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Lewis's concrete worlds give a better account of modality (than fictional worlds). When I learn that a man like me drives a truck, I gain evidence for the fact that I can drive a truck. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 12464. Jacobs still rightly rejects this as an account of possibility, since the possibility that I might drive a truck must be rooted in me, not in some other person who drives a truck, even if that person is very like me. |
12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Suppose somewhere deep in the rain forest is a book that includes a story about you as a truck-driver. I doubt that you would be inclined the think that that story, that book, is the reason you could have been a truck driver. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: This begins to look like a totally overwhelming and obvious reason why possible worlds (especially as stories) don't give a good metaphysical account of possibility. They provide a semantic structure for modal reasoning, but that is entirely different. |
12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: If we want our semantics for modality to give us insight into the truthmakers for modality, then possible worlds semantics is inadequate. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.4) | |
A reaction: [See the other ideas of Jacobs (and Jubien) for this] It is an interesting question whether a semantics for a logic is meant to give us insight into how things really are, or whether it just builds nice models. Satisfaction, or truth? |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
7602 | In the Bible God changes his mind (repenting of creating humanity, in the Flood) [Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: In the Bible God changes his mind, as when he repents of having made man and decides to destroy the human race in the Flood. | |
From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: It becomes apparent that the most startling feature of Christian fundamentalism is its uncritical reading of the Bible, in which passages are wilfully lifted from context, and inconvenient inconsistencies are ruthlessly ignored. |
7605 | Monotheism introduced intolerance into religious thinking [Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: We have become so used to the intolerance of monotheism that we may not appreciate that its hostility towards other gods was a new religious attitude; paganism was an essentially tolerant faith. | |
From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The comedian Dave Allen always signed off with "may your god go with you". To me the most striking feature of monotheists is frequently their barely controlled aggression, beneath a mask of strained compassion. |
7599 | Around 800 BCE teachers superseded gods in India [Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: Around the eighth century BCE the gods ceased to be very important in India, and would be superseded by the religious teacher, who would be considered higher than the gods. | |
From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: At least there has been one culture that gave an appropriate status to teachers. It seems astonishing in that age that human beings could have higher status than gods - way before the European 'humanists'. |
7597 | There is virtually no sign of monotheism in the Pentateuch [Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: It is very difficult to find a single monotheistic statement in the whole of the Pentateuch, and even the Ten Commandments take the existence of other gods for granted ("There shall be no strange gods for you before my face"). | |
From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: The transition from polytheism to monotheism is very strange. First God is 'jealous' of other gods, then supremely above them, and eventually totally exclusive. It's like watching the rise of Stalin. |
7606 | The idea that Jesus was God was only settled in the fourth century [Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: Jesus himself certainly never claimed to be God, and the doctrine that Jesus had been God in human form was not finalised until the fourth century. | |
From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: It was this final view which seems to have provoked Muhammed into developing a religion with the slogan "there is only one God". In Christianity an initially promising set of teachings grew into a prolonged irrational hysteria. |
7596 | Faith is not just belief in propositions, but also putting trust in them [Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: There is a distinction between belief in a set of propositions and a faith which enables us to put our trust in them. | |
From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is interestingly distinct from the usual idea that faith is putting belief in propositions which are not sufficiently rationally justified. How many philosophers actually have faith in the propositions they say they believe? |