Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Emperor's New 'Knows'' and 'Principle of Life and Plastic Natures'

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12 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I do not think that the Cartesians have ever proved or can prove that every perception is accompanied by consciousness.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.195)
     A reaction: This idea is very important in Leibniz, because non-conscious or barely conscious thoughts and perceptions explain a huge amount about behaviour, reality and morality.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content? [Bach]
     Full Idea: How can it be that a sentence like 'George knows that he has hands', even with time and references fixed, does not have a fixed propositional content?
     From: Kent Bach (The Emperor's New 'Knows' [2005], I)
     A reaction: The appeal is to G.E. Moore's common sense view of immediate knowledge (Idea 6349). The reply is simply that the word 'knows' shifts its meaning, having high standards in sceptical philosophy classes, and low standards on the street.
If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context [Bach]
     Full Idea: Contextualism seems to predict that if you encounter a knowledge attribution out of context you won't be in a position to grasp which proposition the sentence expresses.
     From: Kent Bach (The Emperor's New 'Knows' [2005], I)
     A reaction: It is only the word 'knows' which is at issue in the sentence. If someone is said to 'know' about the world of the fairies, we might well be puzzled as to what proposition was being expressed. Is the word 'flat' baffling out of context?
Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think [Bach]
     Full Idea: When a sceptic brings up far-fetched possibilities and argues that we can't rule them out, he is not raising the standard for the word 'know'. He is showing it is tougher than we realise for a belief to qualify as normal knowledge at all.
     From: Kent Bach (The Emperor's New 'Knows' [2005], III)
     A reaction: [Bach cites Richard Feldman for this idea] I think that what happens in the contextual account is that 'true', 'belief' and 'know' retain their standard meaning, and it is 'justified' which shifts. 'I am fully justified' can have VERY different meanings!
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Everything takes place in souls as if there were no body, and everything takes place in bodies as if there were no souls.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.198)
     A reaction: I don't think I have ever encountered a modern thinker who accepts this view. Leibniz rejected Occasionalism, but his account depends entirely on the role of God, to set up the pre-established harmony. Why would God do that?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Death, like generation, is only the transformation of the same animal, which is sometimes augmented and sometimes diminished.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.195)
     A reaction: Leibniz has a very unusual view of death, since neither minds nor their bodies can ever be wholly destroyed. Death is a kind of shrinking. I suspect that he was wrong about that.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It must not be said that each portion of matter is animated, just as we do not say that a pond full of fishes is an animated body, although a fish is.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.190)
     A reaction: This is a particularly clear picture of the role of monads in matter. Monads are attached to bodies, which are entirely inanimate, but monads suffuse matter and give it its properties, like particularly bubbly champagne. Cf Idea 19422.
Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There is no particle of matter which does not contain organic bodies.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.198)
     A reaction: Cf Idea 19416. There seems to be an interaction problem here (solved, presumably, by pre-established harmony). The organic bodies are there to explain the active behaviour of matter, but the related matter seems intrinsically inert.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The maxim that there is no motion which has not its origin in another motion, according to the laws of mechanics, leads us again to the Prime Mover.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.194)
     A reaction: This is Leibniz's endorsement (uncredited) to Aquinas's First Way. It is hard to see how the laws of mechanics could have anything to say about the origin of movement. And doesn't the law say that the motions of God need a mover?
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: My system of Pre-established Harmony furnishes a new proof of God's existence, since it is manifest that the agreement of so many substances, of which the one has no influence upon the other, could only come from a general cause on which they all depend.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.192)
     A reaction: Adjacent harmony seems self-explanatory, but remote harmony is interesting evidence for God. Hence modern quantum non-locality should make us all wonder whether there is a deeper explanation.