12298
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Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
In order to have genuine motion, rather than mere variation in position, it is necessary that the object should be 'entirely present' at each moment of the change. Thus without entire presence, or existence, genuine motion will not be possible.
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From:
Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.6)
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A reaction:
See Idea 4786 for a rival view of motion. Of course, who says we have to have Kit Fine's 'genuine' motion, if some sort of ersatz motion still gets you to work in the morning?
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12296
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4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Four-dimensionalists have thought that a material thing is as equally 'stretched out' in time as it is in space, and that there is no special way in which it is entirely present at a moment rather than at a position.
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From:
Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1)
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A reaction:
Compare his definition of 3-D in Idea 12295. The 4-D is contrary to our normal way of thinking. Since I don't think the future exists, I presume that if I am a 4-D object then I have to say that I don't yet exist, and I disapprove of such talk.
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18882
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You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons]
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Full Idea:
Fine says it is acceptable to ask when a wedding was and where it was, and it is acceptable to ask or state where the bride was (at a certain time), but not when she was.
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From:
report of Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.18) by Peter Simons - Modes of Extension: comment on Fine p.18
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A reaction:
This is aimed at three-dimensionalists who seem to think that a bride is a prolonged event, just as a wedding is. Fine is, interestingly, invoking ordinary language. When did the wedding start and end? When was the bride's birth and death?
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12297
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Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Even if one is a three-dimensionalist, one might affirm the existence of temporal parts, on the grounds that everything merely endures for an instant.
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From:
Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.2)
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A reaction:
This seems an important point, as belief in temporal parts is normally equated with four-dimensionalism (see Idea 12296). The idea is that a thing might be 'entirely present' at each instant, only to be replaced by a simulacrum.
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20440
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Art is a referential activity, hence indefinable, but it has a set of symptoms [Goodman]
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Full Idea:
No definition of art is possible (since it is a referential activity), …but the symptoms of art are syntactic density, semantic density, syntactic repleteness, exemplificationality, and multiple and complex reference.
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From:
Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.22-255), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 4
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A reaction:
I wish these labels were more self-explanatory. Goodman seems to want to assimilate art to his earlier interests in linguistic anti-realism and mereology. I wouldn't have thought he now had many followers.
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20437
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A copy only becomes an 'instance' of an artwork if there is a system of notation [Goodman]
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Full Idea:
Paintings and sculptures do not work within a notation; hence, there is no copying of an original that would preserve its originality. A copy of a painting is a copy, not an instance of the original.
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From:
Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.212), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 2
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A reaction:
Sounds conclusive, but isn't. Is a poetry manuscript a 'notation' or an original? Why is an etching plate a notation, but painting on canvas is an original? Can I create a painting specifically so that it can be copied (by my students)? Intention matters.
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