Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On Fate ('De fato')' and 'Knowledge and its Limits'

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? [Cicero]
     Full Idea: How can something that is not true not be false, or how can something that is not false not be true?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 16.38)
     A reaction: We must at least distinguish between whether the contrary thing is not actually true, or whether we are prepared to assert that it is not true. The disjunction may seem to be a false dichotomy. 'He isn't good' may not entail 'he is evil'.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing [Williamson]
     Full Idea: Knowing is the best kind of believing. Mere believing is a kind of botched knowing. In short, belief aims at knowledge (not just truth).
     From: Timothy Williamson (Knowledge and its Limits [2000], §1.5)
     A reaction: The difference between aiming at truth and aiming at knowledge has to be in the justificiation, so beliefs aim to be justified. Believers always aim at truth, but they can be strikingly relaxed about justification.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose]
     Full Idea: Williamson says that instead of being viewed as a concept to be analysed, knowledge should be seen as something useful in the analysis of all sorts of other concepts to epistemology - and to philosophy of mind as well.
     From: report of Timothy Williamson (Knowledge and its Limits [2000]) by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.8
     A reaction: I just don't believe this, because knowledge is obviously a complex state of mind, which invites breaking it down into ingredients. How could knowledge possibly be prior to truth?
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Oratory and philosophy are closely allied; orators borrow from philosophy, and ornament it [Cicero]
     Full Idea: There is a close alliance between the orator and the philosophical system of which I am a follower, since the orator borrows subtlely from the Academy, and repays the loan by giving to it a copious and flowing style and rhetorical ornament.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 02.03)
     A reaction: It is a misundertanding to think that rhetoric and philosophy are seen as in necessary opposition. Philosophers just seemed to think that oratory works a lot better if it is truthful.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
If desire is not in our power then neither are choices, so we should not be praised or punished [Cicero]
     Full Idea: If the cause of desire is not situated within us, even desire itself is also not in our power. ...It follows that neither assent nor action is in our power. Hence there is no justice in either praise or blame, either honours or punishments.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 17.40)
     A reaction: This is the view of 'old philosophers', but I'm unsure which ones. Cicero spurns this view. It is obvious that the causes of our desires are largely out of our control. Responsibility seems to concern what we do about our desires.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.