10 ideas
| 10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: We cannot in general suppose that we give a proper account of a concept by describing those circumstance in which we do, and those in which we do not, make use of the relevant word. We explain the point of the concept, what we use the word for. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231) | |
| A reaction: Well said. I am beginning to develop a campaign to make sure that analytical philosophy focuses on understanding concepts (in a full 'logos' sort of way), and doesn't just settle for logical form or definition or rules of usage. |
| 10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a rather contentious but very interesting claim. An even stronger claim might be that its value (its normative force) is ALL that the concept of truth contributes to speech, other aspects being analysed into something else. |
| 10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: For a particular bounded language, if it is free of ambiguity and inconsistency, it must be possible to characterize the true sentences of the language; somewhat as, for a given game, we can say which moves are winning moves. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.237) | |
| A reaction: The background of this sounds rather like Tarski, with truth just being a baton passed from one part of the language to another, though Dummett adds the very un-Tarskian notion that truth has a value. |
| 19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Tarski's definition of truth is like giving a definition of what it is to win in various games, without giving a hint as to what winning is (e.g. that it is what one tries to do when playing). | |
| From: report of Michael Dummett (Truth [1959]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 7 | |
| A reaction: This led Dummett to his 'normative' account of truth. Formally, the fact that speakers usually aim at truth seems irrelevant, but in life you certainly wouldn't have grasped truth if you thought falsehood was just as satisfactory. The world is involved. |
| 3597 | Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951], §152), quoted by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: A nice metaphor for the way in which axioms are derived. It is also close to Quine's metaphor of the 'net' of understanding, with the centre area 'standing fast'. Not neat and tidy, though. |
| 3596 | Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Wittgenstein remarked that if you tried to doubt everything, you would not get as far as doubting anything. | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.14 |
| 10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: One could train a dog to bark only when a bell rang and a light shone without presupposing that it possessed the concept of conjunction. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.235) |
| 4721 | If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951], §114) | |
| A reaction: A wonderfully challenging aphorism. I suspect that it is true, but not really a problem. We all know the meaning of 'Loch Ness Monster', as long as we don't get too fussy. And for local objects I am happy that I know the facts. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |