21 ideas
19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is an attempt to understand the world, as it is revealed to us both in our ordinary experience and by the discoveries and theories of science. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973], p.311) | |
A reaction: I don't see a sharp division between 'ordinary' and 'scientific'. I really like this idea, first because it makes 'understanding' central, and second because it wants both revelations. In discussing matter and time, there is too much emphasis on science. |
19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |
Full Idea: For a demonstration to be cogent it is necessary that the passage from step to step involve a recognition of truth at each line. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973], p.313) | |
A reaction: Dummett cited Quine (esp. 1970) as having an almost entirely syntactic view of logic. Rumfitt points out that logic can move validly from one falsehood to another. Even a 'proof' might detour into falsehood, but it would not be a 'canonical' proof! |
19060 | Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett] |
Full Idea: It is arguable whether two-valued truth tables give correct meanings for certain sentential operators, and even whether they constitute legitimate explanations of any possible sentential operators. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973], p.294) | |
A reaction: See 'Many-valued logic' for examples of non-binary truth tables. Presumably logicians should aspire to make their semantics precise, as well as their syntax. |
11066 | Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna] |
Full Idea: For Dummett the semantics of the metalanguage is the external and objective source of the justification of deduction. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 3.4 | |
A reaction: This is offered as an answer to the Lewis Carroll problem that justifying deduction seems to need deduction, thus leading to a regress. [There is a reply to Dummett by Susan Haack] |
19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
Full Idea: A plausible account is that the syntactic notion of consequence is for positive results, that some form of argument is valid; the semantic notion is required for negative results, that some argument is invalid, because a counterexample can be found. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973], p.292) | |
A reaction: This rings true for the two strategies of demonstration, the first by following the rules in steps, the second by using your imagination (or a tableau) to think up problems. |
19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Beth trees give a semantics for intuitionistic logic, by representing sentence meaning in terms of conditions under which it is recognised to have been established as true. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973], p.305) |
19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Nothing is lost, on this view, if in the standard semantic treatment of classical sentential logic, we replace the standard truth-values 'true' and 'false' by the numbers 0 and 1. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973], p.294) | |
A reaction: [A long context will explain 'on this view'] He is discussing the relationship of syntactic and semantic consequence, and goes on to criticise simple binary truth-table accounts of connectives. Semantics on a computer would just be 0 and 1. |
19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The standard two-valued semantics for classical logic involves a conception under which to grasp the meaning of a sentence is to apprehend the conditions under which it is, or is not, true. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973], p.305) | |
A reaction: The idea is that you only have to grasp the truth tables for sentential logic, and that needs nothing more than knowing whether a sentence is true or false. I'm not sure where the 'conditions' creep in, though. |
19065 | Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett] |
Full Idea: A proof of soundess or completeness is a test, not so much of the logical theory to which it applies, but of the theory of meaning which underlies the semantics. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973], p.310) | |
A reaction: These two types of proof concern how the syntax and the semantics match up, so this claim sounds plausible, though I tend to think of them as more like roadworthiness tests for logic, checking how well they function. |
6230 | If the soul were a tabula rasa, with no innate ideas, there could be no moral goodness or justice [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: The soul is not a mere rasa tabula, a naked and passive thing, with no innate furniture of its own, nor any thing in it, but what was impressed upon it without; for then there could not possibly be any such thing as moral good and evil, just and unjust. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Bk IV Ch 6.4) | |
A reaction: He goes on to quote Hobbes saying there is no good in objects themselves. I don't see why we must have an innate moral capacity, provided that we have a capacity to make judgements. |
6228 | Senses cannot judge one another, so what judges senses cannot be a sense, but must be superior [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: The sight cannot judge of sounds, nor the hearing of light and colours; wherefore that which judges of all the senses and their several objects, cannot be itself any sense, but something of a superior nature. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Ch.II.VI.1) | |
A reaction: How nice to find a seventeenth century English writer rebelling against empiricism! |
19061 | An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett] |
Full Idea: An explanation is often a deductive argument, with the fact needing explaining as its conclusion. ...But the conclusion is usually given in advance, and we may only believe the premisses because they plausibly explain the conclusion. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973], p.296) | |
A reaction: [compressed (Dummett's wordy prose cries out for it!)] I suppose this works better in mathematics, which is central to Dummett's interests. In the real world the puzzle is not usually logically implied by its explanation. |
6229 | Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: Sense which lies flat and grovelling in the individuals, and is stupidly fixed in the material form, is not able to rise up or ascend to an abstract universal notion. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Ch.III.III.2) | |
A reaction: This still strikes me as being one of the biggest problems with reductive physicalism, that a lump of meat in your head can grasp abstractions (whatever they are) and universal concepts. Personally I am a physicalist, but it is weird. |
19064 | Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett] |
Full Idea: In the sense of giving a model for the content of a sentence, its representative power, holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973], p.309) | |
A reaction: This will obviously be because sentences just don't have meaning in isolation, so their meaning can't be given in terms of the sentences. |
6227 | Keeping promises and contracts is an obligation of natural justice [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: To keep faith and perform covenants is that which natural justice obligeth to absolutely. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Ch.II.4) | |
A reaction: A nice example of an absolute moral intuition, but one which can clearly be challenged. Covenants (contracts) wouldn't work unless everyone showed intense commitment to keeping them, even beyond the grave, and we all benefit from good contracts. |
6225 | Obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: Obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Ch.II.3) | |
A reaction: Clearly villains can pass wicked laws, so there can't be an obligation to obey all laws (even if they are 'positive', which seems to beg the question). Nevertheless this is a good reason why laws cannot be the grounding of morality. |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
6224 | An omnipotent will cannot make two things equal or alike if they aren't [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: Omnipotent will cannot make things like or equal one to another, without the natures of likeness and equality. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Ch.II.I) | |
A reaction: This is one of the many classic 'paradoxes of omnipotence'. The best strategy is to define omnipotence as 'being able to do everything which it is possible to do'. Anything beyond that is inviting paradoxical disaster. |
6223 | If the will and pleasure of God controls justice, then anything wicked or unjust would become good if God commanded it [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: If the arbitrary will and pleasure of God is the first and only rule of good and justice, it follows that nothing can be so grossly wicked or unjust but if it were commanded by this omnipotent Deity, it must forthwith become holy, just and righteous. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Ch.I.I.5) | |
A reaction: This is the strong (Platonic) answer to the Euthyphro Question (Idea 336). One answer is that God would not command in such a way - but why not? We may say that God and goodness merge into one, but we are interested in ultimate authority. |
6226 | The requirement that God must be obeyed must precede any authority of God's commands [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: If it were not morally good and just in its own nature before any positive command of God, that God should be obeyed by his creatures, the bare will of God himself could not beget any obligation upon anyone. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Ch.II.3) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a self-evident truth, and a big problem for anyone who wants to make God the source of morality. You don't have to accept anyone's authority just because they are powerful or clever (though they do bestow a certain natural authority!). |