9 ideas
| 10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: The most important (ontological) relations holding among truth-makers are the part and whole relations. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6) | |
| A reaction: Hence Peter Simons goes off and writes the best known book on mereology. Looks very promising to me. |
| 10909 | Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true, because sentences with more than one truth-maker would then be ambiguous, and 'a' and 'a exists' would have the same designatum. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
| 10906 | Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: A 'moment' is an existentially dependent or non-self-sufficient object, that is, an object which is of such a nature that it cannot exist alone, ....... and we suggest that moments could serve as truth-makers. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §2) | |
| A reaction: [These three writers invented the term 'truth-maker'] |
| 10907 | The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: A proposition may have a minimal truth-maker which is not unique, or a sentence may be made true by no single truth-maker but only by several jointly, or again only by several separately. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
| 10912 | Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: Because of negative propositions, investigators of truth-makers have said that they are special non-objectual entities with a logical complexity, but we think a theory is possible in which the truth relation is tied to ordinary and scientific experience. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6) |
| 10908 | Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: The correspondence theory of truth invokes a special category of non-objectual entities - facts, states of affairs, or whatever - simply to serve as truth-makers. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
| 18521 | The criterion of existence is the possibility of action [Santayana] |
| Full Idea: The possibility of action ...is the criterion of existence, and the test of substantiality. | |
| From: George Santayana (The Realm of Matter [1930], p.107), quoted by John Heil - The Universe as We Find It | |
| A reaction: I rather like this. I think I would say the power is the criterion of existence. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |