Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Miscellaneous Observations' and 'Aristotle on Essence and Explanation'

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15 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis]
     Full Idea: Man has his being in truth - if he sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself. Whoever betrays truth betrays himself. It is not a question of lying - but of acting against one's conviction.
     From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 038)
     A reaction: Does he condone lying here, as long as you don't believe the lie? We would call it loss of integrity.
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis]
     Full Idea: The distinction between delusion and truth lies in the difference in their life functions.
     From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 008)
     A reaction: Pure pragmatism, it seems. We might expect doubts about objective truth from a leading light of the Romantic movement.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis]
     Full Idea: The more our senses are refined, the more capable they become of distinguishing between individuals. The highest sense would be the highest receptivity to particularity in human nature.
     From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 072)
     A reaction: I adore this idea!! It goes into the collection of support I am building for individual essences, against the absurd idea of kinds as essences (when they are actually categorisations). It also accompanies particularism in ethics.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung]
     Full Idea: If Jones ceases to be a father, or ceases to be over eight years old, he will cease to exist, yet these properties surely do not belong essentially to him.
     From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II)
     A reaction: This seems to correct, though I would doubt whether either of these count as true properties, in the causal sense I prefer. If being 'over 8' is a property, how many 'over n' or 'under m' properties does he have? One for each quantum moment?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung]
     Full Idea: It is possible that a property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another.
     From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], III)
     A reaction: Thus a love of blues music may be part of your essence, but only a minor part of me. Sounds right. Spin or charge are part of the essence of an electron, but only contingently part of a child's top.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung]
     Full Idea: Three essentialist claims are labelled 'Aristotelian': the thing would cease to exist without the property; an essential property is explanatory; and it is such that it must belong to everything to which it belongs.
     From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], Intro)
     A reaction: She says the second one is indispensable, and that it rules out the third one. My working assumption, like hers, is that the second one is the key part of the game, because Aristotle wanted to explain things.
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis]
     Full Idea: Experience is the test of the rational - and vice versa.
     From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 010)
     A reaction: A wonderful remark. Surely we can't ignore our need to test claims of pure logic by filling in the variables with concrete instances, to assess validity? And philosophy without examples is doomed to be abstract waffle. Coherence is the combined aim.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung]
     Full Idea: There will be demonstrated properties at the edge of the system, so to speak. They will be explained in terms of the essential properties of the basic entities and principles of the science, but will themselves not be explanatory of further properties.
     From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II)
     A reaction: This is an important line of thought which needs clarification. We can't glibly say that essences are what explain the other properties. Some properties do more than others to explain subsequent dependent properties.
Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung]
     Full Idea: It seems highly likely that some non-essential properties may explain more about the individual or about things of his kind than the peripheral properties.
     From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II)
     A reaction: Another important issue, if one is defending the explanatory role of essences. It is not only essences which explain. A key question is whether we endorse individual essences as well as generic ones. I think we should. They explain the details.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis]
     Full Idea: The seat of the soul is the point where the inner and the outer worlds touch. Wherever they penetrate each other - it is there at every point of penetration.
     From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 020)
     A reaction: I surmise that Spinoza's dual-aspect monism is behind this interesting remark. See the related idea from Schopenhauer.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis]
     Full Idea: Before abstraction everything is one - but one as chaos is - after abstraction everything is again unified - but in a free alliance of independent, self-determined beings. A crowd has become a society - a chaos is transformed into a manifold world.
     From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 094)
     A reaction: Personally I take (unfashionably) psychological abstraction to one of the key foundations of human thought, so I love this idea, which gives a huge picture of how the abstracting mind relates to reality.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis]
     Full Idea: Everything beautiful is a self-illuminated, perfect individual.
     From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 101)
     A reaction: It is a commonplace to describe something beautiful as being 'perfect'. Unfinished masterpieces are interesting exceptions. Are only 'individuals' beautiful? Is unity a necessary condition of beauty? Bad art fails to be self-illuminated.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis]
     Full Idea: Nothing is more indispensable for true religious feeling than an intermediary - which connects us to the godhead. The human being is absolutely incapable of sustaining an immediate relation with this.
     From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 073)
     A reaction: I take this to be a defence of priests and organised religion, and an implied attack on protestants who give centrality to private prayer and conscience.