40 ideas
| 6346 | The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: The most familiar epistemological theories are foundation theories, coherence theories, probabilistic theories, and reliabilist theories. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], Pref) | |
| A reaction: A helpful list. Reliabilism is now the dominant externalist theory. Probability theories will centre on Bayes' Theorem (Idea 2798). The authors want an internalist theory that includes perceptions as well as beliefs. I currently favour coherence. |
| 6351 | Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: One of the most important modern advances in epistemology was the recognition of defeasible reasons; it is now generally acknowledged that most of our reasoning proceeds defeasibly rather than deductively. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.2) | |
| A reaction: I agree totally. This is why fallibilism is clearly a correct position in epistemology (e.g. Ideas 2736 and 2755). Deduction is not the only grounds given for certainty - there are rationalist foundations (Descartes) and empiricist foundations (Moore). |
| 6374 | To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: If we want an agent to believe as many truths as possible, this could be achieved by simply believing everything; if we want an agent to have only true beliefs, this could be achieved by believing nothing. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §6.6) | |
| A reaction: I like this. It highlights the pragmatic need for a middle road, in which a core set of beliefs are going to be approved of as 'knowledge', so that we can get on with life. This has to be a social matter, and needs flexibility of Fallibilism. |
| 6355 | Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: We defend a version of direct realism, saying that justification must be partly a function of perceptual states themselves, and not just a function of our beliefs about perceptual states. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3) | |
| A reaction: Judgement suggests that perceptual states give good justification about primary qualities (like mass or shape), but not of secondary qualities (like smell or colour). Perceptions can be downright misleading. |
| 6359 | Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Phenomenalism offered the prospect of explaining perceptual knowledge within a framework that recognised only conclusive reasons; once it is acknowledged that at least induction uses nonconclusive reasons, it is no longer needed. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.3.2) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure that that is the only motivation for phenomenalism, which seemed to be attempting to get as close to 'reality' as intellectual honesty would allow. I certainly favour the modern relaxed attitude to knowledge, which needn't be 'conclusive'. |
| 6366 | Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Perception is a causal process that inputs beliefs into our doxastic system without their being inferred from or justified on the basis of other beliefs we already have. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.2.3) | |
| A reaction: This topic is much discussed (e.g. by MacDowell). I don't see how something is going to qualify as a 'belief' if it doesn't involve concepts and propositions. The point that we are caused to have many of our beliefs (rather than judging) seems right. |
| 6362 | Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: We think it is a mistake to suppose that the evidence of our senses comes to us in the form of beliefs; in perception, the beliefs we form are almost invariably about the objective properties of physical objects - not about how they appear to us. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.5.5) | |
| A reaction: The tricky word here is 'evidence'. At what point in the process of perception does something begin to count as evidence? It must at least involve concepts (and maybe even propositions) if it is going to be thought about in that way. |
| 6371 | Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Bayesian epistemology is based upon the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is sufficiently probable) and Bayes' Theorem. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.3.1) | |
| A reaction: For Bayes' Theorem, see Idea 2798. There is the question of whether the proposition is subjectively or objectively probable (I believe in ghosts, so any shadow is probably a ghost). There is also the problem of objective evidence for the calculation. |
| 6373 | Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Internalist theories make justifiability of a belief a function of the internal states of the believer, in the sense that if we vary anything but his internal states the justifiability of the belief does not vary. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §5.4.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a nice clear definition of internalism (and, by implication, externalism). It favours externalism. I know my car is in the car park; someone takes it for a joyride, then replaces it; my good justification seems thereby weakened. |
| 6353 | People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: We argue that all foundations theories are false, for the simple reason that people rarely have any epistemological basic beliefs, and never have enough to provide a foundation for the rest of our knowledge. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3) | |
| A reaction: Once surprising things start to happen in a film, we rapidly jettison our normal basic beliefs, to be ready for surprises. However, it seems to me that quite a lot of beliefs are hard-wired into us, or inescapably arise from the use of our senses. |
| 6361 | Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: What foundationalism requires is self-justification, which is weaker than incorrigibility. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.5.3) | |
| A reaction: The writers oppose foundationalism, but this remark obviously helps the theory. Bonjour votes for a fallible rationalist foundationalism, and an fallible empiricist version seems plausible (because we must check for hallucinations etc.). |
| 6357 | Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Reasoning, it seems, can only justify us in holding a belief if we are already justified in holding the beliefs from which we reason, so reasoning cannot provide an ultimate source of justification. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.1) | |
| A reaction: This sounds slick and conclusive, but it isn't. If we accept that some truths might be 'self-evident' to reason, they could stand independently. And a large body of rational beliefs might be mutually self-supporting, as in the coherence theory of truth. |
| 6363 | Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Either no belief is prima facie justified or all beliefs are prima facie justified; …we regard this as a decisive refutation of foundationalism. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.5.5) | |
| A reaction: The full text must he examined, but it is not at all clear to me how my belief that quantum theory is correct could be even remotely as prima facie justified as my belief that this is my hand. I don't think basic beliefs need be sharply divided off. |
| 6365 | Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: The regress argument has no apparent strength against negative coherence theories, because they do not require reasons for beliefs. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.2.3) | |
| A reaction: A nice point. Such theories endorse Neurath's picture (Idea 6348). On the whole philosophers like positive support for their beliefs, so the rather passive picture of accepting everything unless it is undermined is not appealing. A fall-back position. |
| 6354 | Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: All coherence theories fail, because they are unable to accommodate perception as the basic source of our knowledge of the world. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3) | |
| A reaction: An interesting claim, which the authors attempt to justify. They say it is direct realism, because the perceptions justify, without any intervening beliefs. My immediate thought is that they might justify knowledge of primary qualities, but not secondary. |
| 6367 | Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: The Isolation Argument objects that coherence theories cut justification off from the world. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.2.4) | |
| A reaction: I don't see this as a strong objection. Justification can be in the way beliefs cohere together, but the beliefs themselves consist of holding propositions to be true, and truth asserts a connection to the world (I say). |
| 6370 | Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: There are two major kinds of externalist theory in the literature - probabilism (which expresses justification in terms of probability of the belief being true), and reliabilism (which refers to the probability of the cognitive processes being right). | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.1) | |
| A reaction: A useful clarification. Reliabilism has an obvious problem, that a process can be reliable, but only luckily correct on this occasion (a clock which has, unusually, stopped). A ghost is more probably there if I believe in ghosts. |
| 6358 | One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: If I fall flat on my back running to a class, my belief that I was late for class may cause me to have the belief that there are birds in the trees, but I do not believe the latter on the basis of the former. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.1) | |
| A reaction: A nice example, which fairly conclusively demolishes any causal theory of justification. My example is believing correctly that the phone ring is from mother, because she said she would call. Maybe causation is needed somewhere in the right theory. |
| 6364 | We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: We cannot forsake all of our beliefs and start over again, because then we could not know how to start. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.1) | |
| A reaction: A point with which it is hard to disagree, but even Descartes agreed with it (Idea 3604). Presumably all your beliefs can take it in turn to be doubted, while others are held true, or you can whittle the beliefs which can't be abandoned down to a minimum. |
| 6352 | Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Enumerative induction examines a sample of objects, observes they all have a property, and infers that they all have that property; statistical induction observes a proportion of the objects having the property, and infers that proportion in general. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.4.6) | |
| A reaction: There is also induction by elimination, where it is either p or q, and observation keeps saying it isn't p. A small sample is very unreliable, but a huge sample (e.g. cigarettes and cancer) is almost certain, so where is the small/huge boundary? |
| 6372 | Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: It follows from the probability calculus that every tautology has probability 1; it then follows in Bayesian epistemology that we are justified in believing every tautology. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.3.1.5) | |
| A reaction: If I say 'a bachelor is a small ant' you wouldn't believe it, but if I said 'I define a bachelor as a small ant' you would have to believe it. 'Bachelors are unmarried' men is a description of English usage, so is not really a simple tautology. |
| 6360 | Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: The confirmation of scientific theories is probably best viewed in terms of inference to the best explanation. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.3.3) | |
| A reaction: A simple claim, but one with which I strongly agree. 'Inference', of course, implies that there is some fairly strict logical thinking going on, which may not be so. I suspect that dogs can move to the best explanation. It is, though, a rational process. |
| 7337 | In Mosaic legal theory, crimes are sins and sins are crimes [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: In Mosaic legal theory, all breaches of the law offend God. All crimes are sins, just as all sins are crimes. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
| A reaction: This would seem to define Josephus called a 'theocracy'. Not just rule by a priesthood, but also an attempt to make civil law coincide with the teachings of sacred texts. But doing 80 m.p.h. on a motorway at 2 a.m. hardly seems like a sin. |
| 7339 | Because human life is what is sacred, Mosaic law has no death penalty for property violations [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Where other codes provided the death penalty for offences against property, in Mosaic law no property offence is capital; human life is too sacred, where the rights of property alone are violated. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
| A reaction: We still preserve this idea in our law, and also in our culture, where we are keen to insist that catastrophes like earthquakes or major fires are measured almost entirely by the loss of life, not the loss of property. I approve. |
| 7353 | The Pharisees undermined slavery, by giving slaves responsibility and status in law courts [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: It is no accident that slavery among Jews disappeared with the rise of the Pharisees, as they insisted that all were equal before God in a court. Masters were no longer responsible for actions of slaves, so a slave had status, and slavery could not work. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
| A reaction: As in seventeenth century England, the rise of social freedom comes from religious sources, not social sources. A slave has status in the transcendent world of souls, despite being a nobody in the physical world. |
| 7340 | Mosaic law was the first to embody the rule of law, and equality before the law [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Mosaic law meant that God ruled through his laws, and since all were equally subject to the law, the system was the first to embody the double merits of the rule of law and equality before the law. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
| A reaction: If this is correct, it seems to be a hugely important step, combined with Idea 1659, that revenge should be the action of a the state, not of the individual. They are the few simple and essential keys to civilization. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 7338 | Man's life is sacred, because it is made in God's image [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: In Mosaic theology, man is made in God's image, and so his life is not just valuable, it is sacred. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
| A reaction: The obvious question is what exactly is meant by "in God's image". Physically, spiritually, intellectually, morally? I am guessing that the original idea was intellectual, because we are the only rational animal. The others seem unlikely, or arrogant. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
| 7348 | The Jews sharply distinguish human and divine, but the Greeks pull them closer together [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: The Jews drew an absolute distinction between the human and the divine; the Greeks constantly elevated the human - they were Promethean - and lowered the divine. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
| A reaction: An intriguing observation. The Greek idea runs right through European culture, surfacing (for example) in 'Faust', or 'Frankenstein', or the films of James Cameron. I'm with the Greeks; I want to see how far humanity can be elevated. |
| 7355 | The Torah pre-existed creation, and was its blueprint [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: The Torah was not just a book about God. It pre-existed creation, in the same way as God did. In fact, it was the blueprint of creation. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt III) | |
| A reaction: You can only become a 'people of the book' (which Moslems resented in Judaism, and then emulated) if you give this stupendously high status to your book. Hence Christian fundamentalism makes sense, with its emphasis on the divinity of the Bible. |
| 7336 | A key moment is the idea of a single moral God, who imposes his morality on humanity [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: The discovery of monotheism, and not just of monotheism but of a sole, omnipotent God actuated by ethical principles and seeking methodically to impose them on human beings, is one of the greatest turning-points in history, perhaps the greatest of all. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
| A reaction: 'Discovery' begs some questions, but when put like this you realise what a remarkable event it was. It is a good candidate for the most influential idea ever, even if large chunks of humanity, especially in the orient, never took to monotheism. |
| 7341 | Sampson illustrates the idea that religious heroes often begin as outlaws and semi-criminals [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Sampson is the outstanding example of the point which the Book of Judges makes again and again, that the Lord and society are often served by semi-criminal types, outlaws and misfits, who become folk-heroes and then religious heroes. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
| A reaction: This illustrates nicely Nietzsche's claim, that the jews were responsible for his 'inversion of values', in which aristocratic virtues are downgraded, and the virtues of a good slave are elevated (though Sampson may not show that point so well!). |
| 7342 | Isaiah moved Israelite religion away from the local, onto a more universal plane [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: The works of Isaiah (740-700 BCE) mark the point at which the Israelite religion began to spiritualize itself, to move from a specific location in space and time on to the universalist plane. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
| A reaction: This is necessary if any religion is going to make converts outside the local culture. The crucial step would be to disembody God, so that He cannot be represented by a statue. The difficulty is for him to be universal, but retain a 'chosen people'. |
| 7344 | Judaism involves circumcision, Sabbath, Passover, Pentecost, Tabernacles, New Year, and Atonement [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: The practices of Judaism developed during their Exile: circumcision, the Sabbath, the Passover (founding of the nation), Pentecost (giving of the laws), the Tabernacles, the New Year, and the Day of Atonement. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
| A reaction: These were the elements of ritual created to replace the existence of a physically located state. An astonishing achievement, not even remotely achieved by any other state that was driven off its lands. A culture is an idea, not a country. |
| 7345 | In exile the Jews became a nomocracy [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: In exile the Jews, deprived of a state, became a nomocracy - voluntarily submitting to rule by a Law which could only be enforced by consent. Nothing like this had occurred before in history. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
| A reaction: It is the most remarkable case in history of a people united and strengthened by adversity, and it became an important experiment in the building of human cultures. But what is the point of preserving a culture, with no land? Why not just integrate? |
| 7347 | Zoroastrians believed in one eternal beneficent being, Creator through the holy spirit [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Cyrus the Great was a Zoroastrian, believing in one, eternal, beneficent being, 'Creator of all things through the holy spirit'. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
| A reaction: Is this the actual origin of monotheism, or did they absorb this idea from the Jews? The interesting bit is the fact that the supreme being (called Marduk) is 'beneficent', which one doesn't associate with these remote and supposed pagans. |
| 7349 | Immortality based on judgement of merit was developed by the Egyptians (not the Jews) [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: The idea of judgement at death and immortality on the basis of merit were developed in Egypt before 1000 BCE. It is not Jewish because it was not in the Torah, and the Sadducees, who stuck to their texts, seemed to have denied the afterlife completely. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
| A reaction: This is the idea considered crucial to religion by Immanuel Kant (Idea 1455), who should be declared an honorary Egyptian. To me the idea that only the good go to heaven sounds like sadly wishful thinking - a fictional consolation for an unhappy life. |
| 7354 | The main doctrine of the Pharisees was belief in resurrection and the afterlife [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Belief in resurrection and the afterlife was the main distinguishing mark of Pharisaism, and thus fundamental of rabbinic Judaism. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
| A reaction: Belief in an afterlife seems to go back to the Egyptians, but this development in Judaism was obviously very influential, even among early Christians, who initially seem to have only believed in resurrection of the body. |
| 7356 | Pious Jews saw heaven as a vast library [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Pious Jews saw heaven as a vast library, with the Archangel Metatron as the librarian: the books in the shelves there pressed themselves together to make room for a newcomer. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt III) | |
| A reaction: I'm tempted to convert to Judaism. |