14 ideas
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
Full Idea: While coherence may lack the positive role many have assigned to it, ...incoherence plays an important negative role in our enquiries. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 10.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Peirce as the main source for this idea] We can hardly by deeply impressed by incoherence if we have no sense of coherence. Incoherence is just one of many markers for theory failure. Missing the target, bad concepts... |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
Full Idea: According to Lehrer, coherence should be understood in terms of the capacity to answer objections. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 9) | |
A reaction: [Keith Lehrer 1990] We can connect this with the Greek requirement of being able to give an account [logos], which is the hallmark of understanding. I take coherence to be the best method of achieving understanding. Any understanding meets Lehrer's test. |
21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
Full Idea: Far from guaranteeing a high likelihood of truth by itself, testimonial agreement can apparently do so only if the circumstances are favourable as regards independence, prior probability, and individual credibility. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: This is Olson's main thesis. His targets are C.I.Lewis and Bonjour, who hoped that a mere consensus of evidence would increase verisimilitude. I don't see a problem for coherence in general, since his favourable circumstances are part of it. |
21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
Full Idea: An enquirer who is fortunate enough to have at his or her disposal fully reliable information sources has no use for coherence, the need for which arises only in the context of less than fully reliable informations sources. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 2.6.2) | |
A reaction: I take this to be entirely false. How do you assess reliability? 'I've seen it with my own eyes'. Why trust your eyes? In what visibility conditions do you begin to doubt your eyes? Why do rational people mistrust their intuitions? |
21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
Full Idea: The Input Objection says a pure coherence theory would seem to allow that a system of beliefs be justified in spite of being utterly out of contact with the world it purports to describe, so long as it is, to a sufficient extent, coherent. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Olson seems impressed by this objection, but I don't see how a system could be coherently about the world if it had no known contact with the world. Olson seems to ignore meta-coherence, which evaluates the status of the system being studied. |
21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
Full Idea: Any non-trivial extension of a belief system is less probable than the original system, but there are extensions that are more coherent than the original system. Hence more coherence does not imply a higher probability. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 6.4) | |
A reaction: [Olson cites Klein and Warfield 1994; compressed] The example rightly says the extension could have high internal coherence, but not whether the extension is coherent with the system being extended. |
17064 | 1: Coherence is a symmetrical relation between two propositions [Thagard, by Smart] |
Full Idea: 1: Coherence and incoherence are symmetrical between pairs of propositions. | |
From: report of Paul Thagard (Explanatory Coherence [1989], 1) by J.J.C. Smart - Explanation - Opening Address p.04 |
17065 | 2: An explanation must wholly cohere internally, and with the new fact [Thagard, by Smart] |
Full Idea: 2: If a set of propositions explains a further proposition, then each proposition in the set coheres with that proposition, and propositions in the set cohere pairwise with one another. | |
From: report of Paul Thagard (Explanatory Coherence [1989], 2) by J.J.C. Smart - Explanation - Opening Address p.04 |
17066 | 3: If an analogous pair explain another analogous pair, then they all cohere [Thagard, by Smart] |
Full Idea: 3: If two analogous propositions separately explain different ones of a further pair of analogous propositions, then the first pair cohere with one another, and so do the second (explananda) pair. | |
From: report of Paul Thagard (Explanatory Coherence [1989], 3) by J.J.C. Smart - Explanation - Opening Address p.04 |
17067 | 4: For coherence, observation reports have a degree of intrinsic acceptability [Thagard, by Smart] |
Full Idea: 4: Observation reports (for coherence) have a degree of acceptability on their own. | |
From: report of Paul Thagard (Explanatory Coherence [1989], 4) by J.J.C. Smart - Explanation - Opening Address p.04 | |
A reaction: Thagard makes this an axiom, but Smart rejects that and says there is no reason why observation reports should not also be accepted because of their coherence (with our views about our senses etc.). I agree with Smart. |
17068 | 5: Contradictory propositions incohere [Thagard, by Smart] |
Full Idea: 5: Contradictory propositions incohere. | |
From: report of Paul Thagard (Explanatory Coherence [1989], 5) by J.J.C. Smart - Explanation - Opening Address p.04 | |
A reaction: This has to be a minimal axiom for coherence, but coherence is always taken to be more than mere logical consistency. Mutual relevance is the first step. At least there must be no category mistakes. |
17069 | 6: A proposition's acceptability depends on its coherence with a system [Thagard, by Smart] |
Full Idea: 6: Acceptability of a proposition in a system depends on its coherence with the propositions in that system. | |
From: report of Paul Thagard (Explanatory Coherence [1989], 6) by J.J.C. Smart - Explanation - Opening Address p.04 | |
A reaction: Thagard tried to build an AI system for coherent explanations, but I would say he has no chance with these six axioms, because they never grasp the nettle of what 'coherence' means. You first need rules for how things relate. What things are comparable? |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |