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15094
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I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
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Full Idea:
I now reject the formulation of the causal theory which says that a property is a cluster of conditional powers. That has a reductionist flavour, which is a cheat. We need properties to explain conditional powers, so properties won't reduce.
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From:
Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III)
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A reaction:
[compressed wording] I agree with Mumford and Anjum in preferring his earlier formulation. I think properties are broad messy things, whereas powers can be defined more precisely, and seem to have more stability in nature.
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15099
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If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
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Full Idea:
If it is possible that there could be possible states of affairs that are not nomologically possible, don't we therefore need a notion of metaphysical possibility that outruns nomological possibility?
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From:
Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI)
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A reaction:
Shoemaker rejects this possibility (p.425). I sympathise. So there is 'natural' possibility (my preferred term), which is anything which stuff, if it exists, could do, and 'logical' possibility, which is anything that doesn't lead to contradiction.
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15101
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Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
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Full Idea:
Once the obstacle of the deeply rooted conviction that necessary truths should be knowable a priori is removed, ...causal necessity is (pretheoretically) the very paradigm of necessity, in ordinary usage and in dictionaries.
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From:
Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VII)
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A reaction:
The a priori route seems to lead to logical necessity, just by doing a priori logic, and also to metaphysical necessity, by some sort of intuitive vision. This is a powerful idea of Shoemaker's (implied, of course, in Kripke).
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15100
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Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker]
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Full Idea:
Imaginability can give us access to conceptual possibility, when we come to believe situations to be conceptually possible by reflecting on their descriptions and seeing no contradiction or incoherence.
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From:
Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI)
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A reaction:
If take the absence of contradiction to indicate 'logical' possibility, but the absence of incoherence is more interesting, even if it is a bit vague. He is talking of 'situations', which I take to be features of reality. A priori synthetic?
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22449
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When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
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Full Idea:
One might think that 'is red' means the same as 'seems red to most people', forgetting that when asked if an object is red we look at it to see if it is red, and not in order to estimate the reaction that others will have to it.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.23)
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A reaction:
True, but we are conscious of our own reliability as observers (e.g. if colourblind, or with poor hearing or eyesight). I don't take my glasses off, have a look, and pronounce that the object is blurred. Ordinary language philosophy in action.
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22451
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All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
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Full Idea:
There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33)
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A reaction:
There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view.
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22452
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Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
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Full Idea:
Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it?
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35)
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A reaction:
Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well.
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15093
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We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker]
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Full Idea:
One way to get the conclusion that laws are necessary is to combine my view of properties with the view of Armstrong, Dretske and Tooley, that laws are, or assert, relations between properties.
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From:
Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], I)
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A reaction:
This is interesting, because Armstrong in particular wants the necessity to arise from relations between properties as universals, but if we define properties causally, and make them necessary, we might get the same result without universals.
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