39 ideas
125 | Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: Even a naturally gifted philosopher isn't going to develop into a real man, because he's avoiding the heart of his community and the thick of the agora. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 485d) | |
A reaction: A serious charge against philosophy. An attraction of the subject is its purity, its necessity, its timelessness, and in some ways these are just nicer and easier and more understandable than the hard mess of real life. But understanding has to be good. |
1654 | In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato] |
Full Idea: In the 'Gorgias' Socrates is still supremely confident that the elenchus is the final arbiter of moral truth. | |
From: comment on Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.117 |
4321 | We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato] |
Full Idea: Test me, and let yourself be tested as well, by asking and answering questions. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 462a) | |
A reaction: The idea must be to avoid wild speculation, by continually filtering ideas through rival critical intelligences. The best philosophical method ever devised. |
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
Full Idea: I once wrote that there are three linguistic devices that make it possible for us to frame undecidable statements: quantification over infinity totalities, as expressed by word such as 'never'; the subjunctive conditional form; and the past tense. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 4) | |
A reaction: Dummett now repudiates the third one. Statements containing vague concepts also appear to be undecidable. Personally I have no problems with deciding (to a fair extent) about 'never x', and 'if x were true', and 'it was x'. |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
Full Idea: There is surely no number n such that "n grains of sand do not make a heap, although n+1 grains of sand do" is true. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 4) | |
A reaction: It might be argued that there is such a number, but no human being is capable of determing it. Might God know the value of n? On the whole Dummett's view seems the most plausible. |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The intuitionist account of the meaning of mathematical statements does not employ the notion of a statement's being true, but only that of something's being a proof of the statement. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 2) | |
A reaction: I remain unconvinced that anyone could give an account of proof that didn't discreetly employ the notion of truth. What are we to make of "we suspect this is true, but no one knows how to prove it?" (e.g. Goldbach's Conjecture). |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The idea of 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east'. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: The phrase was coined in Oxford. It is a useful label with which realists can insult solipsists, idealists and other riff-raff. Four Dimensionalists seem to see time in this way. Events sit there, and we travel past them. But there are indexical events. |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
Full Idea: In distinguishing between what can establish a statement about the past as true and what it is that that statement says, we are repudiating antirealism about the past. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: This is a late shift of ground from the champion of antirealism. If Dummett's whole position is based on a 'justificationist' theory of meaning, he must surely have a different theory of meaning now for statements about the past? |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The existence of a universe from which sentience was permanently absent is an unintelligible fantasy. What exists is what can be known to exist. What is true is what can be known to be true. Reality is what can be experienced and known. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as nonsense. The fact that we cannot think about a universe without introducing a viewpoint does not mean that we cannot 'intellectually imagine' its existence devoid of viewpoints. Nothing could ever experience a star's interior. |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Verification is not an individual but a collective activity. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: This generates problems. Are deceased members of the community included? (Yes, says Dummett). If someone speaks to angels (Blake!), do they get included? Is a majority necessary? What of weird loners? Etc. |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
Full Idea: To demonstrate the necessity of a truth-conditional theory of meaning, a proponent of such a theory must argue that use cannot be described without appeal to the conditions for the truth of statements. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: Unlike Dummett, I find that argument rather appealing. How do you decide the possible or appropriate use for a piece of language, if you don't already know what it means. Basing it all on social conventions means it could be meaningless ritual. |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
Full Idea: It is not enough for the truth-condition theorist to argue that we need the concept of truth: he must show that we should have the same conception of truth that he has. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 2) | |
A reaction: Davidson invites us to accept Tarski's account of truth. It invites the question of what the theory would be like with a very robust correspondence account of truth, or a flabby rather subjective coherence view, or the worst sort of pragmatic view. |
114 | Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato] |
Full Idea: Rhetoric is an agent of the kind of persuasion which is designed to produce conviction, but not to educate people about right and wrong. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 455a) | |
A reaction: Surely there must be good rhetoric (or at least it is an open question)? |
116 | Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato] |
Full Idea: Rhetoric is a knack, because it lacks rational understanding of its object or what it dispenses (and can't explain the reason anything happens). | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 465a) | |
A reaction: If there are cunning people who have the wrong sort of intelligence for morality, there must be cunning users of rhetoric who know exactly what they are doing. |
135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
Full Idea: All activity aims at the good. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 499e) | |
A reaction: He includes non-conscious activity, so this is the 'teleological' view of nature, which seems a bit optimistic to the modern mind. |
122 | Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: It's the weaklings who constitute the majority of the human race who make the rules. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483b) | |
A reaction: An aristocrat bemoans democracy. Presumably the qualification for being a 'weakling' is shortage of money. How strong are the scions of the aristocrats? |
139 | A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato] |
Full Idea: A good person is bound to do whatever he does well and successfully, and success brings fulfilment and happiness. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 507c) | |
A reaction: Not how we would see it, I guess, but this is the Greek idea that a good person is one who functions well. Anyone who functions well is probably having a good time. |
128 | Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: Nature says the only authentic way of life is to do nothing to hinder or restrain the expansion of one's desires. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 491e) | |
A reaction: Sounds like the natural desires of a young single man. Parents and spouses have natural desires that focus on other people's desires. |
136 | Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato] |
Full Idea: Good should be the goal of pleasant activities, rather than pleasure being the goal of good activities. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 500a) | |
A reaction: Nice. Not far off what Aristotle says on the topic. So what activities should we seek out? Narrow the pleasures down to the good ones, or narrow the good ones down to the pleasurable? |
4322 | In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato] |
Full Idea: When we drink to quench thirst, we lose the distress of the thirst and the pleasure of drinking at the same moment, but one loss is good and the other bad, so the pleasure and the goodness must be separate. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 497d) | |
A reaction: This is open to the objection that the good of slaking one's thirst is a long-term pleasure, where the drinking is short-term, so pleasure is still the good. |
134 | Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato] |
Full Idea: There is little to tell between good and bad people (e.g. cowards) in terms of how much pleasure and distress they experience. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 498c) | |
A reaction: A very perceptive remark. If the good are people with empathy for others, then they may suffer more distress than the insensitive wicked. |
132 | If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato] |
Full Idea: Socrates: I want to ask whether a lifetime spent scratching, itching and scratching, no end of scratching, is also a life of happiness. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 494c) | |
A reaction: There are plenty of people who think 'fun' is the main aim of life, and who fit what Socrates is referring to. We don't admire such a life, but not many people can be admired. |
4319 | In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato] |
Full Idea: In a fool's mind desire is a leaky jar, …which is an analogy for the mind's insatiability, showing we should prefer an orderly life, in which one is content with whatever is to hand, to a self-indulgent life of insatiable desire. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 493b) | |
A reaction: This points to an interesting paradox, that pleasure requires the misery of desire. And yet absence of desire is like death. An Aristotelian mean, of living according to nature, seems the escape route. |
130 | Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: If a person has the means to live a life of sensual, self-indulgent freedom, there's no better or happier state of existence. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492c) |
120 | Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Socrates: We should avoid doing wrong because of all the bad consequences it will bring us. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 480a) |
118 | I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato] |
Full Idea: Socrates: If I had to choose between doing wrong and having wrong done to me, I'd prefer the latter to the former. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 469c) | |
A reaction: cf Democritus 68B45 |
140 | Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Self-indulgent desire makes a person incapable of co-operation, which is a prerequisite of friendship. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 507e) |
131 | If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: If people who need nothing are happy, there would be nothing happier than a stone or a corpse. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492e) | |
A reaction: We aren't really supposed to approve of Callicles, but to me this is a splendidly crushing western response to many of the ideals found in eastern philosophy. |
119 | A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato] |
Full Idea: Socrates: A criminal is worse off if he doesn't pay the penalty, and continues to do wrong without getting punished. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 472e) |
129 | Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: Why do most people praise self-discipline and justice? Because their own timidity makes them incapable of satisfying their pleasures. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492a) |
4320 | The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato] |
Full Idea: I'm sure you know the list of human advantages in the party song: 'The very best is health, Second good looks, and third honest wealth'. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 451e) | |
A reaction: This invites the obvious question of why anyone wants these three things, with the implied answer of 'pleasure'. But we might want them even if we couldn't use them, implying pluralism. |
137 | As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato] |
Full Idea: As in every case (an artefact, a body, a mind, a creature), a good state is an organised and orderly state. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 506e) |
141 | A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato] |
Full Idea: The only responsibility of a good member of a community is altering the community's needs rather than going along with them. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 517b) |
123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: It's because most people are second-rate that they are happy for things to be distributed equally. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483c) |
124 | Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: We only have to look at nature to find evidence that it is right for better to have a greater share than worse. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483d) |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Maybe both the past and the future are real, determined by our current temporal perspective. Past is then events capable of having a causal influence upon events near us, and future is events we can affect, but from which we receive no information. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: This is the Four-Dimensional view, which is opposed to Presentism. Might immediate unease is that it gives encouragement to fortune-tellers, whom I have always dismissed with 'You can't see the future, because it doesn't exist'. |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The idea that only the present is real cannot be sustained. St Augustine pointed out that the present has no duration; it is a mere boundary between past and future, and dependent on them. It also denies truth-value to statements about past or future. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: To defend Presentism, I suspect that one must focus entirely on the activities of consciousness and short-term memory. All truths, of past or future, must refer totally to such mental events. But what could an event be if there is no enduring time? |