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14629
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If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn]
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Full Idea:
If we ask why A must be the case, and A is then proved from B, that explains it if B must be so. If the eventual source cites some truth F, then if F just is so, there is strong pressure to feel that the original necessity has not been explained.
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From:
Simon Blackburn (Morals and Modals [1987], 1)
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A reaction:
[compressed] Ross Cameron wrote a reply to this which I like. I'm fishing for the idea that essence is the source of necessity (as Kit Fine says), but that essence itself is not necessary (as only I say, apparently!).
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14529
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If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
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Full Idea:
Blackburn asks of what theorists propose as underlying the necessity of a proposition, the question whether they themselves are conceived as obtaining of necessity or merely contingently.
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From:
report of Simon Blackburn (Morals and Modals [1987], p.120-1) by Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann - Introduction to 'Modality' 1
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A reaction:
I've seen a reply to this somewhere: I think the thought was that a necessity wouldn't be any less necessary if it had a contingent source, any more than the father of a world champion boxer has to be a world champion boxer.
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5952
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Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch]
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Full Idea:
Is each of us not the soul, but the chief part of the soul, by which we think and reason and act, all the other parts of soul as well as of body being mere instruments of its power?
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From:
Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1119)
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A reaction:
Socrates is associated with the idea that I am my whole soul (Idea 1650). Plutarch represents an interesting development, which may lead both to the Christian 'soul' and to the Cartesian 'ego'. I think Plutarch is right, but what is the 'soul'?
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5951
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If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch]
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Full Idea:
Perception, mind, intelligence and thought cannot so much as be conceived, even with the best will, as arising among void and atoms, things which taken separately have no quality.
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From:
Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1112)
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A reaction:
A nice articulation of the intuition of all anti-physicalists. Plutarch would have to rethink his position carefully if he learned of the sheer number of connections in the brain, and of the theory of natural selection. His challenge remains, though.
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5948
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The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch]
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Full Idea:
To live the good life is to live a life of participation in society, of loyalty to friends, of temperance and honest dealing.
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From:
Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1108)
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A reaction:
'Participation in society' is the interesting one. This might translate as 'doing your duty', or as 'leading a well-rounded life'. Solitude is wrong if you are indebted to others, and it is unhealthy if you are not. Is solitude really immoral, though?
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5955
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No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch]
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Full Idea:
A city without holy places and gods, without any observance of prayers, oaths, oracles, sacrifices for blessings received or rites to avert evils, no traveller has ever seen or will ever see.
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From:
Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1125)
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A reaction:
The nearest you might get would be Soviet Moscow, but in 1973 I saw a man there jeering at a woman who was kneeling in the street outside a closed church. Plutarch would be stunned at the decline in religious practices in modern Europe.
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