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14664
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Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
A 'necessary being' is one that exists in every possible world; and only some objects - numbers, properties, pure sets, propositions, states of affairs, God - have this distinction.
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From:
Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 2)
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A reaction:
This a very odd list, though it is fairly orthodox among philosophers trained in modern modal logic. At the very least it looks rather parochial to me.
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18451
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The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry]
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Full Idea:
Being everywhere and nowhere, the incorporeal, wherever it happens to be, betrays its presence only by a certain kind of disposition.
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From:
Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 4Enn3 21(20))
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A reaction:
There is a mystical or dualist view of fundamental powers, as the spiritual engine which drives passive physical nature. It's rubbish of course, but if powers are primitive in a naturalistic theory, it is not a view which can be refuted.
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14666
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Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
Socrates is a contingent being; his essence, however, is not. Properties, like propositions and possible worlds, are necessary beings. If Socrates had not existed, his essence would have been unexemplified, but not non-existent.
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From:
Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 4)
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A reaction:
This is a distinctive Plantinga view, of which I can make little sense. I take it that Socrates used to have an essence. Being dead, the essence no longer exists, but when we talk about Socrates it is largely this essence to which we refer. OK?
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14662
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Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
The idea of possible worlds has delivered insights on logical possibility (de dicto and de re), propositions, properties and sets, counterfactuals, time and temporal relations, causal determinism, the ontological argument, and the problem of evil.
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From:
Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], Intro)
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A reaction:
This date (1976) seems to be the high-water mark for enthusiasm about possible worlds. I suppose if we just stick to 'insights' rather than 'answers' then the big claim might still be acceptable. Which problems are created by possible worlds?
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16472
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Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
Plantinga's critics worry that the metaphysics is actualist in name only, since it is achieved only by populating the actual world with entities whose nature is explained in terms of merely possible things that would exemplify them if anything did.
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From:
comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
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A reaction:
Plantinga seems a long way from the usual motivation for actualism, which is probably sceptical empiricism, and building a system on what is smack in front of you. Possibilities have to be true, though. That's why you need dispositions in actuality.
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18453
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Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry]
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Full Idea:
Since intelligence is intelligible for intelligence, intelligence is its own object. ...Intelligence, therefore, is simultaneously thinker and thought, all that thinks and all that is thought.
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From:
Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7))
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A reaction:
This is a bit of a problem for Descartes, if the Cogito is taken as offering evidence (thought) for the existence of a thinker ('I'). Porphyry implies that the separation Descartes requires is impossible.
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18463
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Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry]
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Full Idea:
He who by thought can penetrate within his own substance, and can thus acquire knowledge of it, finds himself in this actualisation of knowledge and consciousness, where the substrate that knows is identical with the object that is known.
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From:
Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 44)
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A reaction:
It seems remarkably that this ability is confidently asserted by Porphyry, and flatly denied by Hume. Were they just different people, or were they looking for different things, or was one of them deluded?
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16469
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Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
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Full Idea:
The domains in Plantinga's interpretation of Kripke's semantics are sets of essences, and the values of variables are essences. The values of predicates have to be functions from possible worlds to essences.
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From:
report of Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
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A reaction:
I begin to think this is quite nice, as long as one doesn't take the commitment to the essences too seriously. For 'essence' read 'minimal identity'? But I take essences to be more than minimal, so use identities (which Kripke does?).
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16470
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Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
For Plantinga, essences are entities in their own right and will have properties different from what instantiates them. Hence he will need individual essences of individual essences, distinct from the essences. I see no way to avoid a hierarchy of them.
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From:
comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
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A reaction:
This sounds devastating for Plantinga, but it is a challenge for traditional Aristotelians. Only a logician suffers from a hierarchy, but a scientist might have to live with an essence, which contains a super-essence.
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14663
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Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
Are there two sorts of thing, propositions and states of affairs, or only one? I am inclined to the former view on the ground that propositions have a property, truth or falsehood, not had by states of affairs.
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From:
Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 1)
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A reaction:
Might a proposition be nothing more than an assertion that a state of affairs obtains? It would then pass his test. The idea that a proposition is a complex of facts in the external world ('Russellian' propositions?) quite baffles me.
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18456
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Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry]
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Full Idea:
By its identity and numerical unity, real existence is neither great nor small, neither very large nor very small, though it causes even greatest and smallest to participate in its nature.
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From:
Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 37(5))
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A reaction:
Note the platonic word 'participate' [metechein], suggesting that he is talking about the Form of Existence here. Note also that we have 'real' existence here, implying a lesser type of existence that participates in it.
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18449
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Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry]
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Full Idea:
Nature binds the body to the soul, but it is the soul herself that has bound herself to the body. It, therefore, belongs to nature to detach the body from the soul, while it is the soul herself that detaches herself from the body.
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From:
Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn9 2)
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A reaction:
Baffling. What happens if there is a conflict? I suppose either party can cancel the bargain, but who wins when they disagree?
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18457
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Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry]
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Full Idea:
Individual souls are distinct without being separated from each other, and without dividing the universal Soul into a number of parts; they are united to each other without becoming confused.
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From:
Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 39)
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A reaction:
This sounds like Jung's theory that there is a universal subconscious which links us all together. Taken literally, I assume it is nonsense. As an invitation to acknowledge how much we all have in common, it is a nice corrective to liberal individualism.
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