33 ideas
24032 | Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Scholars are usually ingenious enough to find ways of spreading darkness even in things which are obvious by themselves, and which the peasants are not ignorant of. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
A reaction: Wonderful! I see it everywhere in philosophy. It is usually the result of finding ingenious and surprising grounds for scepticism. The amazing thing is not their lovely arguments, but that fools then take their conclusions seriously. Modus tollens. |
24033 | Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes] |
Full Idea: The questions on which scholars argue are almost always questions of word. …If philosophers were agreed on the meaning of words, almost all their controversies would cease. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 13) | |
A reaction: He has a low opinion of 'scholars'! It isn't that difficult to agree on the meanings of key words, in a given context. The aim isn't to get rid of the problems, but to focus on the real problems. Some words contain problems. |
24024 | The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes] |
Full Idea: It is necessary, in a series of objects, to recognise which is the simplest thing, and how all the others depart from it. This rule contains the whole secret of the method. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 06) | |
A reaction: This is an appealing thought, though deciding the criteria for 'simplest' looks tough. Are electrons, for example, simple? Is a person a simple basic thing? |
24018 | One truth leads us to another [Descartes] |
Full Idea: One truth discovered helps us to discover another. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 01) | |
A reaction: I take this to be one of the key ingredients of objectivity. People who know very little have almost no chance of objectivity. A mind full of falsehoods also blocks it. |
24035 | Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Unity is that common nature in which all things that are compared with each other must participate equally. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 14) | |
A reaction: A lovely explanation of the concept of 'units' for counting. Fregeans hate units, but we Grecian thinkers love them. |
24036 | I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes] |
Full Idea: I do not recognise what the proportion of magnitude is between two and three, unless I consider a third term, namely unity, which is the common measure of the one and the other. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 14) | |
A reaction: A striking defence of the concept of the need for the unit in arithmetic. To say 'three is half as big again', you must be discussing the same size of 'half' in each instance. |
24029 | Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Among the simple things, we must also place their negation and deprivation, insofar as they fall under out intelligence, because the idea of nothingness, of the instant, of rest, is no less true an idea than that of existence, of duration, of motion. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
A reaction: He sees the 'simple' things as the foundation of all knowledge, because they are self-evident. Not sure about 'no less true', since the specific nothings are parasitic on the somethings. |
5311 | If observation goes up a level, we expect the laws of the lower level to remain in force [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: When the observer shifts his attention from one level of organisation to the next, as from physics to chemistry, he expects to find obedience to all the laws of the levels below. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to state a necessary condition of reduction, but not a sufficient one. Wilson points out that new phenomena emerge at higher levels. This principle is similar to Hume's argument against miracles. You don't easily overthrow basic laws. |
5312 | A child first sees objects as distinct, and later as members of groups [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: From a single-minded effort to move objects a child's activity grows into a detached reflection on the movements themselves. The objects are first perceived as distinct entities, and then as members of groups to be classified. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This does not, of course, prove anything about the philosophical problems of universals, but it does seem to pinpoint the stage in human development when 'universals' are perceived. The basis seems to be groups or sets, but how do we spot those? |
24030 | 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes] |
Full Idea: When I say that four and three make seven, this connection is necessary, because one cannot conceive the number seven distinctly without including in it in a confused way the number four and the number three. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
A reaction: This seems to make the truths of arithmetic conceptual, and hence analytic. |
5309 | Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: How does he know this proposition which he asserts so confidently? Obvious counterexamples seem to be utterly trivial beliefs, and self-destructive beliefs. What is the evolutionary value of low self-esteem? Still, you see his point. |
24019 | If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes] |
Full Idea: It is better never to study than to be unable to distinguish the true from the false, and be obliged to accept as certain what is doubtful. One risks losing the knowledge one already has. Hence we reject all those knowledges which are only probable. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 02) | |
A reaction: This is usually seen nowadays (and I agree) that this is a false dichotomy. Knowledge can't be all-or-nothing. We should accept probabilities as probable, not as knowledge. Probability became a science after Descartes. |
24020 | We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes] |
Full Idea: By intuition I mean the conception of an attentive mind, so distinct and clear that it has no doubt about what it understands, …a conception that is borne of the sole light of reason. Thus everyone can see intuitively that he exists. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 03) | |
A reaction: By 'intuition' he means self-evident certainty, whereas my concept is of a judgement of which I am reasonably confident, but without sufficient grounds for certainty. This is an early assertion of the Cogito, with a clear statement of its grounding. |
24031 | When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes] |
Full Idea: If Socrates says he doubts everything, it necessarily follows that he at least understands that he doubts, and that he knows that something can be true or false: for these are notions that necessarily accompany doubt. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
A reaction: An early commitment to the Cogito. But note that the inescapable commitment is not just to his existence, but also to his own reasoning, and his own commitment, and to the possibility of truth. Many, many things are undeniable. |
24025 | Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes] |
Full Idea: We require two conditions for intuition, namely that the proposition appear clear and distinct, and then that it be understood all at once and not successively. Deduction, on the other hand, implies a certain movement of the mind. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 11) | |
A reaction: A nice distinction. Presumably with deduction you grasp each step clearly, and then the inference and conclusion, and you can then forget the previous steps because you have something secure. |
24022 | Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes] |
Full Idea: The human soul possesses something divine in which are deposited the first seeds of useful knowledge, which, in spite of the negligence and embarrassment of poorly done studies, bear spontaneous fruit. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 04) | |
A reaction: This makes clear the religious underpinning which is required for his commitment to such useful innate ideas (such as basic geometry) |
24034 | If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Let there be a man who has sometimes seen the fundamental colours, and never the intermediate and mixed colours; it may be that by a sort of deduction he will represent those he has not seen, by their resemblance to the others. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 14) | |
A reaction: Thus Descartes solved Hume's shade of blue problem, by means of 'a sort of deduction' from resemblance, where Hume was paralysed by his need to actually experience it. Dogmatic empiricism is a false doctrine! |
24021 | The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes] |
Full Idea: If the method shows clearly how we must use intuition to avoid mistaking the false for the true, and how deduction must operate to lead us to the knowledge of all things, it will be complete in my opinion. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 04) | |
A reaction: A perfect statement of his foundationalist view. It needs a clear and distinct basis, and the steps of building must be strictly logical. Of course, most of our knowledge relies on induction, rather than deduction. |
24027 | Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes] |
Full Idea: The motive power or the nerves themselves originate in the brain, which contains the imagination, which moves them in a thousand ways, as the common sense is moved by the external sense. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
A reaction: This sounds a lot more physicalist than his later explicit dualism in Meditations. Even in that work the famous passage on the ship's pilot acknowledged tight integration of mind and brain. |
24026 | Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes] |
Full Idea: There are four faculties in us which we can use to know: intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
A reaction: Philosophers have to attribute faculties to the mind, even if the psychologists and neuroscientists won't accept them. We must infer the sources of our modes of understanding. He is cautious about imagination. |
24028 | The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes] |
Full Idea: This force by which we properly know objects is purely spiritual, and is no less distinct from the body than is the blood from the bones. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
A reaction: This firmly contradicts any physicalism I thought I detected in Idea 24027! He uses the word 'spiritual' of the mind here, which I don't think he uses in later writings. |
5310 | Philosophers study the consequences of ethics instead of its origins [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Philosophers examine the precepts of ethical systems with reference to their consequences and not their origins. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: He is interested in biological origins, but it strikes me that every moral theory has some account of the origins of morality, be it pure reason, or the love of pleasure, or human nature, or eternal ideas, or the will of God, or selfish desires. |
5313 | The rules of human decision-making converge and overlap in a 'human nature' [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: The rules followed in human decision-making are tight enough to produce a broad overlap in the decisions taken by all individuals, and hence a convergence powerful enough to be labelled 'human nature'. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This is a nice empirical criterion for asserting the existence of human nature, and it seems right to examine decisions, rather than more thoughtless or conformist behaviour. Existentialists dream of new possibilities, but the old ways always seem best… |
5316 | We undermine altruism by rewarding it, but we reward it to encourage it [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: By sanctifying altruism in order to reward it we make it less true, but by that means we promote its recurrence in others. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: So is my preference for not rewarding (or even noticing) altruism an anti-social tendency. The very conspicuous charity of sponsorship seems somehow inferior to the truly anonymous gift. Or super-altruism is very public, to encourage it in others? |
5318 | Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: By 'hard-core' he means suicidally self-sacrificing, rather than extensive. This seems a good thesis. It strikes me that the development of civil society is often impeded by family loyalty, such as in the case of the Mafia. |
5317 | The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: This is a key element of social contract theory. It shows why natural selection of truly altruistic traits might be beneficial to individuals, provided they are surrounded by possible recipricators. We trust those who are genuine and sincere. |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
5308 | The only human purpose is that created by our genetic history [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: No species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This invites the question of what that purpose is perceived to be. Some people feel an imperative to play the piano all day, so presumably genetic history has created that feeling. Presumably we can also choose a purpose, even extinction. |
24023 | All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes] |
Full Idea: I have discovered that all the sciences which have as their aim the search for order and measure are related to mathematics. | |
From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 04) | |
A reaction: Note that he sound a more cautious note than Galileo's famous remark. It leaves room for biology to still be a science, even when it fails to be mathematical. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
5314 | Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and fast, biological evolution is Darwinian and slow [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and very fast, whereas biological evolution is Darwinian and usually very slow. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: An intriguing point, given how discredited Lamarckian evolution is. It links with the Dawkins idea of 'memes' - cultural ideas which spread very fast. Is biological evolution suddenly about to become Lamarckian, as culture influences biology? |
5315 | Over 99 percent of human evolution has been in the hunter-gatherer phase [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Selection pressures of hunter-gatherer existence have persisted for over 99 percent of human genetic evolution. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This seems a key point to bear in mind when assessing human nature. Hunter-gathering isn't just one tendency in our genetics; it more or less constitutes everything we are. |
5320 | It is estimated that mankind has produced 100,000 religions [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Since the first recorded religion (in Iraq 60,000 years ago) it is estimated that mankind has produced in the order of one hundred thousand religions. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: If asked to guess the number, I would probably have said '200'! This staggering figure seems to argue both ways - it suggest a certain arbitrariness in the details of religions, but an extremely intense drive to have some sort of religious belief. |