8525
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Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
Because there cannot be relations without terms, in a meta-physic that makes first-order tropes the terms of all relations, relational tropes must belong to a second, derivative order.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §8)
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A reaction:
The admission that there could be a 'derivative order' may lead to trouble for trope theory. Ostrich Nominalists could say that properties themselves are derivative second-order abstractions from indivisible particulars. Russell makes them first-order.
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8513
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Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
If we have two cloths of the very same shade of redness, we can show there are two cloths by burning one and leaving the other unaffected; we show there are two cases of redness in the same way: dye one blue, leaving the other unaffected.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §1)
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A reaction:
This has to be one of the basic facts of the problem accepted by everyone. If you dye half of one of the pieces, was the original red therefore one instance or two? Has it become two? How many red tropes are there in a red cloth?
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8524
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Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
The metaphysics of abstract particulars gives a central place to space, or space-time, as the frame of the world. ...Tropes are, of their essence, regional, which carries with it the essential presence of shape and size in any trope occurrence.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §7)
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A reaction:
Trope theory has a problem with Aristotle's example (Idea 557) of what happens when white is mixed with white. Do two tropes become one trope if you paint on a second coat of white? How can particulars merge? How can abstractions merge?
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8519
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Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
Each individual is distinct from each other individual, so the bundle account of objects requires each bundle to be different from every other bundle. So the Identity of Indiscernibles must be a necessary truth, which, unfortunately, it is not.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §5)
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A reaction:
Clearly the Identity of Indiscernibles is not a necessary truth (consider just two identical spheres). Location and time must enter into it. Could we not add a further individuation requirement to the necessary existence of a bundle? (Quinton)
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8512
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Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
An item is abstract if it is got before the mind by an act of abstraction, that is, by concentrating attention on some, but not all, of what is presented.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §1)
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A reaction:
I think this point is incredibly important. Pure Fregean semantics tries to leave out the psychological component, and yet all the problems in semantics concern various sorts of abstraction. Imagination is the focus of the whole operation.
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4125
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Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
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Full Idea:
In Hare's theory I apply a "role-reversal test", and then acquire an actual agglomeration of preferences that apply to the hypothetical situation. The result is utilitarianism.
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From:
report of Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
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A reaction:
It hits that traditional stumbling block, of why I should care about the preferences of others. Pure reason and empathy are the options (Kant or Hume). I may, however, lack both.
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4126
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If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
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Full Idea:
Hare's version of utilitarianism requires an agent to abandon any deeply held principle or conviction if a large enough aggregate of contrary preferences, of whatever kind, favours a contrary action.
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From:
comment on Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
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A reaction:
This nicely attacks any impersonal moral theory, whether it is based on reason or preferences. But where did my personal ideals come from?
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4127
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If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
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Full Idea:
If there is to be total identification with others, then if another's preferences are mistaken, the preferences I imagine myself into are equally mistaken, and if 'identification' is the point, they should remain mistaken.
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From:
comment on Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
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A reaction:
Yes. The core of morality must be judgement. Robots can implement universal utilitarian rules, but they could end up promoting persecutions of minorities.
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22483
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A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
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Full Idea:
We say something prescriptive if and only if, for some act A, some situation S and some person R, if P were to assent (orally) to what we say, and not, in S, do A, he logically must be assenting insincerely.
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From:
Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981], p.21), quoted by Philippa Foot - Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? p.190
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A reaction:
Foot offers this as Hare's most explicit definition. The use of algebra strikes me as ludicrous. In logic letters have the virtue of not shifting their meaning during an argument, but that is not required here.
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8516
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Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
Not all singular causal statements are of Davidson's event-event type. Many involve conditions, so there are condition-event (weakness/collapse), event-condition (explosion/movement), and condition-condition (hot/warming) causal connections.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §3)
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A reaction:
Fans of Davidson need to reduce conditions to events. The problem of individuation keeps raising its head. Davidson makes it depend on description. Kim looks good, because events, and presumably conditions, reduce to something small and precise.
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