45 ideas
15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If there is no way of settling metaphysical questions, then who cares whether or not they make sense? | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 4 n20) | |
A reaction: This footnote is aimed at logical positivists, who seemed to worry about whether metaphysics made sense, and also dismissed its prospects even if it did make sense. |
15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The 'quietist' view of metaphysics says that realist metaphysics should be abandoned, not because its questions cannot be framed, but because their answers cannot be found. The real world of metaphysics is akin to Kant's noumenal world. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 4) | |
A reaction: [He cites Blackburn, Dworkin, A.Fine, and Putnam-1987 as quietists] Fine aims to clarify the concepts of factuality and of ground, in order to show that metaphysics is possible. |
15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
Full Idea: My main objection to Fine's notion of grounding as fundamental is that it violates 'purity' - that fundamental truths should involve only fundamental notions. | |
From: comment on Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 08.2 | |
A reaction: [p.106 of Sider for 'purity'] The point here is that to define a grounding relation you have to mention the 'higher' levels of the relationship (as in a 'city' being grounded in physical stuff), which doesn't seem fundamental enough. |
15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
Full Idea: When p 'grounds' q then q holds in virtue of p's holding; q's holding is nothing beyond p's holding; the truth of p explains the truth of q in a particularly tight sense (explanation of q by p in this sense requires that p necessitates q). | |
From: report of Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 15-16) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 08.1 | |
A reaction: This proposal has become a hot topic in current metaphysics, as attempts are made to employ 'grounding' in various logical, epistemological and ontological contexts. I'm a fan - it is at the heart of metaphysics as structure of reality. |
15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I recommend that a statement of ground be cast in the following 'canonical' form: Its being the case that S consists in nothing more than its being the case that T, U... (where S, T, U... are particular sentences). | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: The point here is that grounding is to be undestood in terms of sentences (and 'its being the case that...'), rather than in terms of objects, properties or relations. Fine thus makes grounding a human activity, rather than a natural activity. |
15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: One line of reduction is logical analysis. To say one sentence reduces to another is to say that they express the same proposition (or fact), but the grammatical form of the second is closer to the logical form than the grammatical form of the first. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: Fine objects that S-and-T reduces to S and T, which is two propositions. He also objects that this approach misses the de re ingredient in reduction (that it is about the things themselves, not the sentences). It also overemphasises logical form. |
15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A second line of reduction is semantic, and holds in virtue of the meaning of the sentences. It should then be possible to acquire an understanding of the reduced sentence on the basis of understanding the sentences to which it reduces. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: Fine says this avoids the first objection to the grammatical approach (see Reaction to Idea 15050), but still can't handle the de re aspect of reduction. Fine also doubts whether this understanding qualifies as 'reduction'. |
15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The third, more recent, approach to reduction is a modal matter. A class of propositions will reduce to - or supervene upon - another if, necessarily, any truth from the one is entailed by truths from the other. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Armstrong, Chalmers and Jackson for this approach] Fine notes that some people reject supervenience as a sort of reduction. He objects that this reduction doesn't necessarily lead to something more basic. |
15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The notion of ground should be distinguished from the strict notion of reduction. A statement of reduction implies the unreality of what is reduced, but a statement of ground does not. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: That seems like a bit of a caricature of reduction. If you see a grey cloud and it reduces to a swarm of mosquitoes, you do not say that the cloud was 'unreal'. Fine is setting up a stall for 'ground' in the metaphysical market. We all seek structure. |
15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Questions of what is real are to be settled upon the basis of considerations of ground. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], Intro) | |
A reaction: This looks like being one of Fine's most important ideas, which is shifting the whole basis of contemporary metaphysics. Only Parmenides and Heidegger thought Being was the target. Aristotle aims at identity. What grounds what is a third alternative. |
15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The first main approach says metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is 'objective' or 'factual'. ...According to the second conception, metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is 'irreducible' or 'fundamental'. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: Fine is defending the 'fundamental' approach, via the 'grounding' relation. The whole structure, though, seems to be reality. In particular, a complete story must include the relations which facilitate more than mere fundamentals. |
15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We may grant that some things are explanatorily more basic than others, but why should that make them more real? | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 8) | |
A reaction: This is the question asked by the 'quietist'. Fine's answer is that our whole conception of Reality, with its intrinsic structure, is what lies at the basis, and this is primitive. |
15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I conclude that there is a primitive metaphysical concept of reality, one that cannot be understood in fundamentally different terms. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], Intro) | |
A reaction: Fine offers arguments to support his claim, but it seems hard to disagree with. The only alternative I can see is to understand reality in terms of our experiences, and this is the road to metaphysical hell. |
2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Taking the proposition that gold is malleable to be necessary does not commit one to considering it analytic. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.116) |
2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The four basic kinds of belief are rooted in perception, memory, introspective consciousness, and reason. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], Intr.p.7) |
2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Could one have just a single belief? | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.198) |
2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The possibility of making certain of what we already know suggests that knowing a proposition does not entail its being certain. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.220) |
2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: If you imagine subtracting a book's sensory properties one by one, what is left of it? | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.42) |
2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Where the sense-datum theory is an indirect realism, phenomenalism is a direct irrealism. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.43) |
2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The proposition that nothing is red and green all over at once is not analytic, but it is rationally graspable, so it seems to be an a priori synthetic proposition. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.100) |
2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: I may well need experience to acquire the concepts needed for knowledge of the a priori, such as the concept of a colour. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.103) |
15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: As long as colour terms pick out fundamental physical properties, I would be willing to countenance their use in the description of Reality in itself, ..even if they are based on a peculiar form of sensory awareness. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 8) | |
A reaction: This seems to explain why metaphysicians are so fond of using colour as their example of a property, when it seems rather subjective. There seem to be good reasons for rejecting Fine's view. |
2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.20) |
2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The propositional belief which portrays what I see in front of me AS a field requires my having a concept of one. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.17) | |
A reaction: To me this immediately invites the question of what a cow or horse experiences when they look at a familiar field. They know how to leave and enter it, and register its boundaries and qualities. Concepts? |
2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The sense-datum theory is mainly to explain hallucinations and illusions, though there might be other theories, such as the 'adverbial' theory. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.36) |
2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: A sense-datum theory might be called a representative realism because it conceives perception as a relation in which sense-data represent perceived external (hence real) objects to us. For Locke they were resemblances only of primary qualities. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.33) |
2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Simple perceiving gives rise to objectual perceiving (attaching concepts to the object), which gives rise to propositional perceiving. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.23) |
2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The crucial principles of justification are a priori. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], X p.311) |
2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Rationalists virtually always assert or imply that, in addition to knowledge of analytic truths, there is knowledge of synthetic a priori truths. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.105) |
2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Remembering something is so entails knowing that it is so. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], II p.68) | |
A reaction: Clearly I can say I "remember" x, but be wrong. Presumably we then say that I didn't really remember, which requires success, like "I know". It is true (as with "know") that as soon as I say that the something is false, I can't claim to remember it. |
2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: If I can neither recall nor image Jane I can still remember her, for on seeing her I might recognise her, and might remember, and even recall, our last meeting. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], II p.66) | |
A reaction: Hm. I can hardly claim to remember her if I have no concept of her, and don't recall our last meeting. If seeing her triggers recognition, I would say that I NOW remember her, but I didn't before. Memory is more conscious than Audi claims. |
2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: There are four possible kinds of epistemic chain: infinite and unanchored, circular and unanchored, anchored in a belief which is not knowledge, and anchored in a belief which is bedrock knowledge. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.183) | |
A reaction: About right, though I don't think 'chain' is the right word for what is proposed if justification is to be coherent. The justifications float like lilies in the pond of reason, and a Self (Monet?) seems needed to assess the picture |
2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Internalists about justification tend to conceive of it as a matter of having a right to believe something. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.234) | |
A reaction: I'm an internalist, but I don't understand this, unless it refers to the social aspect of justification. Can I grant myself internal rights? I can justify my belief to other people. |
2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: That 7+5=12 and that carrots are nourishing are mutually consistent, but do not exhibit coherence. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.192) | |
A reaction: This shows how difficult it would be to define 'coherent'. Is 'carrots are nourishing' coherent with 'fish are nourishing'? Is the battle of Hastings coherent with the battle of Waterloo? |
2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: It is very difficult to specify when an explanatory relation generates enough coherence to create justification. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.193) | |
A reaction: I take coherence to be the key concept in epistemology, and quite impossible to define. This is why the 'space of reasons' is a useful concept. It is a courtroom, in which each case is different. |
2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: A schizophrenic who thinks he is Napoleon, if he has a completely consistent story with enough interlocking details, may have a belief system that is superbly coherent. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.194) | |
A reaction: This is an exaggeration, but the fact is that one isolated lie is totally coherent, so coherence can only emerge when a system is large. Sense experience must be central to coherence. |
2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: If someone consistently prophesied the winners of horse races, it appears that this man knows who will win the races, but surely he does not have justified beliefs as to who will win? | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.229) | |
A reaction: This is where internalists and externalists (notably reliabilists) sharply part company. IF a reliable clairvoyant appeared, we would eventually accept them as a knower. But they DON'T appear, because knowledge needs justification! |
2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: If one favours a reliability theory of knowledge (which is externalist) the correspondence theory of truth seems the most appropriate. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.243) | |
A reaction: Sounds right. Coherence implies some sort of internal assessment, whereas correspondence just needs to plugged into the facts. I like coherence justification and correspondence truth. |
2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Reliabilism cannot specify how reliable a process must be before it grounds knowledge, and it cannot specify what is reliable in the first place. 'Reliable' may become circular, and may mean 'justified'. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.225) | |
A reaction: The first time you ever read an instrument, or talk to a stranger, you have no indication of reliability. Circularity looks like a big problem. Knowledge must precede reliability? |
15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The main sources of evidence for judgments of ground are intuitive and explanatory. The relationship of ground is a form of explanation, ..explaining what makes a proposition true, which needs simplicity, breadth, coherence, non-circularity and strength. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 7) | |
A reaction: My thought is that not only must grounding explain, and therefore be a good explanation, but that the needs of explanation drive our decisions about what are the grounds. It is a bit indeterminate which is tail and which is dog. |
15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We take ground to be an explanatory relation: if the truth that P is grounded in other truths, then they account for its truth; P's being the case holds in virtue of the other truths' being the case. ...It is the ultimate form of explanation. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: To be 'ultimate' that which grounds would have to be something which thwarted all further explanation. Popper, for example, got quite angry at the suggestion that we should put a block on further investigation in this way. |
2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: We can have false beliefs, or some degree of ignorance, about our own mental lives. For example, about our own dispositions, such as not believing that we have a certain ignoble desire. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], III p.83) | |
A reaction: This idea, that we don't know ourselves, has become a commonplace of recent philosophy, but I am unconvinced. Mostly we know only too well that we harbour a base desire, and we feel a creeping sense of shame. Total ignorance is very rare. |
15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A proposition essentially contains a given constituent if its replacement by some other constituent induces a shift in truth value. Thus Socrates is essential to the proposition that Socrates is a philosopher, but not to Socrates is self-identical. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 6) | |
A reaction: In this view the replacement of 'is' by 'isn't' would make 'is' (or affirmation) part of the essence of most propositions. This is about linguistic essence, rather than real essence. It has the potential to be trivial. Replace 'slightly' by 'fairly'? |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |