8 ideas
13120 | Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states [Chisholm, by Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Chisholm's Ontological Categories: ENTIA - {Contingent - [Individual - (Boundaries)(Substances)] [States - (Events)]} {Necessary - [States] [Non-States - (Attributes)(Substance)]} | |
From: report of Roderick Chisholm (A Realistic Theory of Categories [1996], p.3) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §01 | |
A reaction: [I am attempting a textual representation of a tree diagram! The bracket-styles indicate the levels.] |
3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The private object or sense datum view is an instance of the false objectification of what is essentially subjective. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.207) |
3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The problem of reconciling the objective and subjective points of view takes its purest form in a sense of incredulity that one should be anyone in particular. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.206) | |
A reaction: Nice observation. This idea has always struck me forcibly, and seems to be one of those basic intuitions which motivates philosophy, and yet the subject has almost nothing to say about it. Of course you are you, or you wouldn't be amazed by it… |
3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The metaphysical ego, if it is a continuing individual with its identity over time, is just one more thing about which the same problem can be raised - will that ego still be me? | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.200) | |
A reaction: You can worry too much about some philosophical questions. If it is me now, and it has continuing individual identity over time, I'm not going to lose sleep over the possibility that it might nevertheless somehow cease to be me. I'm overrated. |
3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.198) |
3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The right thing to do is to turn oneself as far as possible into an instrument for the realisation of what is best 'sub specie aeternitatis'. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.204) |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |