24 ideas
13939 | No possible evidence could decide the reality of numbers, so it is a pseudo-question [Carnap] |
Full Idea: I cannot think of any possible evidence that would be regarded as relevant by both nominalists and realists about numbers, and would decide the controversy, or make one side more probable. Hence I regard the external questions as pseudo-questions. | |
From: Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 4) |
13936 | Questions about numbers are answered by analysis, and are analytic, and hence logically true [Carnap] |
Full Idea: For the internal question like 'is there a prime number greater than a hundred?' the answers are found by logical analysis based on the rules for the new expressions. The answers here are analytic, i.e., logically true. | |
From: Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 2) |
8748 | Logical positivists incorporated geometry into logicism, saying axioms are just definitions [Carnap, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The logical positivists brought geometry into the fold of logicism. The axioms of, say, Euclidean geometry are simply definitions of primitive terms like 'point' and 'line'. | |
From: report of Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.3 | |
A reaction: If the concept of 'line' is actually created by its definition, then we need to know exactly what (say) 'shortest' means. If we are merely describing a line, then our definition can be 'impredicative', using other accepted concepts. |
8960 | Internal questions about abstractions are trivial, and external ones deeply problematic [Carnap, by Szabó] |
Full Idea: Carnap's verdict is that questions regarding the existence of abstracta tend to be trivial when taken as internal and deeply problematic when taken as external. | |
From: report of Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950]) by Zoltán Gendler Szabó - Nominalism 6 | |
A reaction: If the internal aspect of the problem is 'trivial', this would put Carnap in league with fictionalists, who are only committed to entities while playing the current game. What is the status of the theory? Carnap wanted flowers to bloom. |
13933 | Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework) [Carnap] |
Full Idea: We distinguish two kinds of existence questions: first, entities of a new kind within the framework; we call them 'internal questions'. Second, 'external questions', concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole. | |
From: Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 2) | |
A reaction: This nicely disposes of many ontological difficulties, but at the price of labelling most external questions as meaningless, so that the internal answers have very little commitment, and the external (big) questions are now banned. Not for me. |
13934 | To be 'real' is to be an element of a system, so we cannot ask reality questions about the system itself [Carnap] |
Full Idea: To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself. | |
From: Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 2) |
13938 | A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question [Carnap] |
Full Idea: If someone accepts a framework for a kind of entities, then he must admit the entities as possible designata. Thus the question of the admissibility of entities is reduced to the question of the acceptability of the linguistic framework for the entities. | |
From: Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 4) | |
A reaction: Despite the many differences of opinion between Quine and Carnap, this appears to be a straight endorsement by Carnap of the Quinean conception of ontological commitment. |
13935 | We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules [Carnap] |
Full Idea: To accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain form of language, in other words, to accept rules for forming statements and for testing, accepting, or rejecting them. | |
From: Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 2) | |
A reaction: If you derive your metaphysics from your language, then objects are linguistic conventions. But why do we accept conventions about objects? |
13932 | Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism [Carnap] |
Full Idea: Empiricists are in general rather suspicious with respect to any kind of abstract entities like properties, classes, relations, numbers, propositions etc. They usually feel more sympathy with nominalists than with realists (in the medieval sense). | |
From: Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 1) | |
A reaction: The obvious reason is that you can't have sense experiences of abstract entities. I like the question 'what are they made of?' rather than the question 'how can I experience them?'. |
13937 | New linguistic claims about entities are not true or false, but just expedient, fruitful or successful [Carnap] |
Full Idea: The acceptance of new linguistic forms about entities cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended. | |
From: Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 3) | |
A reaction: The obvious problem seems to be that a complete pack of lies might be successful for a very long time, if it plugged a critical hole in a major theory. Is success judged financially? How do we judge success without mentioning truth? |
13940 | All linguistic forms in science are merely judged by their efficiency as instruments [Carnap] |
Full Idea: The acceptance or rejection of abstract (or any other) linguistic forms in any branch of science will finally be decided by their efficiency as instruments. | |
From: Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 5) |
23814 | Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil] |
Full Idea: There is a reality outside the world …outside any sphere that is accessible to human faculties. Corresponding to this reality, at the centre of the human heart, is the longing for an absolute good, which is always there and never appeased by this world. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.221) | |
A reaction: I don't believe in any sort of transcendent reality, but I can identify with this. Even if you have a highly naturalistic view of what is valuable (see late Philippa Foot), there is this indeterminate yearning for that value. |
23824 | Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil] |
Full Idea: Any place where the needs of human beings are satisfied can be recognised by the fact that there is a flowering of fraternity, joy, beauty, and happiness. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.230) | |
A reaction: Weil writes a lengthy analysis of what she sees as the basic human needs, beyond the obvious food, water etc. An excellent place to start a line of political thought. |
23815 | We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to feel equal respect for things that are in fact unequal unless the respect is given to something that is identical in all of them. Men are all unequal in all their relations with things of this world. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.223) | |
A reaction: Weil votes for some link to transcendence in each of us, but I would prefer some more naturalistic proposal for what we all have in common. There are plenty of aspects which unite all human beings, which grounds this unconditional respect. |
23823 | Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil] |
Full Idea: The boredom produced by a complete absence of risk is a sickness of the human soul. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229) | |
A reaction: An unusual analysis of boredom. I think it is probably purposeful activity that we need, rather than actual risk, with all the stresses that involves. Risks are justified by their rewards. |
23822 | We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil] |
Full Idea: The human soul has need of disciplined participation in a common task of public value, and it has need of personal initiative within this participation. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229) | |
A reaction: The intrusion of competitive capitalism into almost every area of modern life has more or less eliminated such activities. Only state employees now have such satisfactions, on the whole. I admire Weil's approach here. |
23817 | We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil] |
Full Idea: The human soul has need of equality and of hierarchy. Equality is the public recognition …of the principal that an equal degree of attention is due to the needs of all human beings. Hierarchy is the scale of responsibilities. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.228) | |
A reaction: This is the conservative aspect of Weil's largely radical political thinking. Presumably what we respect in these people is their responsibilies, and not their mere rank. Idle members of the British House of Lords have no rank in this hierarchy. |
23819 | Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil] |
Full Idea: Every avoidable material falsehood publicly asserted should become a punishable offence. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.228) | |
A reaction: Yes please! The early 21st century has become the time when truth lost all value in public life. Lying to the House of Commons in the UK required instant resignation 50 years ago. Now it is just a source of laughter. No freedom to lie! |
23818 | We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil] |
Full Idea: Liberty is the power of choice within the latitude left between the direct constraint of natural forces and the authority accepted as legitimate. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.228) | |
A reaction: Accepting legitimate authority is a nicely softened version of the social contract. We often find that the office and rank are accepted as legitimate, but then are unable to accept the appalling individual who holds the office. |
23820 | People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil] |
Full Idea: The human soul has need of both personal property and collective property. …The existence of a social class defined by the lack of personal and collective property is as shameful as slavery. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229) | |
A reaction: Nice. Particularly the idea that we all need collective property, such as parks and beaches and public buildings. |
23821 | Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil] |
Full Idea: The human soul needs punishment and honour. A committer of crime has become exiled from good, and needs to be reintegrated with it through suffering. This aims to bring the soul to recognise freely some day that is infliction was just. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229) | |
A reaction: The Scanlon contractualist approach to punishment - that the victim of it accepts its justice. Given her saintly character, Simone had a very tough view of this issue. |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
23816 | Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil] |
Full Idea: Anyone whose attention and love are directed towards the reality outside the world recognises that he is bound by the permanent obligation to remedy …all the privations of soul and body which are liable to destroy or damage any human being whatsoever. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.225) | |
A reaction: [abridged] An interesting attempt to articulate the religious motivation of morality. The Euthyphro question remains - of why this vision of a wholly good higher morality should motivate anyone, unless they already possess a desire for that good. |