18 ideas
| 10794 | The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: The nominalist finds that standard semantics shackles him to first-order languages if, as nominalists are wont, he is to make do without abstract higher order objects. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.166) | |
| A reaction: Aha! Since I am pursuing a generally nominalist strategy in metaphysics, I suddenly see that I must adopt a hostile attitude to higher-order logic! Maybe plural quantification is the way to go, with just first-order objects. |
| 10786 | Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: The tendency has been to call any expression a 'name', however distant from the grammatical category of nouns, provided it is seen as referring. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.162) |
| 10788 | Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: For a nominalist with an ontology of empirically distinguishable objects, proper names are seen as a primary vehicle of reference. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.162) |
| 10799 | Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: For the nominalist, at level zero, where substituends are referring names, the quantifiers may be read existentially. Beyond level zero, the variables and quantifiers are read sustitutionally (though it is unclear whether this program is feasible). | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.167) |
| 10790 | Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: An adequate language for referring to infinitely many objects would seem to require variables and quantifiers in addition to names. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.164) |
| 10791 | Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: On a substitutional semantics of a first-order language, a domain of objects is not specified. Variables do not range over objects. They are place markers for substituends (..and sentences are true-for-all-names, or true-for-at-least-one-name). | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.165) |
| 10785 | Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: It has been suggested that a substitutional semantics for quantification theory lends itself to nominalistic aims. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.161) |
| 10795 | Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: Translation into a substitutional language does not force the ontology. It remains, literally, and until the case for reference can be made, a façon de parler. That is the way the nominalist would like to keep it. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.166) |
| 10798 | A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: Critics say if there are nondenumerably many objects, then on the substitutional view there might be true universal sentences falsified by an unnamed object, and there must always be some such, for names are denumerable. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.167) | |
| A reaction: [See Quine 'Reply to Prof. Marcus' p.183] The problem seems to be that there would be names which are theoretically denumerable, but not nameable, and hence not available for substitution. Marcus rejects this, citing compactness. |
| 10787 | Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: Being itself has been viewed as referent of the verb 'to be'. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.162) |
| 8495 | The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey] |
| Full Idea: The whole theory of particulars and universals is due to mistaking for a fundamental characteristic of reality what is merely a characteristic of language. | |
| From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.13) | |
| A reaction: [Fraser MacBride has pursued this idea] It is rather difficult to deny the existence of particulars, in the sense of actual objects, so this appears to make Ramsey a straightforward nominalist, of some sort or other. |
| 8493 | We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey] |
| Full Idea: The two obvious methods of abolishing the distinction between particulars and universals are by holding either that universals are collections of particulars, or that particulars are collections of their qualities. | |
| From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.8) | |
| A reaction: Ramsey proposes an error theory, arising out of language. Quine seems to offer another attempt, making objects and predication unanalysable and basic. Abstract reference seems to make the strongest claim to separate out the universals. |
| 8494 | Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey] |
| Full Idea: It seems to me as clear as anything can be in philosophy that the two sentences 'Socrates is wise' and 'wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates' assert the same fact and express the same proposition. | |
| From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.12) | |
| A reaction: Could be challenged. One says Socrates is just the way he is, the other says he is attached to an abstract entity greater than himself. The squabble over universals has become a squabble over logical form. Finding logical form needs metaphysics! |
| 10789 | Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: Nominalists have the major task of explaining how predicates work. They usually construct it as a relation between individuals, or deny the referential function of predicates. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.163) |
| 10796 | If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.166) | |
| A reaction: Personally I don't think that would be the end of the world, but Fregeans go into paroxyms at the mention of 'psychology', because they fear that it destroys objectivity. That may be because they haven't understood thought properly. |
| 10797 | Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: Substitutivity 'salve veritate' cannot define identity since two expressions may be everywhere intersubstitutable and not refer at all. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.167) |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |