18 ideas
10571 | Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is often the case that the concern for rigor gets in the way of a true understanding of the phenomena to be explained. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: This is a counter to Timothy Williamson's love affair with rigour in philosophy. It strikes me as the big current question for analytical philosophy - of whether the intense pursuit of 'rigour' will actually deliver the wisdom we all seek. |
21238 | Later phenomenologists tried hard to incorporate social relationships [Bakewell] |
Full Idea: Ever since Husserl, phenomenologists and existentialists had been trying to stretch the definition of existence to incorporate our social lives and relationships. | |
From: Sarah Bakewell (At the Existentialist Café [2016], 08) | |
A reaction: I see a parallel move in Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. Husserl's later work seems to have been along those lines. Putnam's Twin Earth too. |
21237 | Phenomenology begins from the immediate, rather than from axioms and theories [Bakewell] |
Full Idea: Traditional philosophy often started with abstract axioms or theories, but the German phenomenologists went straight for life as they experienced it, moment to moment. | |
From: Sarah Bakewell (At the Existentialist Café [2016], 01) | |
A reaction: Bakewell gives this as the gist of what Aron said to Sartre in 1933, providing the bridge from phenomenology to existentialism. The obvious thought is that everybody outside philosophy starts from immediate experience, so why is this philosophy? |
10565 | There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated, since the set of all those sets which have been generated at a given stage will itself give us something new. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
10564 | We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We might combine the standard axioms of set theory with the standard axioms of mereology. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
10569 | If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We are tempted to ask of second-order quantifiers 'what are you quantifying over?', or 'when you say "for some F" then what is the F?', but these questions already presuppose that the quantifiers are first-order. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005]) |
10570 | Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: In doing semantics we normally assign some appropriate entity to each predicate, but this is largely for technical convenience. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) |
10573 | Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Because of Dedekind's definition of reals by cuts, there is a bizarre modern doctrine that there are many 1's - the natural number 1, the rational number 1, the real number 1, and even the complex number 1. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: See Idea 10572. |
10575 | Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: By what right can Dedekind suppose that there is a number corresponding to any pair of irrationals that constitute an irrational cut? | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) |
10574 | Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: What is the union of the singleton {0}, of zero, and the singleton {φ}, of the null set? Is it the one-element set {0}, or the two-element set {0, φ}? Unless the question of identity between 0 and φ is resolved, we cannot say. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) |
10560 | Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Set-theoretic imperialists think that it must be possible to represent every mathematical object as a set. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
10568 | Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Logicists traditionally claim that the theorems of mathematics can be derived by logical means from the relevant definitions of the terms, and that these theorems are epistemically innocent (knowable without Kantian intuition or empirical confirmation). | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) |
10563 | A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is natural to have a generative conception of abstracts (like the iterative conception of sets). The abstracts are formed at stages, with the abstracts formed at any given stage being the abstracts of those concepts of objects formed at prior stages. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: See 10567 for Fine's later modification. This may not guarantee 'levels', but it implies some sort of conceptual priority between abstract entities. |
10561 | Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think that it must be possible to represent every mathematical object as a Fregean abstract. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
10562 | We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I propose a unified theory which is a version of ZF or ZFC with urelements, where the urelements are taken to be the abstracts. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
10567 | We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Instead of viewing the abstracts (or sums) as being generated from objects, via the concepts from which they are defined, we can take them to be generated from conditions. The number of the universe ∞ is the number of self-identical objects. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: The point is that no particular object is now required to make the abstraction. |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |