136 ideas
2196 | The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy [Hume] |
Full Idea: The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.I.26) | |
A reaction: No wonder some people dislike philosophy. There is no question that the human race is often ludicrously over-confident about its attempts to understand, and a careful examination of the situation tends to undermine such confidence. |
15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
Full Idea: Ontological 'cheaters' are those ne'er-do-well metaphysicians (such as presentists, phenomenalists, or solipsists) who refuse to countenance a sufficiently robust conception of the fundamental to underwrite the truths they accept. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.4) | |
A reaction: Presentists are placed in rather insalubrious company here, The notion of 'cheaters' is nice, and I associate it with Australian philosophy, and the reason that was admired by David Lewis. |
14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics, at bottom, is about the fundamental structure of reality. Not about what's necessarily true. Not about what properties are essential. Not about conceptual analysis. Not about what there is. Structure. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 01) | |
A reaction: The opening words of his book. I take them to be absolutely correct, and to articulate the new orthodoxy about metaphysics which has emerged since about 1995. He expands this as being about patterns, categories and joints. |
14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
Full Idea: The most extreme critics of metaphysics base their critique on sweeping views about language (logical positivism), or knowledge (empiricism), ...but this notoriously threatens the science of unobservables as much as it threatens metaphysics. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 05.1) | |
A reaction: These criticisms also threaten speculative physics (even about what is possibly observable). |
15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
Full Idea: It has always seemed odd that insight into the fundamental workings of the universe should be gained by reflection on how we think and speak. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 07.8) | |
A reaction: A nice expression of what should by now be obvious to all philosophers - that analysis of language is not going to reveal very much. It is merely clearing the undergrowth so that we can go somewhere. |
2187 | If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from [Hume] |
Full Idea: When we entertain any suspicion that a philosophical term is without any meaning or idea, we need but enquire "from what impression is that supposed idea derived?" | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], II.17) |
14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
Full Idea: Conceptual analysts generally regard intuitive judgements about particular cases as being far more diagnostic than intuitive judgements about general principles. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.4 n7) | |
A reaction: Since I take the aim to be the building up an accurate picture about general truths, it would be daft to just leap to our intuitions about those general truths. Equally you can't cut intuition out of the picture (pace Ladyman). |
2200 | All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past [Hume] |
Full Idea: All our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.II.30) |
15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
Full Idea: Arguably, 'there is absolutely no space between two objects in contact' is false, but definitional of 'contact'. ...We need a word for true definitional sentences. I propose: 'analytic'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.8) |
14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
Full Idea: Philosophical concepts of interest are rarely reductively defined; still more rarely does our understanding of such concepts rest on definitions. ...(We generally understand concepts to the extent that we know what role they play in thinking). | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.1) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that I agree with this. I suspect that Sider has the notion of definition in mind that is influenced by lexicography. Aristotle's concept of definition I take to be lengthy and expansive, and that is very relevant to philosophy. |
4636 | All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes) [Hume] |
Full Idea: All our reasonings concerning matters of fact are founded on a species of analogy, which leads us to expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result from similar causes. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], §82) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Analogy notoriously becomes problematical when you have only one case (or a few) to go on, as when inferring other minds, or God's existence from natural design. |
14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
Full Idea: What we care about is truth in joint-carving terms, not just truth. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 04.5) | |
A reaction: The thought is that it matters what conceptual scheme is used to express the truth (the 'ideology'). Truths can be true but uninformative or unexplanatory. |
15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
Full Idea: According to the entrenched truthmaker theorist, the fundamental facts consist just of facts citing the existence of entities. It's hard to see how all the complexity we experience could possibly be explained from that sparse basis. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.5) | |
A reaction: This may be the 'entrenched' truthmaker view, but it is not clear why there could not be more complicated fundamental truthmakers, with structure as well as entities. And powers. |
15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
Full Idea: If we accept the Barcan and converse Barcan schemas, this leads to surprising ontological consequences. Wittgenstein might have fathered something, so, by the Barcan schema, there is something that Wittgenstein might have fathered. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.9) | |
A reaction: [He cites Tim Williamson for this line of thought] I was liking the Barcan picture, by now I am backing away fast. They cannot be serious! |
15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
Full Idea: An object is 'gunky' if each of its parts has further proper parts; thus gunk involves infinite descent in the part-whole relation. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 07.11.2) |
14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
Full Idea: Should our fundamental theory of part and whole take 'part' or 'overlap' as primitive? | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.3) |
14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
Full Idea: Certain debates over the 'correct' logic are genuine, and not linguistic or conceptual. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 01.3) | |
A reaction: It is rather hard to give arguments in favour of this view, but I am pleased to have the authority of Sider with me. |
15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
Full Idea: I cannot legislate-true 'It is raining' and I cannot legislate true 'It is not raining', so if I cannot legislate either true then I cannot legislate-true the disjunction 'it is raining or it is not raining'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a very simple and very persuasive argument against the idea that logic is a mere convention. I take disjunction to be an abstract summary of how the world works. Sider seems sympathetic. |
15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
Full Idea: Despite its brilliant success in mathematics and fundamental science, classical logic applies uneasily to natural language. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 10.6) | |
A reaction: He gives examples of the conditional, and debates over the meaning of 'and', 'or' and 'not', and also names and quantifiers. Many modern philosophical problems result from this conflict. |
15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
Full Idea: The simplest modal account is that logical consequence is just necessary consequence; another modal account says that logical consequences are modal consequences that involve only logical words essentially. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Quine's 'Carnap and Logical Truth' for the second idea] Sider is asserting that Humeans like him dislike modality, and hence need a nonmodal account of logical consequence. |
15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
Full Idea: Some say that logical constants are those expressions that are defined by their proof-theoretic roles, others that they are the expressions whose semantic values are permutation-invariant, and still others that they are the topic-neutral expressions. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 10.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites MacFarlane 2005 as giving a survey of this] |
15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
Full Idea: 'Tonk' is stipulated by Prior to stand for a meaning that obeys the elimination and introduction rules; but there simply is no such meaning; 'tonk' cannot be interpreted so as to obey the rules. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5) | |
A reaction: 'Tonk' thus seems to present a problem for so-called 'natural' deduction, if the natural deduction consists of nothing more than obey elimination and introduction rules. |
2197 | Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application [Hume] |
Full Idea: Abstract reasonings are employed, either to assist experience in the discovery of natural laws, or to determine their influence in particular instances, where it depends upon any precise degree of distance or quantity. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.I.27) |
7700 | We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles [Hume] |
Full Idea: Let any man try to conceive a triangle in general, which is neither Isoceles nor Scalenum, nor has any particular length or proportion of sides; and he will perceive the absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and general ideas. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XII.II.122) | |
A reaction: I think there is a basic error in this. I admit that I can only imagine a particular triangle, but it doesn't follow that I am thinking about one triangle. Ontology/epistemology confusion. I picture a shape while believing the shape to be irrelevant. |
15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
Full Idea: Supervenience is just a kind of modal connection. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.10) | |
A reaction: It says what would happen, as well as what does. This is big for Sider because he rejects modality as a feature of actuality. I think the world is crammed full of modal facts, so supervenience should be a handy tool for me. |
15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
Full Idea: The locus of fundamentality for a Finean is the whole proposition, whereas for me it is the proposition-part. Fundamentality is holistic for the Finean, atomistic for me. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.3) | |
A reaction: This is because Kit Fine has pushed fundamentality into a relation (grounding), rather than into the particular entities involved (if I understand Sider's reading of him aright). My first intuition is to side with Sider. I'm on Sider's side... |
15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
Full Idea: The existence of tables and chairs is just as fundamental as the existence of electrons (in contrast, perhaps, with smirks and shadows, which do not exist fundamentally). However, tables and chairs have nonfundamental natures. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.7) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a good clarification, and to me the 'nature' of something points towards its essence. However, I suppose he refers here to the place of something in a dependence hierarchy. But then, why does it have that place? What power? |
15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
Full Idea: Stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism, whereas things do not. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.6.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Markosian 2004] |
15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
Full Idea: The truthmaker theorist's 'concrete' states of affairs must be distinguished from necessarily existing 'abstract' states of affairs. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.4) | |
A reaction: [He cites Plantinga's 'Nature of Necessity' for the second one; I presume the first one is Armstrong] |
14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
Full Idea: We can add to the Quinean advice to believe the ontology of your best theory that you should also regard the ideology of your best theory as carving at the joints. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.3) | |
A reaction: I've never liked the original Quinean formulation, but this is much better. I just take my ontological commitments to reside in me, not in whatever theory I am currently employing. I may be dubious about my own theory. |
14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
Full Idea: Chisholm and Kim proposed a modal notion of an 'intrinsic' property - that a property is intrinsic if and only if it is possibly instantiated by an object that is alone in the world. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 01.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Chisholm 1976:127 and Kim 1982:59-60] Sider then gives a counterexample from David Lewis (Idea 14979). |
14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
Full Idea: For Armstrong a predicate is sparse when there exists a corresponding universal; for Lewis, a predicate is sparse when there exists a corresponding natural property or relation. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06) | |
A reaction: I like 'sparse' properties, but have no sympathy with Armstrong, and am cautious about Lewis. I like Shoemaker's account, which makes properties even sparser. 'Abundant' so-called properties are my pet hate. They are 'predicates'! |
13602 | We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume] |
Full Idea: We can have no idea of connexion or power at all, and these words are absolutely without any meaning. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], 7.2.58) | |
A reaction: I would say that this ignores a phenomenon of which Hume is well aware, which is the power of our own minds to generate thoughts and actions. Hume seems to be employing a verificationist theory of meaning |
15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
Full Idea: We should not regard nonmodal essence as being metaphysically basic: fundamental theories need essence no more than they need modality. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1) | |
A reaction: He is discussing Kit Fine, and notes that Fine offers a nonmodal view of essence, but still doesn't make it fundamental. I am a fan of essences, but making them fundamental in metaphysics seems unlikely. |
2216 | We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions [Hume] |
Full Idea: Where different effects have been found to follow from causes, which are to appearance exactly similar, all these various effects must occur to the mind in the same proportion in transferring the past to the future. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VI.47) |
2215 | There is no such thing as chance [Hume] |
Full Idea: There is no such thing as chance in the world. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VI.46) |
15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
Full Idea: English modals are context-dependent through and through; there is no stable 'outer modality'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.7) | |
A reaction: Sider has been doing so well up to here. To me this is swallowing the bait of linguistic approaches to philosophy which he has fought so hard to avoid. |
15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
Full Idea: The spirit of Humeanism is that necessity is not a realm to be discovered. We draw the lines around what is necessary. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.3) | |
A reaction: I disagree, but it is hard to argue the point. My intuitions are that the obvious necessities of logic and mathematics reflect the way nature has to be. The deepest necessities are patterns (about which God has no choice). |
15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
Full Idea: If □φ says that φ is true by convention, then □φ would apparently turn out to be contingent, since statements about what conventions we adopt are not themselves true by convention. The main axioms of S4 and S5 would be false. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1) |
15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
Full Idea: Conventionalism is apparently inapplicable to Kripke's and Putnam's examples of the necessary a posteriori (and, relatedly, to de re modality). | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1) | |
A reaction: [Sidelle 1989 discusses this] |
15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
Full Idea: Why are logical (or mathematical, or analytic...) truths necessary? The Humean's answer is that this is just how our concept of necessity works. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.11) | |
A reaction: This is why I (unlike Sider) am not a Humean. If we agreed that 'necessary' meant 'whatever is decreed by the Pope', that would so obviously not be necessary that we would have to start searching nature for true necessities. |
15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
Full Idea: At bottom, the world is an amodal place. Necessity and possibility do not carve at the joints; ultimate reality is not 'full of threats and promises' (Goodman). The book of the world says how things are, not how they must or might be. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12) | |
A reaction: Nice to see this expressed so clearly. I find it much easier to disagree with as a result. At first blush I would say that if you haven't noticed that the world is full of threats and promises, you should wake up and smell the coffee. Actuality is active. |
2209 | Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination [Hume] |
Full Idea: Belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], V.II.40) |
2207 | Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions [Hume] |
Full Idea: What is the difference between fiction and belief? It can't be a peculiar idea annexed to a conception which commands our assent, and is wanting to fiction, for then the mind could voluntarily annex this idea to any fiction, and believe what it pleases. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], V.II.39) |
2208 | Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects [Hume] |
Full Idea: When an object is present to memory or senses, custom carries the imagination to that object which is usually conjoined with it. This carries a feeling different from the loose reveries of fantasy, and in this consists the whole nature of belief. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], V.II.39) |
2213 | Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation [Hume] |
Full Idea: Belief, where it reaches beyond the memory or senses, arises from resemblance, contiguity or causation, with the same transition of thought and vivacity of conception. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], V.II.44) |
3661 | 'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
Full Idea: Hume has a doctrine of "natural belief", about the sorts of things we can't help believing, in 'common' or everyday life, irrespective of our philosophical conclusions. | |
From: report of David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748]) by Galen Strawson - The Secret Connexion App C |
2191 | Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world [Hume] |
Full Idea: Relations of Ideas are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.I.20) |
2239 | If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension [Hume] |
Full Idea: It is agreed that all sensible qualities of objects, such as hard or hot, are secondary, and exist in the mind and not in objects; but then this also follows for the primary qualities of extension and solidity. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XII.I.122) | |
A reaction: he mentions Berkeley |
2237 | It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects [Hume] |
Full Idea: Men instinctively suppose the very images presented by the senses to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion that the one is nothing but representations of the other. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XII.I.117) |
2192 | All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses [Hume] |
Full Idea: All reasonings concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond of our memory and senses. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.I.22) |
23631 | Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species [Reid on Hume] |
Full Idea: When Hume divides all perceptions into two classes or species, distinguished by their degrees of force and vivacity, this is loose and unphilosophical. To differ in species is one thing, to differ in degree is another. | |
From: comment on David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], II.12) by Thomas Reid - Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary 1 | |
A reaction: This is Hume's 'impressions' and 'ideas'. As usual with Reid, this is a very astute criticism. Reid is a direct realist, so his solution is to view ideas as weakened impressions. If impressions are strong ideas, you get idealism (which is bad!). |
2184 | All ideas are copies of impressions [Hume] |
Full Idea: All our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], II.13) |
2190 | All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact [Hume] |
Full Idea: All objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.I.20) |
2182 | Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones [Hume] |
Full Idea: 'Impressions' are our more lively perceptions, when we hear, see, feel, love, hate, desire or will. 'Ideas' are less lively perceptions, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], II.12) |
2246 | If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames [Hume] |
Full Idea: If we take in hand any volume of divinity or metaphysics, ask 'Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?' No. 'Or experimental reason on matters of fact and existence?' No. Commit it then to the flames. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XII.III.132) |
2189 | All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect [Hume] |
Full Idea: To me, there appear to be only three principles of connection between ideas, namely, Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], III.19) |
2194 | How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire? [Hume] |
Full Idea: Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water, that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.I.23) |
2183 | We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences [Hume] |
Full Idea: The creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting or diminishing the materials afforded us by the sense or experience. For example, a golden mountain or a virtuous horse come from joining ideas. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], II.13) | |
A reaction: The example of the Golden Mountain comes from Aguinas Quodlibeta 8.2.1. The original idea is in Sextus Empiricus. |
2186 | We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced [Hume] |
Full Idea: A blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. ….A Laplander or Negro has no notion of the relish of wine. ….A man of mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revenge or cruelty. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], II.15) |
2205 | You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience [Hume] |
Full Idea: An unexperienced reasoner could be no reasoner at all, were he absolutely unexperienced. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], V.I.36 n.1) |
2217 | When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise [Hume] |
Full Idea: When we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas and still find some ambiguity and obscurity, how can we render them altogether precise and determinate? Produce the impressions or original sentiments from which the ideas were copied. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VII.I.49) |
2702 | Only madmen dispute the authority of experience [Hume] |
Full Idea: None but a fool or a madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.II.31) |
3902 | Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions' [Scruton on Hume] |
Full Idea: The greatest weakness in Hume's philosophy is his use of the term 'impression' to refer to both sensations and perceptions. | |
From: comment on David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748]) by Roger Scruton - Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey 24 |
23421 | If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in [Hume] |
Full Idea: Suppose a person to be perfectly acquainted with all colours, except one particular shade of blue. It must be possible for him to raise up from his own imagination the idea of that particular shade, though never conveyed to him by the senses. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], II.16) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He dismisses this as 'so singular it is scarcely worth observing', but it is crucial. It isn't 'singular'. We do it all the time, by extrapolating from experiences and interpolating between them. Thus we extend knowledge beyond experience. |
2206 | Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume] |
Full Idea: If I ask why you believe some fact, you must tell me a reason, which will be some other fact, connected with it. But this process must terminate in a fact which is present to your memory or senses; or you must allow that the belief is without foundation. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], V.I.37) | |
A reaction: A classic quotation of empirical foundationalism. The rival view would be that the process does not terminate at all, but nevertheless builds up a persuasive picture which is foundational. |
2235 | There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume] |
Full Idea: There is no original supreme principle that is self-evident and convincing; nor, if there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by those very faculties of which sceptics are supposed to be already diffident. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XII.I.116) | |
A reaction: This I take to be the chief exponent of empirical foundationalism attacking rational foundationalism. The problem of 'advancing beyond' basic beliefs is also a problem for Hume's position. |
10328 | We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection [Hume] |
Full Idea: The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connexion, which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], X.i.89) | |
A reaction: Well he would say that, wouldn't he? If there is no connection in testimony, presumably there can be no a priori connection with private experience, but there is a danger of never getting started, and ending in anti-realism. |
2230 | Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement [Hume, by PG] |
Full Idea: Reliable testimony needs a good number of educated people, all of undoubted integrity, who have a lot to lose if they are caught lying, reporting very public events. | |
From: report of David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], X.II.92) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: A nice checklist for flying saucer sightings etc: education, integrity, lying risky, very public. If any of those fail, it comes down to likelihood (apply Bayes?) and character assessment. |
2238 | Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects [Hume] |
Full Idea: Reason can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove that perceptions are connected with any external objects. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XII.I.121) |
2242 | Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty [Hume] |
Full Idea: A mitigated scepticism … can make dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding, and inspire them with more modesty and reserve. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XII.III.129) |
2243 | Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding [Hume] |
Full Idea: Mitigated scepticism is an advantage to mankind, as it limits our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XII.III.130) |
2236 | Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason [Hume] |
Full Idea: Trite sceptical examples, such as the oar bent in water, or double images when the eye is pressed, are only sufficient to prove that senses alone are not dependable, but we must correct their evidence with reason. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XII.I.117) |
2241 | The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it [Hume] |
Full Idea: The chief and most confounding objection to excessive scepticism is that no durable good can ever result from it. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XII.II.128) |
2240 | It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument [Hume] |
Full Idea: It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the sceptics to destroy reason by argument and ratiocination; yet is this the grand scope of all their enquiries and disputes. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XII.II.124) |
14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
Full Idea: 'Theories' based on bizarre, non-joint-carving classifications are unexplanatory even when true. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.1) | |
A reaction: This nicely pinpoints why I take explanation to be central to whole metaphysical enterprise. |
14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
Full Idea: If the entire theory of this book were replaced by its Ramsey sentence, omitting all mention of fundamentality, something would seem to be lost. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.2 n2) | |
A reaction: It is a moot point whether Ramsey sentences actually eliminate anything from the ontology, but trying to wriggle out of ontological commitment looks a rather sad route to follow. |
2198 | We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread [Hume] |
Full Idea: We always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those which we have experienced, will follow from them. …Thus, we expect bread to nourish us, from previous experience. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.II.29) |
2199 | Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places [Hume] |
Full Idea: The main question on which I would insist is why reliable past experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for ought we know, may be only in appearance similar. …No reasoning can show this. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.II.30) |
2201 | Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this [Hume] |
Full Idea: It is impossible that any arguments from experience can prove the resemblance of the past to the future, since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of this resemblance. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.II.32) |
2202 | Fools, children and animals all learn from experience [Hume] |
Full Idea: It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants - nay infants, nay even brute beasts - improve by experience. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.II.33) |
2204 | All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning [Hume] |
Full Idea: All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], V.I.36) |
2203 | If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one [Hume] |
Full Idea: If after the constant conjunction of two objects (e.g. heat and flame) we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other,this explains why we can draw an inference from a thousand objects which we couldn't draw from one. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], V.I.36) | |
A reaction: This is Hume's best statement of the problem of the difficulty of demonstration the logic of induction. |
6350 | Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz on Hume] |
Full Idea: Contrary to what Hume supposed, it must be possible for the premises of an argument to support a conclusion without logically entailing it. | |
From: comment on David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748]) by J Pollock / J Cruz - Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) §1.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to me an extremely important point, made with nice clarity. It is why people who are good at logic are not necessarily good at philosophy. The latter is about thinking rationally, not following the laws of deduction. |
3598 | Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M on Hume] |
Full Idea: All that Hume has really shown with his argument is that induction is not deduction. | |
From: comment on David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.II.29) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.18 |
14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
Full Idea: The applicability of 'grue' to each of a pair of particulars does not guarantee the similarity of those particulars. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.2) | |
A reaction: Grue is not a colour but a behaviour. If two things are 'mercurial' or 'erratic', will that ensure a similarity at any given moment? |
14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
Full Idea: 'Is nonblack', 'is a nonraven', and 'grue' fail to carve at the joints. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.3) | |
A reaction: A lot more than this needs to said, but this remark encapsulates why I find most of these paradoxes of induction uninteresting. They are all the creations of logicians, rather than of scientists. |
14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
Full Idea: In the Bayesian approach, bizarre prior probability distributions will result in bizarre responses to evidence. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.3) | |
A reaction: This is exactly what you find when people with weird beliefs encounter ridiculous evidence for things. It doesn't invalidate the formula, but just says rubbish in rubbish out. |
15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
Full Idea: Explanations must cite generalisations. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 07.13) | |
A reaction: I'm uneasy about this. Presumably some events have a unique explanation - a unique mechanism, perhaps. Language is inescapably general in its nature - which I take to be Aristotle's reason for agreeing the Sider. [Sider adds mechanisms on p.159] |
15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
Full Idea: Ultimate explanations always terminate in the citation of entities; but since a mere list of entities is so unstructured, these 'explanations' cannot be systematized with detailed general laws, patterns, or mechanisms. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.5) | |
A reaction: We just need to distinguish between ultimate ontology and ultimate explanations. I think explanations peter out at the point where we descend below the mechanisms. Patterns or laws don't explain on their own. Causal mechanisms are the thing. |
15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
Full Idea: One day the physicists will complete the catalogue of ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the like of spin, charm and charge will perhaps appear on the list. But aboutness sure won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 4 Intro) | |
A reaction: Fodor's project is to give a reductive, and perhaps eliminative, account of intentionality of mind, while leaving open what one might do with the phenomenological aspects. Personally I don't think they will appear on the list either. |
17712 | General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular [Hume] |
Full Idea: All general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], I.VII.17), quoted by Edwin D. Mares - A Priori 08.2 | |
A reaction: This is close to Berkeley's idea that we can only grasp particulars. Personally I think the idea of (psychological) abstraction is unavoidable. Irrelevant features of particulars need to ignored. |
2210 | A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance [Hume] |
Full Idea: Upon the appearance of the picture of an absent friend, our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the resemblance. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], V.II.41) |
8544 | Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
Full Idea: Hume regarded the notion of resemblance as unproblematic, ..but any two objects share infinitely many Cambridge (whimsical relational) properties, and resemble in infinite ways. He needs real resemblance, which needs degrees of resemblance. | |
From: comment on David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], V.II.41) by Sydney Shoemaker - Causality and Properties §2 | |
A reaction: [compressed] See Idea 191. We forgive Hume, because he is a pioneer, but this is obviously right. Draw a line between 'real' resemblances and rest will be tricky, and bad news for regularity accounts of laws and causation. |
2211 | When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly [Hume] |
Full Idea: When I am a few miles from home, whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distance. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], V.II.42) |
2214 | Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning [Hume] |
Full Idea: Our inference of like effects from like causes is so essential to the subsistence of human creatures that it is unlikely to be trusted to the fallacious deductions of reasoning, which are slow, develop late, and are liable to error. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], V.II.45) |
2212 | An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him [Hume] |
Full Idea: One of the best reliques which a devotee could procure would be the handiwork of a saint, because they were once at his disposal, and were moved and affected by him. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], V.II.43) |
2222 | The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions [Hume] |
Full Idea: The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for from a false sensation or seeming experience which we have, or may have, of liberty or indifference, in many of our actions. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VIII.I.72) |
2223 | Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains [Hume] |
Full Idea: By liberty we can only mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will, …which is universally allowed to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VIII.I.73) |
3655 | Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted on Hume] |
Full Idea: Hume's account of the causal relation makes determinism less rigid because there is no longer a logical necessity in the succession of events. | |
From: comment on David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VIII.II.75) by Jennifer Trusted - Free Will and Responsibility Ch.4 |
14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
Full Idea: It is absurd to say that 'before we introduced our conventions, not all green things were green'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5) | |
A reaction: Well… Different cultures label the colours of the rainbow differently, and many of them omit orange. I suspect the blue/green borderline has shifted. |
14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
Full Idea: To suggest that analytic truths make statements about linguistic conventions is a nonstarter; statements about linguistic conventions are contingent, whereas the statements made by typical analytic sentences are necessary. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5) | |
A reaction: That 'anything yellow is extended' is not just a convention should be fairly obvious, and it is obviously necessary. But we can say that bachelors are necessarily unmarried men - given the current convention. |
15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
Full Idea: Nothing can fully play the role traditionally associated with analyticity, for much of that traditional role presupposed the doctrine of truth by convention. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.8) | |
A reaction: Sider rejects Quine's attack on analyticity, but accepts his critique of truth by convention. |
2220 | Only experience teaches us about our wills [Hume] |
Full Idea: We learn the influence of our will from experience alone. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VII.I.52) | |
A reaction: I can, of course, produce inductive generalisations about what my will can achieve, based on some limited experiences. "I know I can master that". Hobbes (and others) say we have no experience of a 'will'. Hume should be more sceptical! |
2224 | Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition [Hume] |
Full Idea: Where actions proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good, nor his infamy, if evil. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VIII.I.76) |
2225 | If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime [Hume] |
Full Idea: According to the principle which denies necessity, and consequently causes, a man is pure and unattainted after having committed the most horrid of crimes, since his actions are not derived from his character. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VIII.I.76) | |
A reaction: The idea that responsibility involves actions which are 'derived from his character' strikes me as good. Once you give up free will, it is almost the only sensible way to go. |
2226 | Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind [Hume] |
Full Idea: Repentance and reformation can wipe off every crime, but that is because criminal acts prove criminal principles in the mind, so alteration of these principles removes that proof, and the acts cease to be criminal. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VIII.I.76) | |
A reaction: A bit overstated, because a heinous crime will always taint our impression of someone's character. The person may cease to be criminal, but surely not the original acts? |
2233 | No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy [Hume] |
Full Idea: A state ought to tolerate every principle of philosophy, nor is there any instance that a government has suffered in its political interests by such indulgence. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XI.114) |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
2195 | We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes [Hume] |
Full Idea: The ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.I.26) |
4772 | If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved [Hume] |
Full Idea: Only when two species of objects are constantly conjoined can we infer one from the other; were an entirely singular effect presented, which could not be comprehended under a species, I do not see that we could form any conjecture concerning its cause. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XI.115) | |
A reaction: A key issue in causation. Note that Hume is willing to discuss causation in a freakishly unique happening, but only if he can spot a 'type' in the each of the events. I don't like it, but the man has a good point… |
2245 | A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect [Hume] |
Full Idea: If we just reason a priori, anything may appear able to produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know, extinguish the sun. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XII.III.132) |
8341 | Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
Full Idea: At no point (in Sect VII of 'Enquiries') does Hume even hint at the thesis that there is (or even might be) no such thing as causation. | |
From: report of David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VII) by Galen Strawson - The Secret Connexion 21.3 | |
A reaction: If, as some people think, Hume is a phenomenalist, then we wouldn't expect him to actually deny the existence of such things. The standard position (cf. Ayer on religion) is that such things are not even worth mentioning. |
8344 | At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Hume, by Davidson] |
Full Idea: In the Enquiries Hume clearly suggests that causes and effects are entities that can be named or described by singular terms; probably events, since one can follow another; but in the Treatise it seems to be the quality or circumstance which is the cause. | |
From: report of David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748]) by Donald Davidson - Causal Relations §1 | |
A reaction: A quality would have to have an associated power if it was going to trigger an effect. But then so would an event (unless inertia carried across?). Qualities are more distinct. Events can last for years. |
2193 | No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions [Hume] |
Full Idea: Without exception, knowledge of cause and effect is not attained by reasonings a priori, but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.I.23) |
4771 | In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events [Psillos on Hume] |
Full Idea: What needs to be stressed is that in both of Hume's definitions of cause, an individual sequence of events is deemed causal only because something extrinsic to the sequence occurs (be it conjunctions, or a mental link). | |
From: comment on David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VII.II.60) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §1.9 | |
A reaction: Simple but important. Hume's basic claim is that there is no 'causation' in events, apart from the events themselves. Hence no necessity, on top of the apparent contingency. |
5194 | Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws [Ayer on Hume] |
Full Idea: Hume's second definition of cause (one object always 'conveys the thought' of another) implies that it is inconceivable that there should be causal laws which have never yet been thought of, and this is not so. | |
From: comment on David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VII.II.60) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This appears to be a good criticism of Hume, but also a bit of a problem for a strong empiricist like Ayer. There may also be causal laws which we cannot discover, but logical positivism will not allow me to speculate about that. |
2221 | A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience [Hume] |
Full Idea: A cause is an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second, or, an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VII.II.60) |
2234 | It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other [Hume] |
Full Idea: It is only when two species of object are found to be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XI.115) | |
A reaction: what is a species? |
3662 | Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
Full Idea: Hume's regularity theory of causation is only a theory about causation so far as we can know about it or contentfully conceive of it in the objects, not about causation as it is in the objects. | |
From: report of David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.I) by Galen Strawson - The Secret Connexion App C |
8422 | Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed [Hume] |
Full Idea: We may define a cause to be where .....if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], 7.2.60) | |
A reaction: This is Hume's second definition, cited by Lewis as the ancestor of his counterfactual theory. It feels all wrong to me. 'If there had been no window, there would have been no window-breakage'? |
2218 | In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities [Hume] |
Full Idea: When we look towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able to discover any power or necessary connexion, any quality which binds the effect to the cause. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VII.I.50) |
15249 | Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden on Hume] |
Full Idea: Hume's contemporary critics are correct. He never really shows how it is possible for a habit, however strong it may be, to generate the concept of necessity. | |
From: comment on David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748]) by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 3.II | |
A reaction: This is a powerful objection which hadn't occurred to me. Presumably eighteenth century critics are referred to? I suppose if a necessity is what 'cannot be otherwise', a very deeply ingrained habit might seem that way - but in me, not in the world. |
8339 | Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
Full Idea: Hume's Regularity theory of causation is about causation as we know about it or contentfully conceive of it in the objects. As far as causation as it is in the objects is concerned, Hume firmly believed in some sort of natural necessity or causal power. | |
From: report of David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748]) by Galen Strawson - The Secret Connexion App C | |
A reaction: Strawson's controversial reinterpretation of Hume. We are confusing his epistemology with his ontology. Hume is simply being sceptical about our ability to bridge the gap to achieve understanding of natural necessity. A very different view of Hume. |
14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
Full Idea: That spacetime is 4D Lorentzian manifold, that the universe began with a singularity, and in a state of low entropy, are all central to physics, but it is a stretch to call them 'laws'. ...It has been argued that there are no laws of biology. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.1) |
14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
Full Idea: Adding the notion of law to physical theory doesn't seem to enhance its explanatory power. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.4) | |
A reaction: I agree with his scepticism about laws, although Sider offers it as part of his scepticism about modal facts being included in explanations of actuality. Personally I like dispositions, but not laws. See the ideas of Stephen Mumford. |
14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
Full Idea: In metaphysics, space is intrinsically structured; the genuine betweenness and congruence relations are privileged in a way that Euclidean-betweenness and Euclidean-congruence are not. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.4) | |
A reaction: I note that Einstein requires space to be 'curved', which implies that it is a substance with properties. |
15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
Full Idea: The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.1) |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
Full Idea: The spotlight theorist accepts the block universe, but also something in addition: a joint-carving monadic property of presentness, which is possessed by just one moment of time, and which 'moves', to be possessed by later and later times. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.9) | |
A reaction: This seems better than the merely detached eternalist view, which seems to ignore the key phenomenon. I just can't comprehend any theory which makes the future as real as the past. |
2244 | It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist [Hume] |
Full Idea: Whatever 'is' may 'not be'. No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The non-existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XII.III.132) |
2232 | You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect [Hume] |
Full Idea: If we infer a cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other. …a body of ten ounces raised in a scale proves the counterbalance exceeds ten ounces, but not that it exceeds a hundred. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XI.105) |
2228 | All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle' [Hume] |
Full Idea: There must be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], X.I.90) |
2229 | To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event [Hume] |
Full Idea: No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], X.I.91) |
2227 | A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored [Hume] |
Full Idea: A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature, and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle is as entire as any argument from experience can possible be imagined. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], X.I.90) |
2185 | The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds [Hume] |
Full Idea: The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise and good being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. | |
From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], II.14) |